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Abstract 
This master thesis aims at examining the binary distinction between licit and 
illicit global production networks of controlled substances. It is hypothesized 
that licit trade of controlled substances is subject to regulation which prevents 
diversion from occurring. Most studies focus on illegal trafficking, but rarely 
on licit trade. When they do, their scope is restricted to a location and one 
controlled   substance,   either   plant-based   or   synthetic.   No    studies have 
conducted this from the perspective of global production networks on opiates, 
the base for many pharmaceutical medicines. I argue that there are junctions 
in which illicit practices penetrate the licit trade, which are located in what I 
refer as critical nodes. My results show that these critical nodes are part of the 
global production network, from the cultivation of poppy fields to the 
consumption of an opiate-based medicine. At a time of questioning supply-
chains, the opioid crisis and international drug control regime dissensus, this 
study aims to address the gap in the existing literature. It does so by analyzing 
one controlled substance, with eclectic theorizing evaluating international 
regulation and the possibility of compliance in practice. This study follows a 
qualitative and inductive methodology completed by additional quantitative 
data. My findings show that there are critical nodes and for most, they are 
structural and dependent on their cultural and geographical roots. The efforts 
made by key actors in critical nodes are considered sufficient both 
internationally and domestically speaking. Three reasons for this attitude are 
outlined: 1) that enough is already being done, 2) that in agenda-setting other 
matters are prioritized, such as the issue of counterfeit medicines – a battle of 
ideologies and values, i.e., access and availability of medicines – and 3) that 
more regulations would be difficult to set and implement in the context of a 
free- trade globalized market. 
Keywords: licit, illicit, controlled substances, international 
regulation, international drug control regime, UNODC, critical nodes, global 
production networks, opium, opioids, practices, diversion, medicines 
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Résumé 
Ce travail de master vise à examiner la distinction binaire entre la production 
et marchandisation licite et illicite de substances contrôlées. L'hypothèse est 
que le commerce licite de substances contrôlées est soumis à une 
réglementation qui empêche le détournement. Un nombre important d’études 
portent sur le trafic illicite, mais plus rarement sur le commerce licite. 
Lorsqu'elles le font, leur portée est limitée à un pays et/ou à une substance 
contrôlée, qu'elle soit d'origine végétale ou synthétique. Aucune étude n'a 
analysé la question du point de vue des réseaux mondiaux de production 
d'opiacés, qui sont à la base de nombreux médicaments pharmaceutiques. Je 
soutiens qu'il existe des points de jonction où les pratiques illicites pénètrent 
le commerce licite, que je situe dans ce que j'appelle des nœuds critiques. Mes 
résultats montrent que ces nœuds critiques font partie des réseaux globaux de 
production, et ce, depuis la culture des champs de pavot à la consommation 
d'un médicament à base d'opiacés. À l'heure où l'on s'interroge sur les chaînes 
d'approvisionnement, où la crise des opioïdes cause de nombreux dégâts, ainsi 
que les revendications qu’ont lieues sur le régime international de contrôle des 
drogues, on peut considérer que cette étude est actuelle et comble les lacunes 
de la littérature existante. Cette étude le fait en entreprenant une étude de cas 
sur une substance contrôlée, tout en maniant diverses théories, évaluant ainsi 
la réglementation internationale   et   la   possibilité   de   s'y conformer dans 
la pratique. La méthodologie appliquée est qualitative et inductive avec 
l’utilisation de données quantitatives. Mes conclusions montrent qu'il existe 
des nœuds critiques et que, pour la plupart, ils sont structurels et dépendent de 
leurs racines culturelles et géographiques. Les efforts déployés par les acteurs 
clés dans les nœuds critiques sont considérés comme suffisants tant au niveau 
international qu'au niveau national. Entre autre, trois raisons peuvent expliquer 
cette attitude : 1) que l'on en fait déjà assez, 2) que l'on accorde la priorité à 
d'autres questions lors de la définition à l'agenda - notamment la question des 
médicaments contrefaits, ayant comme socle une bataille d'idéologies et de 
valeurs profondes, comme les valeurs sociales et morales de la mise en avant 
des médicaments, l'accès et la disponibilité des médicaments, et finalement 3) 
qu'il serait difficile d'établir et de mettre en œuvre davantage de 
réglementations dans le contexte d'un marché mondialisé de libre-échange. 
Mots-clefs: licite, illicite, substances contrôlées, régulation 
internationale, régime de contrôle international des drogues, UNODC, nœuds 
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At a time of many claims and demands targeted at the current 
international drug control apparatus, with the evolving relationship 
to drugs (e.g., the use of micro dosing of psilocybin in the Silicon 
Valley or its use with LSD in PTSD treatment in medical research), 
and during an opioid crisis in the so-called Global North, it seemed 
particularly timely to study the supply chain of substances. 
Moreover, in the era of a global pandemic, these questions 
were especially relevant, with the minimum stock of essential goods 
and the dependence of states on globalized trade, for example. With 
current dysfunctions between states, as shown in the recent relations 
between China and the U.S., debates on the supply of raw material 
raising issues on national sovereignty of goods considered essential 
is striking. 
The interest here is not to discuss all kinds of substances, but 
rather focus on controlled ones. This implies control by a legal 
framework under UN conventions and implemented with variations, 
at the national levels of all signatory parties. Such substances are 
interesting as they bear a double status. They are crucial in health 
care as medicines but have another life in illicit use in the black 
market. Drugs bear this essential ambivalence, they are a remedy in 
small doses and suitable therapeutic application, but also a poison if 
the dose is not appropriate and used non-medically. 
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Introduction 
It is in these terms that I wished to examine the seemingly 
binary distinct markets – licit and illicit – and question whether there 
are any junctions in the licit industry that feeds the illicit market. 
These categories are the result of a social construct, and when 
looking at the international drug control regime, official reports and 
its main players, it seems that both markets exist and function 
differently and do not interact with each other. 
My key assumption was that even if controlled, the licit 
industry must have a proportion of diversion hidden in its structural 
globalized organization. In other words, the current licit industry of 
controlled substances has biases in compliance terms, and the aim 
was to highlight what the biases are, where they are found, and how 
they are managed and regulated at the international level. 
In order to do so, I had to narrow down my research object 
and focus on a case study. I therefore chose opiates as one controlled 
substance. The reason behind this choice can be explained by the 
historical ties to this plant-based substance and its blatant double use 
(when transformed, one obtains heroin), and its many derivatives 
used widely in the health sector. My main research question was 
therefore: what are the critical nodes in the global production 
network of opiates in which licit and illicit can become 
indistinguishable categories? In order to respond to this question, I 
chose to study how it functions today, with a socio-historical 
perspective. My objective was to understand its globalized 
organization, and with that in mind, using the global production 
network approach seemed adequate. Such a perspective allowed me 
to visualize the logic, relationships, and logistics of the businesses 
in accordance with international regulations and question their 
compliance throughout the networks. 
This study is novel in its approach and research design. 
Indeed, a vast body of literature exists on the illegal market and 
production; many studies have focused on its functioning, crop 
reduction or replacement programs, and on the UN international 
9 
control regime itself (concentrated in “illegal producers” such as 
Afghanistan or Mexico), but almost none have examined it through 
the lens of global trade and diversion of licit production. 
Diversion is a technical word to describe the rerouting of the 
licit commerce, from its production to its consumption. Instead of 
studying a particular country, as others have done (for example India 
or Tasmania), I wished to examine diversion through the globalized 
trade perspective. This means that I deconstructed how the industry 
works, from the poppy fields to the consumption of medicines, in 
order to identify critical nodes. By doing so, I addressed the existing 
gap in the literature by outlining the global production network of 
licit opiates, while questioning how the international regulations can  
co-exist and comply with this specific market. 
This research was inductive and investigative. It was 
inductive as I had to build theory from observation and analysis. It 
was investigative, as this industry is particularly complex and 
opaque, and therefore meaning I had to clarify the terms and enter 
the techno-expert sphere in order to study it. While exploring the 
research topic with a global production network perspective, I 
wanted to understand the role of the UNODC, the main UN 
organization whose mandate concerns drugs and crime, in the 
regulation of such critical nodes. 
My findings show that critical nodes are to be found 
throughout the global production network. They are various and 
diverse depending on the geographical position, cultures, histories, 
values, laws and implementation of international regulations and 
practices. These critical nodes are not organized by transnational 
organized crime; they rather behave simultaneously and can be 
organized albeit in a small scale. They are the expression of the 
multiple independent illicit practices which have become a social 
fact. I have outlined them in this research in a way that also breaks 
down how the industry functions. 
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Introduction 
Regarding the role of the UNODC, I have found that 
although from the outside it may seem they play an important role, 
this is not the case for various reasons. The UNODC focuses mostly 
on illegal issues: it is an organization that collaborates broadly with 
other agencies on transnational crime, produces reports and provides 
spaces for discussions, and holds the Commission on Narcotic Drugs 
(CND). The CND is particularly important as it is withing the 
sessions that the current status of regulated drugs in the scheduling   
system is evaluated and voted. 
Rather than the UNODC, the International Narcotics Control 
Board in Vienna (INCB) is the right organ to address my topic. Self- 
described as “independent, quasi-judicial expert body” (INCB, 
2020), they assist governments in the implementation of the Single 
Convention of 1961. They ensure the supply of drugs for medicine 
and scientific research, produce estimates and reports, assess the 
chemicals used in the illicit manufacture, analyze information 
provided by agencies and governments and make recommendations 
to governments in the management of the obligations of the treaties 
(mainly Single Convention of 1961 and Psychotropic Substances of 
1971). While I initially believed that more actions were undertaken 
in order to avoid diversion, my research findings provide results that 
what prevails is a risk assessment thinking. As I will demonstrate, 
depending on the ideological background and their agenda-setting, 
the matters to deal with are prioritized differently. For instance, in 
the case of medicines, the most important matter is availability and 
access to medicines (the existence of an essential medicine list by 
the WHO illustrates this point) while fighting counterfeit medicines 
implies many side-effects, deaths for patients, and loss of profit and 
reputational costs to pharmaceutical industries. 
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In order to examine my research questions, this master thesis 
will cover, in this order, the following parts: the first chapter will 
outline the conceptual framework with the literature review. The 
second chapter will present my questions, hypotheses, methodology 
applied. The third chapter is an evaluative description of the 
institutionalization of the international drug control regime from its 
beginnings until its current regime. The fourth chapter examines 
opioids as a broad category and the questions it raises. The fifth 
chapter explores the critical nodes in the global production 
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The research object 
My initial concern started while questioning how the 
international regulation of drugs could prevent illicit channels 
without blocking access to medicines used from the same substances. 
The double status of a number of drugs is indeed striking. On the one 
hand, they can be viewed as a commodity for the public good, 
providing access – and the right to - medical treatment. On the other 
hand, they are based on substances with psychotropic attributes that 
feed addiction and are likely to be diverted into illegal markets 
causing harm, with moral, societal, health, economic and security 
implications. This prompts me to ask how a controlled substance 
used in both medicine and illegal drug markets is regulated at the 
international level. 
Controlled substances – or controlled drugs – have been 
internationally regulated by treaties since the UN Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, its protocol amended in 1972, the UN 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances in 1971, and the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances in 1988. These conventions make up what 
14 
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I will refer to here as the International Drug Control Regime1 (Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, 2018; Global Commission on Drug 
Policy 2019; Chouvy 2012). Signatory Parties endorsed national 
laws either prior, concomitantly or after the institutionalization of 
such conventions. On the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)’s 
website, the agency defines controlled substances as “drugs or 
chemical whose manufacture, possession, or use are regulated.” As a 
common characteristic, controlled substances are both useful in the 
treatment of human disease, but also tend to be diverted, 
recreationally abused, illegally produced and/or smuggled. They 
represent a significant public health hazard in relation to underlying 
patient-safety issues and criminal behavior (Tribble, 2016). 
It is worth noting that, on a strictly semantic basis, the English 
word drug betrays the ambivalence outlined above.2 Such 
contradictions are inherent and contextual. The Greek roots of 
pharmacology come from pharmakon, which means “cure” as well 
as “poison” (Urboniene, 2009). Such opposites are frequent in Greek 
philosophy. Derrida, in exploring Plato’s Pharmacy, adds layers to 
this understanding (Derrida, 1972). According to him, pharmakon is 
interconnected with pharmakon as a remedy, pharmakeus as 
druggist/alchemist/magician, and in ancient Greece, pharmakos 
representing the sacrifice ritual, relating to the scapegoat – which is 
present in the Bible as well. Such background knowledge helps to 
retain a critical stance on the highly morally charged issues of drugs 
in international relations as well as in other social spheres. 
1United Nations Treaties on the International Drug Control, New York, 2013: 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/conventions.html accessed 
September 14th, 2020. 
2 In French, two separate words denote the ambivalence: médicament is understood as 
remedy, and legal. However, in the field of medicine it is widely accepted that it has the 
potential to be poisonous. The second word is drogue which connotes poison, as an abusive 
practice, and in illegality. A drogue can under no circumstances be a médicament. In 
French, therefore, there are two words for the two sides of the coin. In English, it is more 
nuanced as drug refers to kinds of medicines but can also connote illicit, in which case the 
words co-occur: illicit drug. However, for other kind of medication, medicine is preferred, 
and has a remedy connotation. 
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Drugs are polymorphic in nature, and this has always been 
the case given the contingent socio-historical context within which 
they have been institutionalized. This is where the licit and illicit 
come into play, with the distinction between the two arising first 
from a legal understanding. Licit means what is allowed by law, 
conforming to the requirements of the law, of an authority, or by 
usages.3 In contrast, illicit is defined as not permitted, unlawful, 
illegal, disapproved of by the normal rules of society, condemned by 
moral.4 However, what is lawful or unlawful at a given time is 
mutable and socially constructed. 
From a sociological perspective, Durkheim mentioned that: 
"punishment is meant to affect honest people, not criminals, and we 
do not condemn an act because it is criminal, but it is criminal 
because we condemn it”5 (in Normandeau, 1970). The issue of drugs 
is quite similar. Whereas a dichotomist view on what is legal, and 
illegal might be straightforward, when it comes to practice it is much 
more nuanced. As Durkheim’s quote expresses, what is lawful or 
unlawful today is the fruit of a social construct. As for other 
sociologists and anthropologists who worked on deviance (e.g., 
Becker or Goffman), this assumption comes as no surprise. The 
interest of sociologists is to understand the use of drugs. Following 
work on deviance, Enrich Goode suggests a typology of four main 
forms of drug use in the licit/illicit spectrum which  helps  in 
3 Definition of licit: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/licit: 
allowed by law ; https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/licit: 
allowed or legal. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/licit :conforming to the 
requirements of the law; not forbidden by law: permissible. Accessed September 15th, 
2020. https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/licite: [En parlant d'une chose] qui est permis par la 
loi, par une autorité, par les usages ; qu’aucune loi ne défend. Accessed September 15th, 
2020. 
4 Definition of illicit: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/illicit : not permitted; 
unlawful. 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/illicit : illegal or disapproved of by 
society. 
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/illicit : not allowed by the 
law; not approved of by the normal rules of society. https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/illicite 
En parlant d'un inanimé - Qui est condamné par la loi et/ou par la morale. Accessed 
September 15th, 2020. 
5 My translation. The original text is in French: « Le châtiment est destiné à agir sur les 
honnêtes gens, non sur les criminels, et nous ne réprouvons pas un acte parce qu'il est 
criminel, mais il est criminel parce que nous le réprouvons. » 
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nuancing the understanding of drugs.6 This is only one example of a 
typology, of many, that highlights that there is no such thing as black 
or white when studying a social object. Social science 
methodologies, such as ethnographies, surveys, interviews and most 
importantly, field work are used in this area. 
Laws exist to define boundaries, to work to protect and 
preserve rights; in democracies, they are proposed and voted by 
Parliaments, and sometimes endorsed by Governments or citizens. 
Regulations, however, are issued by independent or dependent 
agencies and tend to regulate activities, irrespective of rights. They 
are used to carry out or maintain specificities in the intent of the 
broader scope of a law. 
In positivist legal science, law is considered pragmatic and 
also descriptive in the sense that it is interested in human beings at a 
given time; and it is prescriptive, in the sense that it legislates in 
function of what can reasonably be expected from human beings.7 In 
other words, what is licit today, may not be licit tomorrow, and vice- 
versa. It is through social construction that a legal and/or a moral 
status is applied. In the case of international law, it has a specific 
purpose: 
“[it] provides normative guidelines 
as well as methods, mechanisms, and a 
common conceptual language to 
international actors […]. International law 
is an independent system of law existing 
outside the legal orders of particular states. 
It differs from domestic legal systems in a 
number of respects. For example, although 
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 
which consists of representatives of some 
6 He distinguishes between: “1) legal instrumental use: prescription and over-the-counter 
medicines to address physical and mental ailments ; 2) legal recreational use: consumption 
of alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine for their pleasurable effects ; 3) illegal instrumental use: 
using medicines without a prescription, such as anti-depressants and stimulants, to address 
pain or undertake tasks such as staying awake to cram for exams, and ; 4) illegal 
recreational use: drugs consumed for their pleasurable, euphoric, and intoxicating effects.” 
(Goode, 2012 in Freij & Germov, 2015). 
7 For the interested reader, see the article on the adequation of the Sein and Sollen in Law: 
Ladavac, N. B. (2019). Sein and Sollen, “Is” and “Ought” and the Problem of Normativity 
in Hans Kelsen. In: Ladavac N. B., Bezemek C., Schauer F. (eds) The Normative Force of 
the Factual. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 130. Springer, Cham. 
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190 countries has the outward appearance 
of a legislature, it has no power to issue 
binding laws. Rather, its resolutions serve 
[mostly] as recommendations […]. Also, 
there is no system of courts with 
comprehensive jurisdiction in international 
law. […] This value consists in the certainty, 
predictability, and sense of common purpose 
in international affairs that derives from the 
existence of a set of rules accepted by all 
international actors. International law also 
provides a framework and a set of 
procedures for international interaction, as 
well as a common set of concepts for 
understanding it.” (Shaw, 2019). 
Abbott and Snidal (2000) believe that international 
governance refers to soft law as compared to hard law as they are no 
legally binding obligations but remain powerful and effective 
norms.8 In this work I follow the latter, and the following Abbott, 
Keohane and Moravcsik’s understanding of legalization, i.e., “as 
a particular form of institutionalization characterized by 
three components: obligation, precision, and delegation.” 9 
What distinguishes international relations from a stricto 
sensu international law perspective is the subject of inquiry. From 
the perspective of an international relations student, this thesis 
considers the relationships between actors while studying the norms 
underlying them. A formal international law standpoint would only 
be interested in the norms that govern relationships between states, 
and their transactions. One might here refer to the difference 
8 Rather than using “global governance” without any distancing – I agree with Susan 
Strange’s “semantic euphemism” and believe that “intergovernmental bureaucracy’s 
decision-making power set by the most powerful government” express better the reality of 
international cooperation (Strange, 1990: xiv). 
9 “"Legalization" refers to a particular set of characteristics that institutions may (or may 
not) possess. These characteristics are defined along three dimensions: obligation, 
precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule 
or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are 
legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behaviour thereunder is 
subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and discourse of international law, 
and often of domestic law as well. Precision means that rules unambiguously define the 
conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe. Delegation means that third parties have been 
granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and 
(possibly) to make further rules.” (Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, 2000: 2). 
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between “realism and idealism, what actually is done and what ought 
to be done by states” (Keohane, 1997). Notwithstanding, 
international law has its importance in the context of national laws. 
Analyzing how they each interconnect is an important matter. 
Moreover, from a regime perspective (Krasner, 1983 in 
Keeley, 1990) the international drug control apparatus applies to 
Krasner’s regime definition – and this is why I speak of the 
international drug control regime: 
“implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' 
expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behavior defined in 
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions for action. Decision- 
making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective 
choice.” (Krasner, 1983:2). 
Nadelmann (1990) explores different types of “international 
prohibition regimes” and puts forward crucial elements to their 
founding, their raison d’être, and their survival motives. However, 
he also outlines similarities of various regimes (for example, human 
trafficking and drug substances) and explains why – as a realist 
would ask itself– in a state of anarchy, states would make 
international laws (Wendt; Friedheim, 1995) and continues with the 
question of a liberal institutionalist - why states would be better off. 
The common denominator attributed is often, in a globalized world 
in which complex interaction and interdependence among states 
should bring more cooperation between states (Keohane; Nye, 
1973).10
While such approaches believe in a certain rational choice, 
there is an element of social constructivism, and some limited 
10 I will not define “globalization” in this work as I agree with Susan Strange on this 
question that it is a “term which can refer to anything from internet to a hamburger.” 
(Strange, 1996: xiii). 
19 
rationality that has to be admitted when deciding upon treaties. This 
does not imply that they have full knowledge or understanding, 
rather, that they rationally decide to create an international 
prohibition regime. Indeed, states realize their own limitations in 
terms of the “inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement 
measures in the face of criminal activities that transcend national 
borders” (Nadelmann, 1990). Crucially, “in explaining why [only] 
certain criminal laws evolve in international prohibition regime is 
the role of moral proselytism”, Nadelmann, when referring to actors 
taking part in moral proselytism talks about “transnational moral 
entrepreneurs”11; a term that applies rightly in the case of opium. As 
we will see in the contextualization section below, transnational 
moral entrepreneurs of different sorts were decisive in the current 
drug control regime.12 In addition to the regime, the influence of 
transnational moral entrepreneurs, and events throughout history, I 
note the hegemony which the US held, and still hold to a certain 
degree, in the instauration and stability of the current system in the 
drug control apparatus. Although today there is profound criticism 
of this apparatus, it is still supported by conservative states (for 
instance in the Middle East or in Asian regions). 
11 As he mentions in his article p.482 in a footnote: “transnational moral entrepreneurs” is 
inspired by the work of Becker on deviance, “moral entrepreneurs”: “those who operate 
with an absolute ethic in seeking to create new rules to do away with the perceived great 
evil” (Becker, 1963: 148) ; and Huntington’s notion of “transnational organization”: 
relatively large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy... [that] performs 
a set of relatively limited, specialized, and in some sense, technical functions . . . across one 
or more international boundaries and, insofar as it is possible, in relative disregard of those 
boundaries” (Huntington, 1973: 333). 
12 Nadelmann (:482) describes transnational moral entrepreneurs as follows: “these groups 
mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad; 
they stimulate and assist in the creation of like-minded organizations in other countries; and 
they play a significant role in elevating their objective beyond its identification with the 
national interests of their government. Indeed, their efforts are often directed toward 
persuading foreign audiences, especially foreign elites, that a particular prohibition regime 
reflects a widely shared or even universal moral sense, rather than the peculiar moral code 
of one society. Although the activities that they condemn do not always transcend national 
borders, those which do go beyond borders provide the proselytizers with the transnational 
hook typically required to provoke and justify international intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states.” Although not necessarily organized as above, persona who came 
together through their ideals were essential in the drug control regime. One can think of 
Harry Anslinger and Hamilton Wright in the U.S. or Colonel Charles Ludovic Sharman in 
Canada, among others. 
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However, more countries and regions have adapted their 
approach, mostly in an effort towards depenalization. Such 
endeavors have been historically disapproved by fervent 
prohibitionist parties. Civil society has been at the front line of this 
battle, calling for research-based policies and socio-medical 
approaches, both of which would bring better security perspectives 
as a whole. Security here encompasses human, societal, and crime- 
and violence-related security. Many advocates, including parts of 
international consortiums, NGOs, and the health sector have 
championed - for many good reasons – a change of strategy. Public 
policy literature explores past, current and future regulations, 
assesses them and recommends variations on the public policies. 
Critical public policy on this topic has been opposed to 
the current prohibitionist regime in place. I will mention a few of the 
usual reasons stated. Firstly, policies are heavily supply- oriented 
even today - although huge progress has been made in that direction- 
and have focused on where the drug came from instead of the 
demand. Secondly, the current system, since its establishment, has 
been based upon principles of criminality and penalization, thus 
particularly demonizing drug users and drugs, and this was 
traditionally targeted to certain social and/or racial minorities, rather 
than on what the drug itself could cause (Speaker, 2001; Reinarman 
and Levine, 1997). 
Further, the system has not adequately addressed the many 
issues of interdependence such as those between illicit drug markets 
and consumption. This could create a “balloon effect” whereby 
squeezing the trade in one area would lead it to relocate (Ashton, 
2002 in Buxton, 2006: 101). Indeed, another important criticism is 
that there are not enough research-based and evidence-based 
policies; most are politically driven. Politics around the control 
regime was used to gain political advantages in governments in the 
1960s and 1970s, infused with the propaganda and fear statements 
of the “stepping-stone” theory: from marijuana to heroin (Buxton, 
2006: 61). While prisons are filled with mostly petty criminals, 
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usually low users and from low social status, even imprisonment has 
been questioned due to the high-level rates of recidivism. Not enough 
is done on the demand-side, and policies must adequately reflect 
multiple realities rather than bear ideologies. The policies in place 
are perceived as too unfair and inequitable, and even though the 
current control system has brought some good things, there is not 
enough cooperation between states, even though drugs and their 
misuse have been recognized as a transnational problem. 
In my research, I focus specifically on one substance and its 
derivative: opium. Within opium lays many active pharmaceutical 
ingredients that are used in many medicines, but also the source of 
many illicit uses. The existing extensive literature on opium has been 
explored through various lenses in multiple fields. I adopt a non- 
exhaustive perspective applied to both licit as well as illicit opium. 
It is studied by the medical field studies for its effects on the mind 
and body, its uses in treatments and also in harm reduction and 
dependence, mostly demand oriented. Pharmacologists and 
chemists, whose research constitute a specialized body of literature, 
focus on the potency of the substances, technologies for synthesizing 
them, drug manufacture and opium precursors. The pharmaceutical 
industry also produces literature, directed at drug creation, 
manufacture, control, prevention, and research and development. 
For this thesis, I have also reviewed literature from a logistics and 
economic perspective, on the global supply chain of medicines, and 
on plant-based medicine, which will be more fully addressed in the 
industry section. 
Opium interested many historians and geographers for its 
rich background rooted in history and histories, territories and 
cultural aspects but also its institutionalization. Development 
studies, whether with historians and geographers, or sociologists and 
economists, have focused on inequalities, poverty, north/south 
relations, access to medicine and counterfeit, but also nexuses with 
illegal activities, poverty and violence. They also question different 
aspects for instance in development projects put forward for crop 
22 
Chapter I. Theoretical framework and literature review 
reduction, they advocate that such projects are not well thought out, 
leaving too fundamental considerations aside (such as the gain 
benefit for a farmer to cultivating for illegal sources instead of legal 
ones) or changes in technologies used for cultivation and production 
(such as the traditional harvest of opium poppies versus the CPS 
method – which is more cost-effective and less prone to diversion), 
or even the exploitation of peripheries from centers in terms of the 
salary farmers receives compared to the price of medicines then sold. 
Development studies and post-colonial literature have pinpointed 
the so-called “traditional production countries” or illegal production 
such as the well-documented narco-state Afghanistan along with the 
Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos, Myanmar) and Golden Crescent 
(Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan), known for their illegal trafficking. 
Political science and international relations have largely 
examined opium through processes and negotiations of public 
policies, international regulation, the political economy of narcotics, 
the commodity of such substances in an economy, co-dependence 
with illicit activities, and through vast research on the illegality of 
opium. Indeed, illegality, trafficking, clandestine manufacture, 
transnational organized crime (TOC), have all been extensively 
studied by scholars, international organizations and law 
enforcement. 
The diverse aspects of opium are studied in different ways 
by the various actors. For instance, international organizations in 
general, civil society, and medical fields will study the right to 
access medicine, counterfeiting, and diversion practices. Other 
international organizations and political and economic sciences will 
question illegal trafficking, violence, crime, poverty, trade, 
corruption, as dependent variables of this substance.13 Their research 
13 I invite you to read the work on Cox (2002) the covert world. It provides interesting 
insights on illegal and legal markets. But as a matter of comparing the illegal market and 
the legal one, important nuances must be made. In a workshop attended in 2019, Daudelin 
and Jones (unpublished) presented their potential research article on this specific questions. 
Some points should be restated here: 1) The defining feature of illegal markets is either that 
what is traded on them is prohibited, or that legal goods are traded on such markets in 
violation of state regulations. 2) illegal markets exist at once because and in spite of state 
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and findings are mostly focused on supply rather than on demand. 
They are all usually region-based, use a methodology and theory or 
concepts, and have a normative trait, given the intensity of the moral 
aspect in this area. Finally, public opinion produces discourse and 
research as well, but mostly on the opioid crisis and the role of 
pharmaceutical industries. Another point I should make here is that 
there have been studies on the international drug control regime 
mandated to experts by governments. For example, the health 
department in the U.K. commissioned David Mansfield (2001) for 
reports on the current situation (with licit and illicit activities and 
countries), or the FOPH in Switzerland recently asked Groupement 
Romand d’Etudes des Addictions (GREA) on the current system of 
control, future scenarios with other adequate indicators.14 Though 
there has been extensive literature covering the many facets of the 
theme and topic, I did not find any research which aimed to respond 
to the same questions I ask myself here, nor with the theoretical 
approach I have come together that I would like to mobilize. So, let 
us explore the conceptual framework now. 
Conceptual approach 
When discussing licit and illicit activities, it is important to 
bear in mind the stance of specific literature from international 
political economy (IPE) sometimes coined as illicit international 
political economy (IIPE) (Andreas, 2004). Authors such as 
Nadelmann (1990), Friman and Andreas (1999), Williams (2003), 
and Strange (1996) and Naylor (2005) studied these aspects. As 
Andreas clarifies, IPE “is conventionally defined as the relationship 
between states and international markets, [whereas] IIPE can be 
action: without state regulation, those markets would be legal and would cease to exist as 
illegal markets, but with effective enforcement of state regulations, they would not exist 
either. 3) They exist and function at least to some extent in the cracks and nooks of state 
rules and their enforcement. Another point is, market wise, the price of a commodity good 
is typically determined as a function of its market as a whole whereas in case of illicit good 
it depends on the level of risk. This above can well be applied for the topic studied here. 
14https://www.grea.ch/sondage-sur-le-systeme-international-de-controle-des-drogues 
accessed October 17th, 2020. 
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defined as the relationship between states and illegal international 
markets. Through its monopoly on the power to criminalize certain 
economic sectors, the state defines the boundaries of illegal market 
activities.” (Andreas, 2004). This is particularly important as I aim 
to study the relationships between the international regulation of the 
international drug control regime (made by states) and the 
international market of opiates and examine the critical nodes of such 
international markets bounded with illegal market activities. Andreas 
notes that sometimes it is better to “engage in eclectic theorizing, 
combining insights from various theoretical traditions.”15 For the 
purpose of this work, this is exactly what I do. I have thus created my 
own conceptual framework to study the topic, as embracing only one 
perspective would seem to provide an unnecessarily narrow 
understanding of my research questions. 
In light of eclectic theorizing, inspiration from the Global 
Production Network studies seemed an interesting lens from which 
to begin.16 It is partially applied in my research and aims at reviewing 
15 Andreas (2004: 645): “The utility of multiple theoretical perspectives can be illustrated 
in the case of illegal drugs and anti-drug policies. For example, sharp variations in state 
responses to global drug trafficking (contrast, for example, the highly punitive US approach 
to the more public health approach of many west European states) cannot be explained 
without incorporating the role of culture (stressed by social constructivists). The creation 
and maintenance of a global drug prohibition regime cannot be explained without taking 
into account the backing of the most powerful states in the international system (stressed 
by realists), but also cannot be explained without recognizing the role of nonstate actors, 
including organized societal groups of ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ (stressed by both 
liberals and constructivists) (Nadelmann, 1990). The fact that some poor countries depend 
on illegal drug exports to generate foreign exchange and employment can be seen as part 
of the broader historical pattern of dependence on ‘boom and bust’ primary export 
commodities (stressed by Marxists and other radicals in the dependency theory tradition). 
Viewed from the economic perspective of comparative advantage (as stressed by neoliberal 
economics), such reliance on illegal drug crops can be interpreted as rational specialization 
based on a country’s competitiveness in a global market niche (thus, Afghan poppy growers 
and Bolivian coca farmers are, in a sense, taking the advice of western liberal economic 
advisors literally by growing high-demand export crops in which they have a competitive 
advantage and that offers them the highest international market returns).” 
16 I follow the distinction from Yeung and Coe (2015, 2019). Global Production Network 
(with capital letters) refers to the study in general, whereas global production network(s) 
refers to the empirical phenomenon. It seems important to briefly outline the roots of Global 
production network by explaining the Global Commodity Chain (GCC) and Global Value 
Chain (GVC). The GCC framework originates World-System Theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 
Arrighi and Drangel, 1986). A commodity chain was defined as: “a network of labour and 
production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 
1986) and was later paradigmatized in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz’s (1994) famous work: 
Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism. GCC aims to “examining forms of economic 
interactions and power relations between (mostly northern) ‘lead’ firms and their suppliers. 
[…] its objective is to understand and facilitate (mostly southern) supplier firm ‘upgrading’, 
which in turn is held to contribute to regional development. This ‘north–south’ element 
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international regulations in the context of the global network of 
actors involved in the production and regulation of controlled 
substances. 
Global production networks, in their empiricism, are 
“organizational platforms through which actors in different regional 
and national economies compete and cooperate for a greater share of 
value creation, transformation, and capture through geographically 
dispersed economic activity.” (Yeung; Coe, 2015). These 
specificities are structural variables. Such an approach is actor- 
oriented and focuses on organizational relationships. Adopting this 
perspective makes it possible to explain “how these globalization 
processes [in the context of outlining the manufacture and 
distribution of opioid alkaloids and analyzing diversion] are actually 
organized”. 
A global production network is defined by key authors in this 
area as: “an organizational arrangement comprising interconnected 
economic and noneconomic actors coordinated by a global lead firm 
and producing goods or services across multiple geographic 
locations for worldwide markets.” (Yeung; Coe, 2015). For the sake 
of this master thesis, the global production network of opium is 
considered to describe a global multiscalar network of licit and illicit 
economic and noneconomic actors, through licit and/or illicit 
practices, behaviors, sometimes coordinated, but from which actors 
are implicated in the specific industry. 
Given the globalized nature of the pharmaceutical industry, 
adopting such an approach allows one to visualize – without 
provides the framework with the potential for understanding processes of global uneven 
development. […] but GCC analysis is concerned above all with poor country firms’ ability 
to upgrade.” (Selwyn, 2015) GVC is somehow the developments of the GCC, while it bears 
today fundamental distinctions for each stand. Their commonalities are: “(1) how a global 
commodity/value chain is organized, and who the most powerful players are driving the 
chain (“lead firms”); (2) how the way the chain is governed (“governance structure”) affects 
the distribution of gains across chain participants, that is, countries, firms, and workers in 
developed and developing countries; and (3) what determines the movement of chain actors 
from low to high value-added activities (“upgrading”). In methodology, both approaches 
focus on a firm-level chain analysis with data gathered from fieldwork.” (Lee, 2010). It is 
worth noting that “there are some inevitable incursions into GVC conceptual terminology 
and territory given the overlaps between the fields and the shared sensibilities of some 
aspects of the GVC research agenda” (Coe and Yeung, 2019). 
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analyzing one specific country or global lead firm in-depth–the 
location within key parts of the supply-chain of key actors 
worldwide, from the production to the commercialization of a 
controlled plant-based drug. Therefore, as a first research question I 
will address the following: What are the critical nodes in the global 
production network in which the licit and illicit aspects of a 
substance can lose their distinguishable categories? This framing is 
constructed solely to outline critical moments in which controlled 
substances can be unmonitored and diverted. The thesis argues that 
diversion can happen – more frequently than seems to be admitted – 
at any stage of licit trade, and in particular for the case of this 
commodity: opiates. While arguing that diversion happens, which 
may be considered novel, I attempt to illustrate the supposition of 
specific junctions in which licit and illicit should not be binary 
categories but taken as a whole network. 
Although actors and practices definitely have their 
importance in diversion, there are also systemic structural 
justifications that can explain what is – or is not – done about those 
junctures. As outlined by Mansfield with regard to opiate raw 
material (also called narcotic raw material - NRM) from which the 
opiate alkaloids are extracted, “[A]s such, there would seem to be a 
growing conflict between the highly regulated and controlled nature 
of the market for the supply of opiate raw materials, and the 
increasingly laisser-faire model for their purchase on the 
international market” (Mansfield, 2001: 9). In an economic context 
giving prominence to laissez-faire and free trade, the regulation of 
commodities defined as controlled substances can easily become 
fraught with difficulties. 
These difficulties can arise from different grounds. As 
mentioned by Mansfield, one can explain a certain paradox of the 
phenomenon of enquiry. Controlled substances represent a 
willingness to regulate and monitor within a laissez-faire and free 
trade environment. In other words, there are discrepancies in the 
founding of such regulation systems. In addition, due to the success 
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of some kinds of framing over others – whether in particular ways, 
through paradigmatic battles, either at the time of implementation or 
over time – specific measures linked to certain ideologies are 
ultimately preferred. This is the case for the international drug control 
regime. Indeed, its institutionalization, as we will see in more detail in 
the contextualization section below, was initiated and proactively 
pursued by the United States, based upon prohibitionist ideals. 
Furthermore, the global division of labor, overtly present in 
all sectors, is another structural variable and a result of globalization 
to bear in mind. The global organization is multifactorial, but often 
arises from the industrial specialization of a country. This 
organization can be explained after having taken into account a cost- 
benefits analysis. Factually, as admitted generally, any rational 
human being would seek a Pareto optimal. Similarly, for any 
globalized commodity, each step usually involves different actors 
taking part in the manufacturing process and generally spread out 
throughout the world, until the end-product is considered finished 
(here, when consumed). In terms of logistics, such global 
management can also be the foundation of diversion practices and 
links of licit-illicit channels as particular regulations and laws justify 
certain practices (Rodrigue, 2020). 
One example of global organization of trade in the anti- 
money laundering processes as part of the Financial Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), could be for example the principle used mostly 
in finance service but also in my topic: “Know Your Customer” 
(KYC).17 This principle tries to articulate domestic and international 
business to make it more transparent and provide due diligence. 
Although principles or code of conduct are in place, it is important 
to remember that adopting a realist perspective in international trade 
makes sense, and what ultimately matters for states is in essence what 
17 Should you be interested in reading more about “KYC” see an article that explains it: 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/02/07/fincen-know-your-customer-requirements/ 
accessed October 20th, 2020. 
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happens on their national soil, and the guarantees they can provide 
on the land for which they are responsible. To my knowledge, never 
a legally binding treaty with sanctions has been put in place for the 
international community to be held responsible for a commodity. It is 
often left for each participating party to have its part completed and 
controlled. 
Global Production Network studies take into account that 
“rather than emphasizing North-South oriented production networks, 
contemporary polycentric trade involves overlapping, multiple 
production networks oriented towards different end markets –across 
both global North and South.”18 This framework emphasizes the 
relations such actors have, and the division of labor, in the context of 
diversion. Consequently, as outlined in Global Production Network 
studies, bottleneck moments in which value is created, captured and 
transformed, can make sense for my topic. Since specific junctures 
of the global production network are crucial for production, one may 
ask whether it is also in such junctions that diversion occurs, and 
therefore, licit-illicit categories blur. 
The main assumption when exploring diversion is that, 
depending on the geographies, the sense of risk and its assessment 
arising from diversion, is felt and dealt differently according to 
domestic circumstances. For instance, in the US, the opioid crisis has 
brought to light many concerns, and implicated actions in the health 
sector. Indeed, one fact was the diversion taking place in the health 
sector in order to feed dependence cravings. It is hard to deny the 
supplying and the diversion that currently takes place in the US 
(Titan Group DEA, personal communication, October 7th, 2020). Yet 
it is not only a question of locations, but of motives and of culture to 
which we belong. To illustrate the latter, after an exploratory 
interview with a senior representative at a pharmaceutical 
18 https://www.gdi.manchester.ac.uk/research/groups/gpn-trade-labour/ accessed October 20th, 2020.
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multinational company, its former head of the quality and compliance 
section, said to me that diversion from pharmaceutical industries 
(compared to state-owned enterprises), seldom happens, to the degree 
that it would be similar to “imagining a pharmacy hold- up”. To sum 
up, he explained that although they take it into account in their risk 
analysis, it does not happen (Anonymous, personal communication, 
July 2020). 
However, contemporary history has proven otherwise, as 
diversion can arise much more than initially admitted. Although 
other innocent but somehow free-rider (Ostrom, 1990) beings can be 
involved in diversion and wreaking of crops, they are stoned- 
Tasmanian wallabies19, opium-hooked Indian Parrots20 and Indian 
dozing monkeys.21 However, in my belief, drugs are polymorphous, 
and so is diversion. I will consider that different human beings and 
factors do take part in different kinds of diversion, throughout the 
supply-chain. 
Some research has focused on applying the Global 
Production Network approach to the manufacture of medicinal 
plants, while addressing the illicit practices taking place, through a 
developmental perspective, or the study of the pharmaceutical 
industry in India, for example (Pauls; Franz, 2013; Horner, 2014; 
Horner; Murphy, 2018). However, these papers focus primarily on a 
geographical development perspective, and outline different results, 
as their analysis unit is primarily domestic. In this analysis, the global 
production network is understood in its empiricism to examine the 
critical nodes more specifically. 
What is meant by “critical nodes”, comes again, from a 
variety of inspirations. Firstly, after reviewing articles, in the global 
19 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1195417/Stoned-opium-munching-wallabies-create-crop-
circles-crashing-poppy-fields.html  accessed October 21st, 2020. 
20 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/parrots-opium-addicted-india-eating-crops-
parakeets-birds-a8803396.html  accessed October 21st, 2020.
21 http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7509059.stm  accessed October 21st, 2020. For other
amusing stories on the use of opium, other animals such as water buffalos in South East Asia have been 
known to use it for leisure, or the use of bees for their chemical attraction to opium poppies for 
pollinating purposes. 
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commodity chain academic strand, they look at value chain which 
“consisted of multiple “nodes” or “boxes”, each of which 
representing distinct production operations and chains linking them 
to each other” (Lee, 2010:5). Proposed as a tool to examine the 
geographical dispersion of production activities, scholars have 
suggested to identify through it which firms or countries “retained 
the most profitable nodes within the chain, thus uncovering the 
uneven distribution of profits among them” this view favorizes the 
specificities of each nodes varying in terms of “geographical loci of 
operations, forms of labor force, technology used [etc.]” (Idem.). The 
idea to examine it through nodes conception, but instead of looking 
at profit, keeping the concentration in nodes for diversion seemed 
interesting. 
Furthermore, the idea of critical nodes, even though not 
specifically mentioned as such, is borrowed from economical 
geography and international political economy literature on the 
Global Production Network. As mentioned above, they describe it in 
terms of value creation, addition, capture and transformation (Yeung; 
Coe, 2015; Coe; Yeung, 2019). Selwyn contributes to this with a 
slightly different approach. Starting from a GCC standpoint, the main 
argument from selected articles is that firm-led transnational 
corporations (TNCs) exploit labor systematically.22 In his most 
recent article, he proposes the notion of poverty chains, focusing on 
exploitation of labor. In such chains, Selwyn describes nodes of labor 
exploitation that have a syndicate leverage potential for workers and 
unions to bargain their rights. (Selwyn, 2013; 2015; 2019). 
Finally, the “node” concept is extremely present in network 
theory (computer sciences and network sciences), social network 
analysis (SNA) and actor-network theory (ANT) in which nodes can 
have different attributes. For instance, in computing science, it can 
22 I use TNCs and/or MNCs interchangeably although some argue they have fundamental 
differences. 
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be a unit or device with data of particular potential for the network, 
acting as a gateway which can receive, send and store information 
along different routes through a distributed network, for example.23 
For SNA, it would generally be a group of individuals in relation to 
a network and for ANT, nodes are constituted of objects and 
individuals; the similarity between the three is that nodes define a 
specific place, composed by different components and always 
ascribed to a network. 
Based upon this non-exhaustive review, for the sake of this 
thesis I define critical nodes in the context of the opium industry as: 
microcosms within a network in which value can be created, 
captured, transformed, or logistically transported; considered as 
crucial because of their role in the supply-chain and in their potential 
of being exposed to illicit practices such as diversion.24 This 
definition takes into account the actors and objects involved in those 
specific nodes, requiring that the actors and objects (such as 
regulatory instruments) combine a mixture of logics which can be 
subject to change over time. 
The very few studies found which looked at diversion of licit 
production of opium focused on particular regions and other 
conceptual frameworks. No research was found that analyzed the 
role of the UNODC or was conducted with a network analysis of licit 
and illicit.  This gap is addressed in this master thesis. Let us delve 
into the  research design. 
23 For more theoretical use of the critical node concept: in computer science, critical nodes 
are those the removal of which significantly degrades network connectivity. As a network 
can take different forms after disconnection, node criticality depends on how the network 
is disconnected once the node has been deleted, which depends on the objective of the 
application considered (Lalou et al, 2018:93). On a military perspective, critical node is an 
element, position, or command and control entity whose disruption or destruction 
immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct 
combat operations. Also called target critical damage point (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2005). So critical nodes for me takes this idea of diversion with the combination of value 
creation/transformation/capture inspired by the global production networks studies. 
24 Diversion “is the theft of opium at any point along regulated production and distribution 




    
Research questions 
What are the critical nodes in the global production network 
of opiates in which licit and illicit can become indistinguishable 
categories? 
What is the role of the UNODC in the regulation of the 
critical nodes of controlled substances used for medicines? 
Hypotheses 
The current international drug control regime provides rules 
and norms on controlled substances. However, given the global 
production network and the considerable number of actors taking 
part in this specific industry, states and non-state authorities cannot 
fully implement the objectives of the three UN treaties on controlled 
substances. Instead, these authorities therefore are often in conflict 
with the ambitious and illusionary UN aim of ending the “drug 
problem”. 
I assume that there are critical nodes in the global supply 
chain of opiate-based medicine in which licit and illicit cultivation, 
manufacture, production, and transportation join at specific 
junctures, and in which they bypass the seemingly binary distinction 
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of lawful and unlawful activities. There are much more nuanced and 
diverse nodes, but I will focus essentially here on the exclusively licit 
channels, rather than on licit channels and activities that could 
interfere with illicit activities and channels. 
It is often argued by international organizations that licit 
commerce, ever since it has been monitored, suffers from a very 
limited potential of diversion, and this does not refer to the level of 
the industry or other spheres. I will suggest that it happens much 
more than thought, and this can be largely explained by structural 
variables. 
Furthermore, let us assume, based on global production 
network studies assumptions, that networks are dynamic and must 
remain so if they want to be viable. Dynamicity in this case can be 
illustrated in the continuous reconfiguration of the global production 
network of opiate. A current system can adapt due to diverse 
variables such international regulation (their evolution in time, as in 
the case of the scheduling of New Psychoactive Substances - NPS), 
state laws, market changes, illicit trade, and all these variables could 
be interdependent, therefore inducing a rearrangement within the 
whole network. This does not result in an entirely new system, but 
rather in a slight transformation and reorganization within the 
network. For instance, if a specific alkaloid is selected for regulation 
or change in the schedules, as occurred for thebaine – an opioid- 
alkaloid – this will result in the adaptation of domestic laws, changes 
in market behavior, restructuring of techniques and methods used in 
criminal activities, and also in the location of critical nodes in the 
global supply-chain and the methods used for diversion purposes. 
This could also be applied in many ways. For example, to 
manufacture heroin, one fundamental precursor – a chemical needed 
in order to create a controlled substance – is acetyl anhydride. Acetyl 
anhydride is thus necessary for heroin, but due to its use in various 
sectors in legal activities, it is difficult to properly monitor the trade 
flow of this chemical. Sometimes human beings 
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involved in illegal activities will find very creative ways either to 
gain access to this specific chemical by extending their network, or 
by producing what is defined as pre-precursors/design-precursors. 
The latter is a chemical that can be used in substitute of the main 
chemical, or a base from which another chemical, easier to access, can 
be transformed to have the solution needed in order to produce the 
final substance desired. By doing so, regulators are faced with 
pressure to retain an adequate control and should adapt their 
strategies, which would then result in structural changes. 
But also, external and environmental factors can have an 
impact on the structure of the global production network. 
Technology, machinery, research and development findings are all 
domains where in fact, discoveries of this kind can revolutionize the 
whole functioning of an enterprise and its organization.25 
The industry level is characterized by a “fragmented-yet- 
coordinated nature of global production systems” (Coe; Yeung, 
2019), webs of actors “originating from different home economies 
and endowed with different ownership structures, corporate cultures 
might respond differently to competitive dynamics and risks” (Coe; 
Yeung, 2019). Such description can well apply for controlled 
substances too. The responsibility borne is fragmented amongst 
actors, while its compliance is state sovereign. In regard to 
international trade and laws, there are usually similar principles 
unless there is a conflict (in which case the WTO can intervene). In 
addition, I assume the various actors involved in the plant-based 
pharmaceutical supply-chain “deliberately dissociate themselves 
from the negative aspects of commodity production” (Ibert et al., 
2019 in Coe; Yeung, 2019: 793) but also for the cultivation, 
25 To detect or control diversion from happening, the former DEA agent mentioned, for 
instance: GPS tracking, technological inventories, analytical programs and software 
programs. He also confirmed that, for example, blockchain or automated dispensing 
machines (ADM) can change the routes and functioning of these examples and can even 
slightly change the nodes. For instance, prior to an ADM service in a hospital, certain 
diversion practices were found, and it could happen that an ADM engineer end up getting 
into diversion itself (Titan group DEA, 2020). 
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manufacture, transportation and until consummation. It is as if each 
piece of the puzzle carries its own responsibility, through various 
means of requirements and compliance, essentially applying certain 
market principles as this is the most functional option in terms of 
cost-benefit, for all parties involved. To avoid any confusion, rather 
than questioning the whole system, I will aim to transcribe the 
structural logic of this industry, in order to understand who-does- 
what and who-gets-what. 
Another hypothesis is based on the role of the UNODC on 
critical nodes. I assume that the UNODC participates in various 
ways, for example through the creation and use of instruments to 
count, observe, accept or condemn the existence of critical nodes, 
through cooperation with other international organizations (such as 
the WHO) or agencies (INCB, INTERPOL, EUROPOL). The 
UNODC as a United Nations Office does not deny the existence of 
critical nodes but wishes to avoid devoting too many resources to 
them. These assumptions are reasonable for a number of reasons, such 
as the fact that it would question the current system in place, its 
falsifiability and the very purpose of the UN treaties – the supply of 
essential substances for medicine. 
Moreover, the UNODC does mention and act on certain 
fronts on the subject but somehow accepts its very own limitations 
on its potential for action. Ultimately, the UNODC cannot, and does 
not want to be sovereign on signatory parties. Furthermore, the 
UNODC as a whole must choose its battles and is confronted with a 
“lesser evil mental phenomenon” – whether it be conscious or 
unconscious, admitted or unadmitted. Since the UNODC’s work is 
related to drugs and crime, their focus is crime related, and embraces 
all kinds of criminal activities. Diversion and/or the critical nodes of 
licit trade act as a counterbalance to other crucial issues such as 
human trafficking or the arms trade, which instinctively prevail over 
the detour or smuggling of supposedly legitimate business. 
37 
Finally, it is possible that some of the incoherencies that 
might be discovered, or the network that is aimed to be outlined, may 
be inherent and essential to the substance examined. The 
ambivalence of drugs in their remedy-or-poison aspect can be seen 
in their use, but in their sales as well, each being an expression of the 
same roots. This ambivalence is ubiquitous. In treaties, one can find 
the state’s needs for medication based upon controlled substances, 
while in parallel willing to stop the evil of drug use. This is supposed 
to work with the previous year’s estimated needs, serving for the 
estimated production needs of the following year. Since access to 
medicines is a necessity in global health, one side cannot exist 
without the other, thus, illicit activities will constantly take place. 
Although there might be better ways to manage it, this is beyond the 
scope of this study. Therefore, the objective to suppress and eradicate 
trafficking, diversion and so on, is only a target at which to aim, as it 
is impossible to truly eliminate these factors.26 
To conclude, my general hypothesis can be phrased as 
follows: even in licit – and controlled - global trade of opiates, illicit 
aspects co-occur throughout, from cultivation to consumption. Such 
illicit activities are believed to be condensed in nodes – which can 
change over time – in the global production network of this 
controlled substance. The purpose of the regime is therefore to 
control, in order to limit. Given the justification above, the question 
should focus on limitation and not prohibition. My hypotheses can 
be summarized as follow: 
H1: There are critical nodes in the licit global supply chain of 
opiate-based medicine in which licit and illicit practices meet at 
specific junctures. 
26 As former DEA responded to one of my questions as follows: “I love your question 
though. And in other words, what is the lifespan of compliance? I swear to God, the lifespan 
of compliance is pretty much, the minute we walk out the door, they're already going 
downhill. Because people just can't seem to keep compliance, you know, compliance 
standards where they need to be.” This highlights the importance of practice as a whole, 
and everyday practice (Titan group DEA, 2020). 
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H2: The UNDOC has a distinct role but cannot and does not 
wish to do more than what it currently does. 
Unit of Analysis – the actors 
It is important to specify that the first research question is 
formulated in such a way that part of the analysis aims at 
highlighting the complexity of the actors in the global production 
network of the medical opium industry through the instruments in 
order to map the network for prospecting critical nodes. However, 
my unit of analysis for the second research question is to expose 
what is done about critical nodes in the network described, by 
examining the role of one international organization of the UN 
apparatus – the UNODC based in Vienna. 
In terms of states, they play an important role in the licit as 
well as the illicit global production network. Perhaps this has not yet 
been emphasized enough earlier when outlining the illicit 
international political economy and international political economy, 
but by combining theoretical perspectives, in this work we see licit 
and illicit as one, while focusing only on critical nodes. States 
through: 
“its many activities and interactions with 
corporate and other non-firm actors, [are] 
seen to influence directly and indirectly the 
processes of value creation, enhancement 
and capture that take place both within and 
across the borders of, its territory.” “[…] 
National state plays the role of an “inter- 
scalar mediator” in seeking to facilitate, 
enhance, prolong or indeed end the strategic 
coupling of particular regions within its 
territory with global production networks 
(Lee, et al 2014; Horner, 2014; Hsu et al, 
2018).” (Coe; Yeung, 2019: 782). 
Therefore, it seems appropriate that if states have those 
characteristics when addressing legal commerce, one can see the 
above as rightly applying to illegal commerce as well. In 
consequence, Horner’s description of states’ four various roles is 
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useful: “regulator: setting the rules of the game - particularly through 
labor regulations and foreign direct investment/trade policies; 
producer – through the activities of state-owned and government- 
linked corporations of different kinds; buyer – through large-scale 
public procurement; investor in certain contexts through the 
activities of sovereign wealth funds.” (Horner, 2017:7-13).27 It is 
also important to keep in mind how a range of state initiatives not 
just shape but also are shaped by their positioning in global 
production networks (for e.g. in the case of transit countries). 
Moreover, one should note that states attempt to have key quality 
segments to govern rather than quantity segments to control. Indeed, 
regal powers have diminished over time, and transferred to non-state 
authorities in various domains. Thus, states have limited power 
when it comes to certain subjects, in which non-state authorities now 
have mastery. As Strange (1996:4) argues: “where states were once 
the masters of markets, now it is the market, on many crucial issues 
that are the masters of governments states”. Without agreeing to such 
an extent, this thesis aims for a better understanding of states roles in 
the context of “untangle the complex web of overlapping, symbiotic 
or conflicting authority” (Strange, 1996: 99) in the sector of opiates. 
Methodology 
The methodology applied in this master thesis is largely 
qualitative – in the data collection - and post-positivist in both the 
data collection and analysis. This type of research is based upon a 
case study structure. This means that the opiate industry and the 
international regulation in place are examined in order to transcribe, 
when possible, general observations on the topic. The case study is 
exploratory and inductive, in the sense of assuming no prior 
knowledge, a choice which made learning about the topic possible 
while researching it. It has the purpose of being descriptive – 
27 Please see appendix 1 for Horner’s table on the four states roles. 
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explaining how it works – which can be linked with the analytical 
tools borrowed from the Global Production Network. But it is also 
evaluative, for once the context has been set, and the map has been 
described, it will focus on how the UNODC participates in critical 
node regulation, which constitutes an evaluation. 
The post-positivist approach is a normative one, believing 
that as individuals, we cannot have axiological neutrality, we 
interact psychologically with our object of study, even while trying 
to distance ourselves from limiting thoughts. I also study the topic 
with a constructivist mindset. This does not constitute an approach 
per se but rather, it allows me to avoid taking for granted the kind of 
data at disposal. In terms of the empirical corpus, the types of data 
are overall desk-research based apart from the eight expert- 
interviews. Most of the primary sources are official reports and 
documents, treaties, laws, official declarations, research on websites 
of official actors. Reports were selected from a contemporary 
timeframe, i.e., in the past ten years, apart from pharmacologist 
documents (to evaluate the technological evolutions of methods for 
the production of medicine). 
The reports were selected from various sources, mostly the 
UNODC, for example the World Drug Report 2020 and 2019 
divided in six booklets, the annual reports of the UNODC (2018, 
2019) as well as bulletins of various years on opium poppies 
cultivation and manufacture, and the multilingual dictionary of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under international 
control (MLD). On the INCB side, the following sources were used: 
the annual report of 2019, “Progress in ensuring adequate access to 
internationally controlled substances for medical and scientific 
purposes” in 2018, “Precursors and chemicals frequently used in the 
illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances” 
in 2019 and the “Estimated World Requirements for 2020” based on 
the statistics of 2018 named the “Narcotic Drugs 2019”, the “Yellow 
List” of 2018 and 2019, which is a list of narcotic drugs under 
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international control, and finally, some Ministerial Agreements 
concluded at the CND in 2019. In addition to scrutiny on their 
websites, these gave me perspective and trends on controlled 
substances and the work done by these institutions. 
Reports from the EUROPOL were also consulted, such as 
“EU Drug Markets Report 2019” co-written between EMCDDA and 
EUROPOL, as well as other documents from the INTERPOL 
websites and from many other NGOs and think tanks and 
consortiums including: the international drug policy consortium 
(IDPC), the international development research center (IDRC), the 
Global Commission Drug Policy (GCDP), Transform Drug Policy 
Foundation, the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), mostly 
Swiss drug dependence associations such as Addiction Suisse, 
Addiction Vaud and Groupement Romand d’Etudes des Addictions 
(GREA), and finally, some reports from the WHO about access and 
counterfeit medicines, with essential medicine lists and reports from 
the ECDD. They were based mostly on opacity/transparency, right 
to access, patents, drug dependence, etiological considerations. 
Scholarly articles of primary sources were also explored, 
specifically on theoretical approaches, and on the object of study – 
opium. 
Webinars were attended, on “Transparency and Access to 
Medicines: One Year After the WHA Resolution”, the 73rd World 
Health Assembly Week; “Trade Responses to Global Health Crisis” 
and “Policy Concerns and Ideas on How to Strengthen the Situation 
in the Trade of Vital Medical Supplies”. Participation in nine 
conference calls organized by the American Swiss Foundation, 
special program during the global pandemic, three out of nine 
contained information on pharmaceutical industries, medicine, and 
dependencies on international trade on necessity goods such as 
particular chemicals or active pharmaceutical ingredients (API) in 
relation to the pandemic and general observations and previsions for 
industries, politics, policies and reconfigurations. They were calls of 
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40 minutes, with participants from all walks of life and positions – 
American and Swiss politicians, ambassadors, industry leaders (out 
of which some pharmaceutical industries CEO/COO/employees) 
etc. These conferences gave an overview from an economic 
approach regarding the true uncertainties we face today – and their 
growing importance – since the beginning of COVID-19. In order to 
analyze such data, methods from critical discourse analysis are used, 
not only to highlight patterns, meanings, double meaning and 
relations between actors within a sector and between sectors but also 
to examine instruments and events. 
In addition, data has been collected from expert interviews, 
conducted mostly online, applying a semi-structured interview 
method. The introduction of the requester was on an informative 
basis, as a second-year master student in political science 
specializing in globalization. Brief comments on the topic of the 
master thesis would be announced, i.e., legal and illegal activities 
surrounding the narcotics trade. Interviews were initiated by email 
or telephone. A number of contacts were made with other 
organizations, some of whom wished not to be addressed for various 
reasons. On this basis, if accepted, questions would be sent – if 
requested and prior to the interview, giving the candidate time to 
prepare.28 For a couple of interviewees, the respondents wished not 
to be recorded and to remain anonymous. These wishes have been 
duly respected while adhering faithfully to the criteria of scientific 
research. Due to the obvious technicalities of the subject, it is rare to 
find someone who knows everything on the topic. The purpose of 
these interviews are, among other things, to question certain 
accepted or common-sense thought systems and beliefs, to be 
instructive on confused and unclear elements, to highlight inter- 
actor dynamics and specific mandates between actors, and finally to 
28 For an overview of all the questions sent and the responses of the conducted interviews, 
please contact the author directly: c.yousefzai@gmail.com 
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expose different cultures according to selected “representative” 
people of particular environments. 
Between the months of July and December 2020, eight 
interviews were conducted with experts in the field. 
Chronologically, the first interview was with Dr Dilkushi 
Poovendran. She is a technical officer at the ECDD Secretariat, 
Access to Medicines, Vaccines and Pharmaceuticals Cluster. The 
ECDD is a scientific advisory body to the WHO that consists of an 
independent group of experts in the field of drugs and medicine and 
drug dependence liability. They make direct recommendations to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) chaperoned at the UNODC. 
The interview lasted about an hour. 
The second interview in the month of July 2020 was with a 
doctor who retired as the director of global medical safety in a 
multinational pharmaceutical industry. He wished to remain 
anonymous, and the interview, which was not recorded at his 
request, lasted two hours. From this interview, a clearer vision 
emerged of the industry configuration, logics, norms and values. The 
third interview conducted in August 2020, was with a doctor based 
in Lausanne and specialized in addictology, who wished to remain 
anonymous, and lasted thirty minutes. This interview allowed me to 
explore the addictive side of the substances and have her thoughts 
on “questions she never asked herself” on the supply of controlled 
substances. 
The fourth interview was online in October 2020, with the 
director, Jack Teitelman and managing partner Kelley Detweiler of 
Titan Group DEA, a New York compliance business. They are 
former DEA agents who specialize in diversion of controlled 
substances; they provide training and conduct compliance 
throughout the health sector in the U.S. The interview lasted forty- 
five minutes and was recorded. It was particularly informative and 
gave interesting insights. 
44 
Chapter II. Research design 
The fifth interview was in-person in October 2020, at the 
CHUV with Dr. Laurent Schild. He is a professor of biology at the 
University of Lausanne, and permanent member of the Swissmedic 
expert committee, as well as being a member of the standing 
committee on medical products of the CHUV and President of the 
Federal Medicines Commission which advise the Federal Office of 
Public Health and the Federal Department of Home Affairs with the 
aim to guarantee adequate supply of medicine to the Swiss 
population. 
The sixth interview was held online in early November, with 
Kahlid Tinasti, director of the Global Commission on Drug Policy 
and an Expert in the Network of the Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime, and the author of scientific and 
policy papers and research. He is an active advocate for change in 
the current control regime; thus, it was particularly interesting to 
access his views on the topic and nexuses of the master thesis. 
The seventh interview was in November 2020, on the phone 
and lasted one hour. The person interviewed is the head of the 
international drug affairs at the Federal Office of Public Health at 
the Swiss Confederation, Diane Steber Büchli. An expert in her 
field, she provides important insights not only on how a government, 
in this case the Swiss one, tackles such issues, but more importantly, 
what matters one must bear in mind, given the complexity of the 
subject. She is mostly specialized in access to and availability of 
medicines in Switzerland, and therefore her point of view may be 
different than that of a law-enforcement or monitoring perspective. 
The eights interview was conducted on the phone and lasted 
thirty minutes. The discussion was with a veterinary doctor based in 
Switzerland in December 2020. He had worked with pet animals 
mostly, in animal refugees, animal hospital and had his own cabinet. 
This discussion gave me his perspective and many insights from this 
sector. 
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In terms of interviews or contacts sought but not obtained, 
they were as follows: attempted contact with the UNODC with 
various messages left by phone, but no results; initial contact with 
the INCB, but they said they would only communicate with states. 
There is still one person expected to respond to emails sent to the 
Executive Officer at the ECDD, Dr Gilles Forte, who works for the 
director general of the ECDD and is the coordinator at the Access to 
Medicines, Vaccines and Pharmaceuticals Cluster. A few exchanges 
were made but no responses were obtained yet. 
I have had email and phone exchanges with INTERPOL and 
EUROPOL, both of whom told me they had sections in which they 
consider these matters, but due to the sensitivity of the topic and the 
discretion they must keep, I could not expect to receive more 
information than what was already visible on their website. Finally, 
I had the opportunity to ask questions to medicrime (a branch of 
Swissmedic). The enforcement officer who responded on their 
behalf answered all my questions, for which they had asked the 
questions to be short and concise, and in binary format – yes/no. 
Swissmedic is the Swiss authority responsible for the authorization 
and supervision of therapeutic products. It is a federal public law 
institution and is autonomous with respect to its organization and 
management and has its own budget (Swissmedic, 2020). 
In terms of secondary sources, many newspaper articles were 
consulted, particularly in relation to the opioid crisis in North 
America, and pharmaceutical industry scandals. A broad range of 
scholarly articles from different branches were studied (e.g., 
pharmacology, technology, medicine) which were necessary to 
understand the scope and range of the topic. Books were also used, 
mostly relating to international political economy, illicit markets, 
criminal activities, and narcotics. Finally, four documentaries 
produced by the RTS, Arte and RT were watched. They were on the 
history of drugs, on opium wars, commerce of drugs and trafficking. 
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For the industrial analysis of the global production network, 
I used a corpus of newspapers, industry website research, logistics 
companies, various databases for exports/imports, and international 
distribution of production and consumption data such as on 
comtrade (UN) and atlas (Harvard) as well as Statista, which helped 
to grasp an idea of the global licit commerce of opium alkaloids and 
its derivatives. The use of international instruments such as 
harmonized names, codes or through certifications were observed. 
Data collected through interviews, webinars and conference calls 
helped to construct the section. By using a mapping technique as 
suggested in the global production network studies, this has been 
able to provide “the possibility of visualizing the economic and 
social agents as well as highlighting the structural and spatial 
dimensions of networks, sectors and the linkages between them” 
(Henderson et al, 2002 :457). 
Overall, the whole process has been largely inductive, 
finding information, which was often contradictory, misleading and 
diverse - for instance in the scientific side of pharmacology, the 
terminology used across the spectrum is heterogeneous. Indeed, 
when talking about opium and its derivatives, one should keep a 
lexical booklet to track terms and usage. As Williams (2010) says 
“terminologies are difficult purposely” as this commodity is “not 
ordinary merchandise” (Wood 1988:149 in Williams 2010:292). 
According to Wood’s conclusions (1988:164) when studying 
the monetary significance of the crop to growers of opiates, 
obfuscation is intended “as the whole industry has been handled with 
an air of secrecy; for example, even the official agricultural census 
publications refer to “oil poppies” when the main purpose of 
production is pharmaceutical”. Thus, I adopt Williams’ view that 
“deconstruction is a useful tool for interpreting such discursive 
silences and duplicity, and it has a specific relevance in this context”. 
Yet even the tone in which the information is communicated 
between actors is noteworthy, whether delivered in pathos, logos or 
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somewhere in the middle. This topic has high moral attributes and 
has been debated socially for a long time. One should remain 
attentive on the form of the language used. 
In addition, there has been a gap in the data corpus between 
what I ought to gather and what has been gathered. Access to people 
was often difficult; the current situation of the covid-19 pandemic 
added complexity as some of the experts sought have been fully 
mobilized elsewhere since late February 2020; the theme itself can be 
a barrier to discussion, and many opacities surround the data. Even 
the methodologies used in the official reports all have one common 
aspect: their irregularities. Firstly, the data on consumption is difficult 
to assess due to the confidential and/or illegal nature, secondly, 
treatment and emergency rooms are subject to medical discretion, 
and thirdly, data on illegal drug trafficking are mostly compiled by 
drug seizure numbers, and finally surveys for consumption 
estimations that are sent are different, completed by different 
authorities which leads to radically different conclusions as to the 
scale and intensity (Manski et al, 2001; Musto;Sloboda, 2003 in 
Buxton, 2006: 69). Also, the INCB data relies largely on state 
estimates, which again, methodologically speaking, is not neutral. 
Thus, quantitative data remain only ‘guesstimates’ and not precise 
numbers. However, they allow imagining its potential. 
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In this chapter I aim to lay the ground on the 
institutionalization of controlled substances and most specifically, 
opium. This is important to acknowledge in socio-historic terms as 
it paved the way to the apparatus we face today. I will explore the 
two identified periods in the control regime building. 
For millennia, plant-based substances have been used in 
various forms and for different purposes. Their utilities were based 
on traditional cultural norms, medical and recreational use and even 
manipulative ends in strategic security matters by agencies (e.g., in 
counterinsurgency). More generally, five functions can be attributed 
to drugs: pain relief, physical stimulation (for example in arduous 
employment), relaxation, food sources and means of exchange in 
early trading system (Inglis, 1975). 
Substances have had a contingent socio-historical aspect 
and are part of specific Zeitgeists and illustrate Weltanschauungs. 
Indeed, substances were not always controlled, but are the result of 
political action, its transfer to law, and the enforcement of this law. 
Therefore, for the majority of controlled substances that are illegal 
today, most were actually legal a hundred years ago. Institutional 
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and legal changes happened over time as a result of numerous events 
including the opium wars, diasporic movement of people around the 
world, scientific discoveries, chemical experiments, industrial 
development such as the rise of the pharmaceutical industry, and 
globalization more generally. Some of these changes acted as 
focusing events (Birkland, 1998) whilst others, lasting longer in time 
or implication, which paved the way to today’s institutional regime 
framework. 
The justification for initial regulation by states was based 
upon problem-solving mindsets. The considerations and actions were 
mainly driven by socio-economic, political and religious ideologies. 
The United States has been a crucial player of the institutionalization 
of prohibition and moral values concerning drugs since long before 
it declared the “War on Drugs” and drugs became “public enemy 
number one” as famously stated by Nixon in 1971 (Niesen, 2011). 
But as previously stated, substances have been used for 
both medical and recreational purposes. As described by Mitchell 
(2012:228), in Mid-Victorian Britain, one could walk into a 
chemist’s shop, buy without prescription laudanum (popular 
beverage made out of opium and alcohol), cocaine, arsenic, opium 
preparation (which were freely sold in market halls) until 1868. He 
mentions on the same page that “they could be bought like any other 
commodity.” There was no moral condemnation, and their use was 
rather seen as a habit. It is only in the 1860s with opium dens that 
campaigns against unrestricted opium begun (Diniejko, 2008). 
These statements illustrate the long construction of this matter, into, 
first, domestic policy agenda setting before getting into the 
international agenda. 
It is interesting to note that besides the debates taking 
place, considerable impact was felt on public policy by scientific 
developments and discoveries, as well as from the rise of the 
pharmaceutical industry, such as the identification of opium’s first 
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active pharmaceutical ingredient. Discovered in 1805 by the German 
apothecary Sertürner, and with the help of the work of the French 
chemist J.L Gay-Lussac, their work had already been published in 
1817 (Brook; Bennett; Sukumar, 2017). 29 From 1898, Bayer had 
manufactured and marketed diacetylmorphine (also named 
diamorphine), as a “safe and nonaddictive” substitute for morphine, 
to cure coughs for adults and children, trademarked as “heroin” 
(Goodman; Gilman, 1941).30 The use of morphine and diamorphine 
during the 19th century helped ease pain as the most powerful 
analgesic of its time, but also contributed to drug addiction. Problems 
of self-medication, dependence and side-effects started to raise 
awareness in societies, was then seen not only as a habit but also as 
something which could have negative consequences on people. 
A description of the institutionalization of the international drug 
control regime is necessary as it will clarify the practices and 
philosophical assumptions underlying drug-related conventions. 
This contextualization will help for my main focus, i.e., controlled 
substance in international regulation and in practice. Although 
rudimentary and non-exhaustive, it will provide a framework from 
which to apprehend the control regime. 
From 1909 to 1953 
Two periods in history defined this institutionalization: a first 
one from 1909-1953 and the second one from 1961-1988. The first 
period began with the desire to end, for good, the Opium Wars. Two 
periods in history defined this institutionalization: one was between 
Great Britain and France against China (and also financed or helped 
by the US and Russia) in 1856–1860 (Maguet; Dumand, 2011: 60-
63; Hanes; Sanello, 2002). At the insistence in particular 
29 For a timeline highlighting important periods in the history of opium and morphine use 
from a medical and pharmacology perspective, see Appendix 2. 
30 An example of advertising is provided in Appendix 3. It is interesting to see patterns of 
practices perpetuating. In the opioid crisis, the “non-addictive” argument was put forward 
when marketing oxycontin. 
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of the US and of two important figures, Anslinger and Wright, the 
implementation of anti-opium movements called for a Conference 
in Shanghai in 1909. It is important to note the figures and 
movements roles in the United States, but also more broadly other 
societies and groups such as the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade in the U.K. and in the 1930s the Canadian, Colonel 
Charles Henry Ludovic Sharman (Messac, 2016) who were as 
Nadelmann (1990) coins “transnational moral entrepreneurs”. 
The focus at that time was on the supply chain of opium in 
order to control its availability, and to export it to different countries. 
During the 1912 International Convention of Opium at the Hague, 
the primary usage of opium for medical and scientific research only 
was sought, notably by Charles Henry Brent of the Episcopalian 
Church and US President Theodore Roosevelt. This meant that 
medical and scientific purposes would be considered legal, and all 
other uses defined as illegal. A national control system was desired, 
and the pharmaceutical industry lobby started to become prevalent 
in the debate. 
The next discussions on Opium took place during the Treaty 
of Versailles, when it was agreed that a control organism would be 
established, the Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) and the creation 
of a hygiene organ (the precursor of the WHO), which would later 
timidly explore the socio-medical aspects of this subject. The next 
convention was during the Geneva Opium Convention in 1925, more 
transnational controls were sought but colonial powers were 
reluctant to agree due to the economic and revenue considerations 
opium had for them. 
In 1931, the Geneva Narcotics Manufacture and Distribution 
Limitation Convention concluded in the start of statistics estimations 
for the production of substances based on each signatory party’s 
needs. This means that from this point, the creation of estimates began 
in order to stock defined substances for domestic needs. Statistics 
would be maintained to keep track, observe 
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tendencies, and presumably, the international authorities be better 
equipped to avoid diversion from licit production. 
As for the Suppression of the Opium Smoking Agreement, 
in Bangkok, it was considered a failure, as no decisions were made 
on any of the important points (New York Times, December 20th, 
1931). This was mainly because colonial powers were unwilling to 
give up their economic gains and the United States was alone in its 
attempts at restrictions and controls. 
Until this point, illegal trafficking was not a criminal offense 
and the objective had been to regulate and restrict trade. Since the 
1936 Geneva Trafficking Convention, illegal trafficking has been 
considered a criminal offense punishable by law. As it was 
considered ineffective by the US, this Convention never gained 
widespread acceptance, especially in relation to extradition rights 
and since the confiscated goods would further weaken the local 
systems already in place. 
When the United Nations assumed the functions and 
objectives of the League of Nations, the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) took responsibility of controlled substances 
through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), replacing the 
OAC. These changes were amended at the Protocol of Luke Success 
in New York in 1946 (Sinha, 2001). In 1948, the first socio- 
etiological considerations were discussed, and the creation of an 
expert committee on drug dependence in the WHO was formed. This 
gave the WHO some authority in deciding which drugs should be 
placed under control, under certain guidelines and criteria (Bruun; 
Pan; Rexed, 1975: 70). 
Finally, in 1953 the New York Opium Protocol was 
discussed essentially along the lines that it would be easier for 
everybody to make an international trade monopoly of opium so 
control could be highly effective. However, fears of restriction and 
higher prices resulting from many states stockpiling, but also stated 
who accommodated fruitful pharmaceutical industries, opposed to 
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this initiative. The idea was then left behind. Apart from other minor 
changes, this Protocol never received ratification, and then, 50 years 
of negotiations transformed into the 1961 UN Single Convention. 
To summarize, this initial period was replete with 
conferences, conventions and treaties being promoted by prominent 
figures and associations, together with the societal transformations 
and scientific and technological developments at the time, as well as 
the creation of international organizations like the League of Nations 
and the United Nations. These variables were important in what we 
know of today’s control regime. An awareness of the many variables 
that have impacted the peculiarity of the establishment of the control 
regime is thus essential in understanding the first period of this 
institutionalization process. Let us now pass to the second period 
1961-1988, illustrated by three conventions, the most relevant ones 
for today’s context. 
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Figure 1 : Summary of multilateral agreements 31 
The second period: from 1961 to 1988 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by 
the 1972 Protocol 
The “Single Convention” signed in New York in 1961 and 
amended in 1972 by the additional protocol has played an important 
formative role in the contemporary international drug control 
regime.32 The aim of the “Single Convention”, as stated in the 
31 Source: Sinha, 2001:8 
32 The amended protocol of 1972 tightens the control of production, use and distribution of 
narcotics, illicit narcotics and added dispositions for the treatment and re-adaptation 
programs for addiction (Sinha, 2001). 
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convention is “to replace by a single instrument the existing 
multilateral treaties in the field, to reduce the number of international 
treaty organs exclusively concerned with control of narcotic drugs, 
and to make provision for the control of the production of raw 
materials of narcotic drugs.” As mentioned in the Preamble, they 
recognize the medical use of narcotic drugs, and recognize that 
addiction to them constitutes a “serious evil for individuals with 
social and economic danger” and that they must “prevent and combat 
this evil”.33 They call for universal action and international co- 
operation. The language used in the Preamble is particularly telling 
in the ideology underlying the Single Convention. At the time the 
convention was created, five groups were formed according to their 
drug control stance and objectives (Sinha, 2001:19-21). These 
groups will be outlined briefly. 
The first group was the organic group. Constituted of traditional 
producers of organic raw material (narcotics, coca, cannabis), they 
were open to socio-cultural organic drug use and favored weak 
control due to existing restrictions and domestic impacts but 
supported national control based on local conditions. They sought 
development aid to compensate for the losses. Countries such as 
India, Turkey, Pakistan and Burma took the lead role, and states of 
Indonesia and the Andean region of South America participated, as 
did the opium- and cannabis-producing countries of South and 
Southeast Asia, and the cannabis-producing states in the Horn of 
Africa (Idem.,). 
The second was the manufacturing states group. As Sinha 
(Idem.,) states: they had “no modern cultural affinity for organic drug 
use and being faced with the effects of drug abuse among their 
citizenry, they advocated very stringent controls on the production 
of organic raw materials and on illicit trafficking.” They were the 
primary manufacturing states of synthetic psychotropic drugs, 
33 Evil is italicized by the author 
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lobbied with industry, they wanted a minimum regulation. They 
were in favor of supra-national control (for which they would 
continue to exercise de facto control). Western countries such as the 
U.S., the UK, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, West Germany
and Japan were part of this group.
The third, called the strict control group, involved countries that 
were non-producing and non-manufacturing with no direct 
economies at stake in the drug trade. They were culturally opposed 
to drug use and encountered domestic addiction problems. They 
favored drugs for medical and scientific uses. They accepted a supra- 
national body although it would mean losing some national 
sovereignty. The key countries were France, Sweden, Brazil and 
Nationalist China (Idem.,). 
The fourth, the weak control group, had no interests in the drug 
trade with little problem of addiction domestically; this group was 
against a supranational body. It was led by the USSR and its allies 
(Idem.,). As for the last, the neutral group, they were interested 
mostly in being guaranteed sufficient drug supplies. They were 
constituted by African countries, 
Central America, Sub-Andean South 
American, Luxembourg and the 
Vatican (Idem.,). 
These groups agreed that 
substances should be categorized 
into so-called schedules (I, II, III, 
Figure 2 : Schedules 
IV), for which different levels of controls would apply. Schedules I 
and IV are the strictest while Schedules II and II are less so. The 
scale of control is based upon criteria that have been defined 
according to “the dependence potential, abuse potential and 
therapeutic usefulness of the drugs included in them” (Global 
Commission on Drug Policy, 2019:4). Scheduling decisions are 
taken by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) which was 
established by the ECOSOC. 
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The WHO makes recommendations on the advice of its Expert 
Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD), then sends these to the 
Secretary General for approval before submitting them to a vote at 
the CND (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2019:4). The revised 
list of drugs in Schedules I, II, III and IV of the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol is 
contained in the “yellow list” a list of all the narcotic drugs under 
international control, prepared by the International Narcotic Control 
Board (INCB, 2018). The process for making a request for 
modification in the schedules is dissimilar depending on the 
requesting party. In general, under specific medical or scientific 
evidence such as ill effects, abuse potential and therapeutic 
advantages, the WHO (through the ECDD) or signatory parties can 
recommend a change (either through the general secretary at WHO 
or ECOSOC first). Then the recommendation must be voted upon by 
parties at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, with 
a simple majority vote. 
Figure 3 : The Secretariat of the CND outlines the schedules 
from I to IV 34 
These schedules imply various measures depending on the level 
of schedule. However, for all four schedules, the production, 
manufacture, export, import, distribution of, trade, use and 
possession must be limited exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes (Art. 4(c).). Licensed persons and enterprises as well as all 
34 Secretariat to the Governing Bodies, July 2019. 
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steps in the manufacture, trade and distribution of international trade 
are to be controlled through governmental licensing (Art. 29, 34 (a), 
30 (1)). Furthermore, estimates must be furnished to the INCB for 
future drugs requirements (based on the previous year’s trends) so 
that there is a balance between supply and demand (Art. 19 (1). 21. 
29 (3), 31 (1b), 30 (2a)). And finally, all participants in the narcotic 
trade are required to keep detailed records of any transactions in 
drugs (Art. 34(b)).35 
Two specific comments can be made related to the Single 
Convention; the first, is the strictness of the limitations of opium 
international trade to state monopolies (Art. 23-24) and the supposed 
abolishing of quasi-medical use of opium, opium smoking, with all 
their production and manufacture (Art. 49). Traditional countries, 
only, had 25 years, for others prohibition would have been 
immediate. By 1989, these practices became fully prohibited and the 
drugs can only be used domestically regulated medical and scientific 
purposes. This is obviously not the case in practice today but in 
theory this is the context. The second comment applies for the 
articles 23-24: opium trade is not limited to state monopolies, and 
the information gathered by the INCB is not publicly available (apart 
from the reports they publish). 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 
During the 1960s, due to post-WWII effects, such as soldiers’ 
and veterans’ addiction, the availability of synthetic substances 
flourished, and addiction became an important concern to many 
states. The use of amphetamines, barbituric and LSD was high. The 
need for regulation on these substances then became a necessity. In 
this context, the Single Convention was taken as an example to create 
another convention on psychotropic substances, which I shall refer 
to the 1971 Convention hereafter. 
35 For detailed tables on all the control measures and exceptions for each schedule, please 
refer to appendix 4. 
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In this respect, CND/INCB would have administrative authority, 
and distinguished levels of controls for different drugs organized in 
schedules, mandatory transaction documentation and licensing, an 
import/export control system, illicit trafficking and penal provisions 
were applied (Sinha, 2001: 24; Kusevik, 1975 :39). This convention 
however is much weaker in terms of controls imposed. It has been 
said that blatant corporate influence of pharmaceutical industries 
made this possible (McAllister, 2000: 232; Kusevic, 1975:39; Sinha, 
2001:25). 
While there were five groups in the Single Convention, two 
groups were formed in the discussion of the 1971 convention, with 
fundamentally advanced reverse arguments than in 1961. The first 
was the manufacturing group, counting mostly industrialized 
countries, with pharmaceutical industries and psychotropic 
substances markets, and asking for weak control and national 
sovereignty prevalence over that of a supranational body (Sinha, 
2001:25). The second was the organic group of developing countries 
supported by socialist nations, with little interest in this industry, 
which pushed for strong control as in the Single Convention (Idem.,). 
In the Preamble of the 1971 Convention the tone is radically 
different than in the Single Convention and in the scheduling system 
it changes. While in the Single Convention a substance is supposed 
to be dangerous, until proven otherwise, this presupposition is not 
systematically applied in this convention. This can be seen in a 
selection of sentences from the Preamble: “Noting with concern the 
public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain 
psychotropic substances” and “recognizing that the use of 
psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes is 
indispensable and that their availability for such purposes should not 
be unduly restricted” are “determined to prevent and combat abuse 
of such substances and the illicit traffic to which it gives rise.” 
It is on this tone that the 1971 Convention had been written. 
In other words, faced with addiction and non-medical use of 
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Figure 4 : Schedules 
legitimate medicines, the UN and its signatory parties decided to 
regulate psychotropic substances without putting too much pressure 
on the industries. Indeed, by admitting such substances should not 
be “unduly restricted” it became an entirely intersubjective notion 
which is illustrative in the framing of this convention through more 
flexible measures which aimed at facilitating trade. 
The schedules are also separated in four sections – different 
from the previous - from stricter to 
weaker controls. 36 The WHO can 
recommend that a substance be placed 
under international control under 
specific criteria if it has the capacity to 
produce: a state of dependence and 
central nervous system stimulation or 
depression, resulting in hallucinations or disturbances in motor 
function or thinking or behavior or perception or mood; or similar 
abuse and similar ill effects as a substance in Schedule I, II, III or 
IV; and, that there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being 
or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social 
problem warranting the placing of the substance under international 
control (1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Art.2(4)). 
Unlike the Single Convention that included control on salts, esters, 
ethers and isomers (their derivatives), the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances initially did not contain this (Sinha, 
2001:27). 
UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances 1988 
During the 1970s and 1980s, various national and regional 
drug control initiatives and drug-related discussions flourished. In 
36 The preamble was taken from the Convention on Psychotropic substances and the figure 
of the schedules from a conference held by the CND to the governing bodies in July 2019. 
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Europe, the Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking in Drugs, commonly known as the “Pompidou Group” 
illustrates well (EMCDDA, 2019:6). It aimed at improving police 
and customs drug enforcement cooperation and from then, 
INTERPOL became an important clearinghouse for information and 
a sponsor in drug enforcement meetings (Sinha, 2001:33). In that 
climate, the Resolution adopted by the 1984 UN General Assembly 
requested ECOSOC to instruct the CND “to add an additional 
“trafficking-specific” layer to complement the two existing 
Conventions” (Idem.,). 
The 1988 UN Convention is essentially an instrument of 
international criminal law (Idem.,). In the Preamble, the following 
sentences were kept here to acknowledge the mindset of this 
convention: parties are “deeply concerned by the magnitude of and 
rising trend in the illicit production of, demand for and traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which pose a serious 
threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely affect 
the economic, cultural and political foundations of society”; they 
recognize “the links between illicit traffic and other related 
organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate 
economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of 
States”, and they desire “to eliminate the root causes of the problem 
of abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, including 
the illicit demand for such drugs and substances and the enormous 
profits derived from illicit traffic.” 
Such sentences are important in understanding how parties 
are willing to suppress the root cause of illicit traffic that undermines 
humankind and states, for social and economic reasons. What seems 
peculiar, however, is the objective to eliminate the root cause of such 
a dual commodity. As seen previously, drugs are ambivalent in their 
essence; therefore, eradicating them seems like an unattainable 
target. Furthermore, faced with the realities and the limited 
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capacities of the current globalized organizational industry, it 
appears that doing more than currently is less likely to happen. 
Under this instrument, objectives stated by the parties were 
to harmonize national, drug-related criminal laws and enforcement 
actions to decrease illicit drug trafficking through the use of 
criminalization and punishment. Parties are required to create and 
implement very specific criminal laws aimed at suppressing illicit 
trafficking (Stewart, 1990: 392-393). These laws cover money 
laundering, confiscation of assets, extradition, mutual legal 
assistance, illicit cultivation, and trade in chemicals, materials and 
equipment used in the manufacture of controlled substances. As with 
the other two Conventions, the CND and the INCB are the bodies 
charged with administration (Sinha, 2001:36). 
Figure 5 : Tables 
Two tables in the 1988 Convention describe a list of 
substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances, which can be revised through 
time, under certain criteria. For my research, the most important 
instrument is the Single Convention of 1961, because it focused 
primarily on opium. One of the biggest issues has been to reconcile 
the strict drug economy with the liberal nature of international trade 
agreements intended to promote free flow of commodities (Sinha, 
2001:36-37). Figure 6 summarizes all the schedules of the 
international drug control regime: 
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Figure 6 : Schedules under the UN Drug Conventions 37
Mandates and actors 
Like most UN treaty-based regimes, a number of 
organizational actors oversee its various aspects. There are only a 
few important actors to bear in mind in the UN apparatus, mandated 
by the three UN conventions and supervised by ECOSOC. The 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the 
International Narcotic Control Board (INCB), the Commission on 
Narcotic Drug (CND), the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ECDD). Let us look at 
them more closely in figure 7 below which shows the UN apparatus 
for international drug control. 38 
37 Source: Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2019:9 
38 Taken from the UNODC website, with my addition of the ECDD and WHO. 
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Figure 7 : United Nations system, drug control organs, 
secretariats 39 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is 
an institution of the UN. It coordinates all drug and crime related 
activities of the UN, with a focus on administrative and technical 
support (Courtwright, 2012:17). They write annual reports and 
special issues, but mostly have a “name and shame functioning” 
(Tinasti, personal communication, November 2020). 
The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) was 
established by the 1961 Convention. Known as “the Board”, it 
describes itself as a ‘independent and quasi-judicial’ control organ 
for the implementation of the treaties (INCB, 2020). It monitors the 
cultivation, traffic and use of narcotic and psychotropic substances 
worldwide to ensure that these activities are confined to legal 
purposes. The INCB publishes an annual report of its work and the 
worldwide situation on drugs. In order to assess this and facilitate 
dialogue on national drug policy, it regularly sends delegations to 
39 Source: UNODC website with the author personal addition of the ECDD and WHO 
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individual member states and makes estimates based on their work 
and the states cooperation. 
Among these, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), 
which is the central policy-making body, has a key role. The CND 
consists of 53 member states and was founded in 1946. It determines 
the strategic goals of the UNODC and monitors their 
implementation. According to Article 8 of the Single Convention, 
their functions are the following: “to amend the Schedules; to call 
the attention of the Board [INCB] to any matters which may be 
relevant to the functions of the Board; To make recommendations 
for the implementation of the aims and provisions of the Convention, 
including programs of scientific research and the exchange of 
information of a scientific or technical nature; and to draw the 
attention of non-parties to decisions and recommendations which it 
adopts under this Convention, with a view to their considering taking 
action in accordance therewith.” 
Figure 8 : The UN apparatus 40 
The WHO has a specific technical mandate to make 
recommendations about what substances should be placed within 
those conventions. The WHO created the ECDD, which has a special 
mandate within the international drug control conventions, which is 
essentially to protect access to medicines (Dilkushi, personal 
communication, July 2020). “The ECDD makes a purely kind of 
evidence-based assessment that considers both, access to controlled 
medicine, and that [the substance] might have drug dependence 
40 Buxton, J. (2006). The political economy of narcotics. London: Zed Books. p.59. 
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producing properties, what do they actually do cause, dependence or 
other kind of types of misuse or abuse or digression or harms” 
(Dilkushi, 2020). The ECDD collaborates with the WHO in the sense 
that they make recommendations. Once endorsed, the WHO makes 
the recommendation to the CND. The CND then votes whether to 
accept the technical recommendations from the WHO (Dilkushi, 
2020). Here below is a summary table made by the WHO on its role 
under the international drug control conventions. 
Figure 9 : WHO in the International Drug Control Regime 41
Limits of the international drug control 
As for many international tools, limits can be drawn. Without 
being exhaustive, let us explore what seem the most relevant. The 
matter of scheduling is particularly difficult and controversial. 
41 Source: WHO website 
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The arguments put forward are that the scheduling is too political 
and lobbied by the corporate or prohibitionist ideologies, but not 
evidence based. For example, one of the most debated argument is 
that tobacco and alcohol do not figure in any conventions although 
they cause most of the harm. The arguments are that prohibition has 
implied many negative consequences on various aspects (Global 
Commission Drug Policy, 2014; Tinasti, 2020). While associations, 
non-governmental organizations, and experts in the field have 
pushed for a renewal of the conventions, there is evidence that 
reports to push re-structuring or changes in the schedules have been 
kept out by “institutional gatekeepers” (Courtwright, 2012:14). 
In that respect, Buxton (2006:120-121) provides a selection of 
expert reports that have been written, were “sidelined or 
suppressed”, with the implication sometimes of authors being 
dismissed (Tinasti, 2020).42 The most recent example of this was the 
case of David Nutt, at the time posted as chair at the Advisory 
Council on the Misuse of Drugs in the U.K. government, who 
published an article which caused his dismissal. In 2009, he and his 
colleagues who resigned created an Independent Scientific 
Committee on Drugs (now called Drug Science) and published the 
findings in the Lancet (Nutt, King, Phillips, 2009). They compared 
harm caused by licit and illicit drugs with other than usual 
variables.43 
For about twenty years, scientists, civil society (non- 
governmental organizations, associations, federations) and 
governments, have been mobilizing for looser control and focus 
towards societal and depenalization orientation. Constituting real 
42 Along the same lines, Sheila Jasanoff asks herself many interesting questions on the 
relation between science and public policy, specifically the way science adviser influence 
policy, as she coined the “fifth branch” (1998). An interesting research could be made on 
the role of scientific research and knowledge it plays in controlled substances. See appendix 
19 for a list of expert research which were side-lined. 
43 See appendix 5– for more details on the reports suppressed and David Nutt’s 
research. 
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epistemic communities,44 they have innovated and permitted 
evolution, in the sense of Haas (1992:3). Some governments have 
drawn limits to international convention measures as they saw this 
concern rising above their national sovereignty right. As expressed 
by Steber Büchli in our discussion “the health of our people concerns 
us” when describing the establishment of the four pillars drug policy 
in Switzerland (Steber Büchli, personal communication, November 
2020). 
As some coin “internal tensions” in the international drug control 
regime (Barrett; Bewely-Taylor; Gootenberg; et al, 2012:49) 
initiatives have started in the late 1990s taking effects in the 2000s. 
The so-called UNGASS decade,45 in which the UN drug control 
regime experienced normative and societal transformations such as with 
the depenalization of all drugs in Portugal in 2004, cannabis in many 
countries including Uruguay, the Netherlands, medical cannabis in 
states of the U.S. and Canada, to state only a few.46 Heroin-assisted 
treatment for addiction has flourished in certain countries, famously 
in Switzerland with its four pillars policy. Different policies would 
imply social benefits and income, but initially fear and blockage by 
the international drug control regime (Tinasti, 2020).47 Despite this, 
many are favoring such an orientation and broadening their horizons. 
One example is Russia, who passed a legislation in July 2019 
“authorizing the cultivation on its territory 
44 For Haas (1992:3), an epistemic community “is a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” 
45 “Increasingly dissatisfied with the punitive approach promoted by the conventions, a 
significant number of regime members engaged in a process of ‘soft defection’ (Bewley- 
Taylor, 2012:20). Rather than quitting the regime, these states deviated from its prohibitive 
norm, and exploited plasticity within the treaties, while technically remaining within their 
legal boundaries. Since norms are crucial to the essential character of a regime, such a 
process of normative attrition represented a form of regime transformation. Crucially, 
however, in this case transformation involved regime weakening and changes from within, 
rather than a more substantive change of the regime” (Barrett; Bewely-Taylor; Gootenber; 
et al, 2012:50). 
46 Some call the “dissensus” in drug policy, which was highly awaited at the United Nations 
General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS) in 2016. (Brookings, 29th April 
2015). It could also be what Haas (1992:373) describes as the process of policy evolution 
(innovation, diffusion, selection and persistence). 
47 A strand of governance literature has been describing the functioning of the UN 
especially on matters like environment, internet and food security of “multistakeholderism 
governance” popularized by the founder of the World Economic Forum in Davos (Klaus 
Schwab) or “polylateralism” by Geoffrey Wiseman. 
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of opium poppy plants for the purpose of extracting alkaloids. More 
specifically, the new law allows for the cultivation […] and the 
processing of poppy straw for the purpose of manufacturing 
pharmaceutical or veterinary preparations containing these opiates” 
(INCB, 2019:98). This announcement echoes the growing 
willingness in narrowing the dependence on other states, become self-
reliant and have a part in the international trade of categorized 
essential goods. 
In the UNODC World Drug Report executive summary 2020, 
the UNODC call for a “balanced, comprehensive, effective response 
to drugs, while being health-centered rights-based and gender- 
responsive approach to drug use and related diseases deliver better 
public health outcomes” (World Drug Report, 2020: Preface). Even 
more recently, the CND voted on a highly anticipated and much 
delayed decision to reclassify cannabis from schedule IV of the UN 
Single Convention, to stop it from being as strict as like heroin (UN 
news, December 2nd, 2020). 
This chapter lays the institutional groundwork needed to 
understand the international regime in controlled substances. It also 
paves the way for me to answer my second research question, which 
I will return to at a later stage but repeat here: what is the role of the 
UNODC in the regulation of the critical nodes of controlled 
substances used for medicines? For now, let us continue with my 
case study, natural opioids. This will then allow me to examine the 
critical nodes in the global production network of opiates. 
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The legal business of plant-based medicine 
In order to respond to the first research question, i.e., the 
critical nodes of the global production network, it seems crucial to 
first explain how the legal business works based upon my research 
and interviews. The first part of this chapter will be dedicated to 
definitions. I will go over the definition of pharmacology and its 
purposes and objectives, then move on to the definition of medicine 
and its different nexuses. I will then explain what narcotic drugs are 
and we will learn to distinguish opiates and opioids. I will then 
outline what opium alkaloids are and evoke a distinction between 
opioid medical and non-medical use. The second part of the chapter, 
I will explore the business of opiate medicines, from poppy field 
cultivation to delivery (consumption). I will outline the unique 
characteristics of this industry by mapping out the key players spread 
out globally, focusing on the most important ones in each segment 
of the supply-chain processes. Moreover, I will help readers overview 
the scale of the business by providing information from databases of 
this commodity’s international trade. While some sections might 
seem unnecessary for the purpose of this study, it is extremely 
important to cover this basic knowledge. Most of the specific 
literature, be it books or academic articles, only tends to 
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focus on one aspect or the other. It is either aimed at experts in the 
scientific side of the topic (pharmacology, criminology), or public 
policy (global health, international relations, economic) or industries 
(logistics, economic, R&D), all of which are specialized in one 
specific area. 
What is pharmacology? 
Pharmacology is an interdisciplinary branch of medicine that 
mixes biology and chemistry, commonly called “the science of 
drugs”. As seen in the contextualization part, pharmaco comes from 
Greek – pharmakon – poison/remedy, and logy from logos – the 
study of. Its fields of application cover everything from the 
development of medicines to their use after they have been put on 
the market. This science includes various disciplines such as 
pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics, clinical pharmacology, 
experimental pharmacology, pharmacovigilance, pharmaco- 
epidemiology and even pharmaco-economics. All of these sub- 
disciplines are specific in their study.48 
The founding father of pharmacology is considered to be 
Pedanius Dioscorides, a Greek physician who wrote his famous 
book between 50-70 C.E, the first pharmacopoeia,49 De materia 
medica, describing the preparations, properties and testing of drugs 
and medicinal preparations. This book has been read and used for 
more than sixteen centuries and made crucial contributions to what 
we know of pharmacology today. Already in his text, he clearly 
48 I will not detail each of them here but will briefly explain what I think are the most 
important regarding my research. Pharmacokinetics (PK) is the quantitative study of the 
four phases of a drug's development in the body: absorption, distribution, metabolism and 
elimination, so it describes the drug concentration-time courses in body fluids resulting 
from administration of a certain drug dose. Pharmacodynamics (PD) is the detailed study 
of how the drug works. It combines with any receptor, enzyme or cell structure to induce 
the pharmacological response. It is the observed effect resulting from a certain drug 
concentration. Pharmacovigilance aims to detect, evaluate, understand and prevent adverse 
effects that may occur during the use of a medicine in a population after it has been placed 
on the market. Every single pharmaceutical industry will have a department of 
pharmacovigilance in their infrastructure, as it constitutes a crucial component of this 
industry, especially for its viability (Meibohm and Derendorf, 1997). 
49 Pharmacopoeia today are published by legitimate authorities or governments. 
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refers to opium preparations for sleeping potions as a surgical 
anesthetic (Saleh, 2001). This example highlights the traditional 
importance of opium in its uses in the medicine field over several 
millennia. 
What are medicines? 
The WHO defines a medicine as any substance or 
composition presented as having preventive or curative properties 
with regard to human or animal diseases. It is any product that can 
be administered to humans or animals with a view to establishing a 
medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or modifying their 
organic functions (Saleh, 2001). 
The functions of medicines are twofold: therapeutic and 
diagnostic. Therapeutic use is more common and can be preventive, 
as for example vaccines, and/or curative; etiological; substitutive or 
for symptomatic purposes. The diagnostic function, on the other 
hand, is used for exploration and includes opacifiers, tracers, and 
various pharmacodynamic agents. The effects of medicines are 
usually classified by their therapeutic effects (therapeutic efficacy, 
favorable effect, beneficial effect, or clinical effect) and their 
adverse effects (notorious, secondary and toxic). There are different 
origins of fabricating medicines, which can be classified as 
followed: vegetable (plant-made), animals, synthetic, 
biotechnological/biogenetic, microbiological and mineral.50 While 
the focus here is on plant-based medicine, it will also be necessary 
to discuss synthetic origins for the case of opioids. 
50 Vegetable (whole plants or parts of plants such as mint) or extractant after purification as 
in alkaloids (morphine, quinine). Animals (organs, glands, tissues). Active ingredients 
obtained after extraction, especially hormones and enzymes. Synthetics (complex 
molecules obtained by organic chemical synthesis methods or by the transformation of 
already known molecules). Biotechnology/biogenetics (by genetic engineering methods - 
manufacture of natural polypeptide substances that have characteristics of their human 
model (hormones, cytokines)). Microbiological: vaccines from bacteria or viruses and 
sometimes certain antibiotics. Mineral (natural mineral products used as active ingredients 
or excipients for medicines (e.g., water, talcum powder, sodium bicarbonate, magnesium 
sulphate)) (Saleh, 2001). 
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A typical drug is composed of an active ingredient (known 
as active pharmaceutical ingredients) which is a substance endowed 
with therapeutic properties. It supports the pharmacological activity 
of the medicine. In order to form a medicine with active 
pharmaceutical ingredients, through what is known as the 
formulation process of medicine manufacture, other compounds are 
used, which are referred to as “excipients.” An excipient is a 
substance, or a mixture of substances called auxiliary substances, 
inactive by themselves, which facilitate the preparation and use of 
medicine. An excipient can sometimes have adverse effects, but 
usually the most neutral one is chosen and used. The excipient is 
particularly important when choosing a drug delivery system in the 
formulation process. Drug delivery systems are engineered 
technologies for the targeted delivery and/or controlled release of 
therapeutic agents (Drug Delivery System, 2016). Therefore, the 
selection of one type over another in a drug delivery system will 
influence the form and efficacy of the medicine. A drug can either 
be sub-lingual/oral (tabs/pills/sprays), transdermal (patch), rectal 
(suppository), subcutaneous (intramuscular, intravenous), 
intrathecal/epidural (cerebral spinal fluid), intranasal and 
iontophoresis. This is important to keep in mind as some security 
considerations might come to play when choosing a drug delivery 
system51, other than pharmacology or economic factors. For 
instance, in the U.S. or in Switzerland, to avoid dependence and 
hinder access to certain drugs, the form of the delivery will differ 
depending on the client/patient. Hospitals will usually have soluble 
medicines for their inpatients whereas outpatients would be given 
51 It is interesting to note that strategically thinking of an effective drug delivery system is 
not only reserved to licit markets. In illicit markets, they also consider the form of a drug 
for its efficacity and traceability. It can arise from traffickers or consumer willingness. 
However, the reasons will be different. Traffickers will prefer forms for transport security, 
and consumers for purity and effectiveness of the drug. The latter was seen for the case of 
heroin in the 70s. Previously smoked or sniffed, due to a reduction in quality, consumers 
started to heat it and inject it, therefore changing the practices of this niche. Many 
considerations arose, especially with the HIV epidemic, and public policy had to adapt in 
order to contain the number of infections. 
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oral pills. This means that soluble medicines make diversion in 
hospital settings less probable. However, it would be incorrect to 
consider that this is the only reason. Costs and practicability are also 
important factors, as well as cultural values, as certain countries 
prefer one form over another (Schild, personal communication. 
October 7th, 2020). 
Medicines as a whole must respect three requirements: 
safety, efficacy and specificity. These requirements can be found in 
any pharmaceutical industry manufacturing or creating drugs, and 
typically a priority in pharmacovigilance (Schild, 2020; 
Anonymous, 2020). 
Regarding the naming of medicines, there are different 
names used depending on their different applications. Firstly, the 
scientific or chemical name is usually in accordance with 
international nomenclature but often too complicated to be used in 
daily practice. Secondly, the International Nonproprietary Name 
(INN) gives each active ingredient a standard name that can be used 
in all countries. The INN has been created on the WHO’s initiative, 
and is used by the UN apparatus, and sometimes other industrial 
actors. Thirdly, there is the commercial name: this is the brand name 
registered by the manufacturer, which is generally written in capital 
letters. And lastly there is a commodity code, the Harmonized 
System (HS) which was proposed initially by the WCO and is a 
multipurpose international product nomenclature used in 
international trade (WCO, 2020). Such varieties of nomenclature 
make enquiries and research particularly difficult and time 
consuming. 
Even though these names are instruments put in place to 
facilitate and make international trade more visible, to exhaustively 
grasp the range of medicines produced from a plant is extremely 
difficult and perhaps even impossible. For this research, diverse 
databases were examined to acknowledge the scope of opium-based 
medicines. This will be discussed at a later stage of this work. 
77 
Chapter IV. Opioids 
How is it relevant for us? 
One of the biggest ills in today’s world is pain. The number 
of people suffering from chronic pain is estimated to be extremely 
high, up to 40% of the population worldwide, being the “first reason 
why adults seek medical care” (Dahlhamer; Lucas; Zelaya; et al., 
2018: 1001). Chronic pain “has been linked to restrictions in 
mobility and daily activities, dependence on opioids, anxiety and 
depression, and poor perceived health or reduced quality of life” 
(Schappert; Burt 2006; Smith; Elliott; Chambers; et al., 2001; Greje; 
Von Korff; Gater 1998; in Dahlhamer, Lucas, Zelaya, et al., 2018: 
1001). Thus, addressing opioids is extremely relevant. 
Different medicines are available for pain-relief, depending 
on their type and intensity. The use of pain assessment tools with a 
variety of scales helps provide more customized treatment. 
Physiotherapy and other kinds of therapies may also be used. In the 
field of pain management and treatment, pain is more and more 
approached through a systemic perspective as the body and mind’s 
responses result from a complex variety of variables. In terms of 
medicines used in order to ease pain, the kind of pain - whether 
acute, chronic, nociceptive (which can be acute or chronic and either 
visceral or somatic) or neuropathic - will impact the selection of the 
type of drug, delivery and dosage. 52 This means that certain drugs 
will be preferred for types of pain, and here enters the crucial role of 
narcotics. 
52 For instance – different types of pain killer drugs used. Usually, there are gradual 
approaches to the type of medicine depending on the level and origin of pain. Although 
criticized for good reasons, the WHO issued guidelines “the three-step analgesic ladder” 
(WHO, 1986) for pain management medicines. Based upon the principles ‘by mouth’, ‘by 
the clock’, ‘by the ladder’, ‘for the individual’ and ‘attention to detail’ – they help 
physicians choose one drug over another and select timing. The types of medicines are the 
following: paracetamol, NSAIDs (nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs) typically 
ibuprofen or aspirin (both over the counter) and prescribed: corticosteroids, nerve blockers 
or anti-depressants, and opioid analgesics (codeine, morphine, and synthetic opioids – 
fentanyl, oxycodone etc. See appendix 6 to see the WHO three-step analgesic ladder. 
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Narcotics originally comes from the Greek word narkōtikon 
meaning stupor, making stiff or numb.53 It was then used in French 
and referred to a substance which induces sleep and blunts the senses 
(Narcotics, 2020; DEA, 2020; UNODC, 1956). Though some people 
associate narcotics to illegal drugs, today narcotics connote directly 
to opium, opium derivatives, and their semi-synthetic substitute. It 
is important to note that these substances are not prescribed or used 
in the same way throughout the world. It depends on the culture, 
practices and availability as well as the quality of medicine.54 
Finally, when it comes to pain relief, the aforementioned substances 
are part of the analgesic group of drugs. Analgesic drugs act on the 
central and peripheral nervous system and allay the feeling of pain, 
without causing loss of consciousness. On the other hand, antalgics 
– for which the terminologies are often used interchangeably – refer
to counteracting pain.
This leads to the need to distinguish between opiates and 
opioids – both being the most potent narcotics and analgesics 
available. Opioids or opiates likely sound familiar to the reader. 
Their similarity is that they are both analgesics and bind to opioid 
neurotransmitters. But general misunderstanding in the 
terminologies lie in the topic whenever it is brought up in 
discussions. This is why I will take the following sub-section to go 
over it, but also the important features to keep in mind when 
discussing opiates.55 
53 Narcotics can be analgesics (pain killers), hypnotics (sleep inducing), sedatives 
(soothing), anesthetic (inducing unconsciousness). The line between the four is not clearly 
drawn (UNODC, 1956). 
54 In a limited number of countries, diamorphine medicines (methadone) are found for the 
treatment of heroin dependence. The availability of this medicine goes theoretically against 
the U.N. conventions, but it is assumed by such states that they understand better their 
domestic needs, usually more liberal in their approach to drug control, and the use of 
methadone has shown positive results on patients. Also, another synthetic opioid antagonist 
can be used in case of opioid overdose, namely naloxone. Such medications have had 
specific studies regarding their diversion in hospital facilities and ambulatory treatment. 
This will be more explored at a later stage. 
55 Even if there are “official” resources, the resources are not exhaustive and it is not 
transcribed to the reality, as much heterogeneity is found in practice throughout the spheres. 
One particularly telling resource in terms of multi-names can be found in the “Multilingual 
dictionary of precursors and chemicals frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances”, transcribing names and chemical structures of the 
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The differences between opiates and opioids 
One should note that many different theories and definitions 
exist around the opiate and opioid distinction. Extra care needs to be 
taken as in some situations it is still not used properly, even in 
medical practice. Detailed research made it possible to specifically 
differentiate them. The main difference between the two are that: 
“opioids” represent a popular, most use term referring to any 
substances – natural, semi-synthetic, synthetic – which bind to opioid 
receptors and produce opiate-like effects. It is possible to find that to 
certain people this word might only mean synthetic substances. On 
the other hand, “opiates” derive solely from the opium poppy plant, 
usually the papaver somniferum (and sometimes papaver 
bracteatum) from which many alkaloids are then used in medicine 
manufacture. Therefore, opiates are opioids, but not all opioids are 
opiates.56 A figure was made to illustrate the differences at the end of 
this section. 
To compare morphine to a synthetic opioid, morphine is one of 
the strongest natural substance and also the oldest in practice. A 
synthetic opioid in comparison, fentanyl or oxycodone – identified 
as fueling the opioid crisis for the last twenty years – is a hundred 
more times potent than morphine (drugbank, n.d.). This contrast 
implies much reflection regarding dosage, availability, diversion and 
counterfeit-falsified of such substances. Indeed, it is much easier to 
create a synthetic medicine in clandestine laboratories than by 
accessing raw narcotic material, in any forms - opiate alkaloids, 
opium paste, or concentrate poppy straw.57 In this case, one would 
need some precursors and basic chemical and biological knowledge 
in order to counterfeit synthetic medicines. Another difference 
between the two is that morphine figures on the essential medicine 
substances. The link to access it: https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/2019-
%20MLD_Precursors_supplement-ebook.pdf  
56 Please see appendix 21 for a table of human use of opium compared to other opioids. 
57 In the industry section, terminologies will be better explained terminologies at the 
industry level (opium alkaloids, narcotic raw material, opium paste, opium resin, opium 
gum, concentrate of poppy straw, opium derivatives). 
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list, the EML. This list was created by the WHO to work towards the 
availability and access to essential medicine throughout the world, 
but also facilitate access to generics, after patents would expire, thus 
providing greater and cheaper medicines. In addition, one often 
debated issue is the inequal diffusion of essential drugs, mostly 
located in the Global North.58 
Other features in opiate that should be covered are that they 
are part of plant-made pharmaceuticals (Sil; Jha, 2014), for which 
their active pharmaceutical ingredients are called “alkaloids” 
(Bézanger-Beauquesne, 1958). Alkaloids are defined as “any of a 
number of medicinally active compounds produced by plants; 
alkaloids are often active in small amounts and toxic in large 
amounts; well-known alkaloids produced by plants include caffeine, 
codeine, morphine, nicotine, quinine and strychnine” (Segen’s 
medical dictionary, n.d.). For instance, in opium, a debatable number 
of alkaloids are found, ranging between seven to fifty. In medicine 
manufacture, six in particular are used, either because of their 
medical value and/or their economic benefit. The six main ones are 
morphine, codeine, thebaine, papaverine, oripavine and narcotine. 
However, their concentration will depend on the plant, even though 
they usually originate from the same root species, papaver 
somniferum. 
The situation nonetheless becomes more complex as one 
considers that “a number of other "opium alkaloids" are commercial 
products and are used medically, but they are not obtained directly 
from opium, but by conversion of morphine, codeine and thebaine” 
(UNODC, January 1st, 1953).59 This is due to chemical conversions, 
and from this point, an unaccountable number of derivatives can be 
58 Please see appendix 7 for three graphs on the distribution and availability of consumption 
of opioids. 
59 It seems important to note that even in the expert fields, terminologies can differ as can 
categorizations. So, for example, morphine might sometimes be considered as a natural and 
other times as semi-synthetic substance. The same applies in different ways for all 
substances and alkaloids. 
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made. For example, using thebaine as a base, one can obtain 
oxycodone, a semi-synthetics opioid broadly consumed today.60 
A last consideration should be made at this stage. One may ask 
whether it is possible to synthetically create morphine, or any other 
opiate alkaloids, without the raw narcotic material (i.e., opium)? 
This question is relevant because it could engender serious political, 
economic, and structural implications throughout the sector and in 
the diversions, illicit practices and activities denoting one process 
over another. Much research and development (R&D) activity has 
been undertaken in order to create a better cost-efficient solution and 
ready-made one. 
Two studies are particularly important: one is to transform 
“sugar-to-morphine”, commonly glucose to morphine, and the other 
one uses “brewer yeast” to morphine (Galanie; Thodey; Trenchard; 
et al., 2015; Oye; Lawson; Bubela; Maynard; 2015). From the 
researcher’s perspectives such transformation would have many 
benefits. Firstly, it would be safer, as no residue would be left in the 
final commodity – as reliant from raw material; and it would please 
fervent believers in the national economy, as they would no longer 
need to rely on foreign essential commodities, therefore allowing the 
industry to flourish from within, and fixing a “broken globalized 
supply chain” as shown by the COVID-19 pandemic (Smolke, July 
16th, 2020). From an economic perspective, this would reduce most 
of the many uncertainties in crop yields (DeLoache; Russ; Narcross; 
et al., 2015) such as the weather, climate change or pests; but above 
all, an alternative more cost-efficient and generating better value. 
However, in a perspective of world-system theory, this could well 
be catastrophic given the current transnational distribution of labor, 
the success of such technologies would mean profound 
restructuration throughout the plant-based pharmaceutical industry, 
affecting all its currently players, benefiters and losers, it would 
60 One should also note the use of opium cultivation for other purposes than medicine such 
as in the food industry (poppy seeds, poppy oil). 
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redistribute many cards. This could well be what Schumpeter coined 
as creative destruction in 1942: an appearance of innovative 
technology, creating chaos, before rebuilding other perspectives- 
similar to a newborn phoenix arising from its ashes. 
But such a scenario is not yet the current reality, in spite of 
twenty years of progress in that direction. Potency has not yet 
reached commercial standards, and research is continued to reach 
them. It is nonetheless important to address developments and 
research of this nature, as the COVID-19 pandemic has added weight 
to arguments around self-reliance in essential commodities, 
outlining fragile global supply chains in general, but also in 
pharmaceuticals being of utmost importance. Such research might 
well change the whole global production network. 
The medical and non-medical uses of opioids 
Figure 10 : Opioids for medical and non-medical purposes 
The graph above describes the medical and non-medical purposes of 
opioids. It is striking to note the highly normative stance from an 
official source, the UNODC in the World Drug Report 2019. Indeed, 
one can correctly see the distinction between opiates and synthetics 
opioids. However, two misconceptions can be observed. 
The first, and most important, is the circle for pharmaceutical 
opioids. It does not take into account heroin, morphine and opium 
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although they are used in pharmaceutical opioids. Opium, morphine 
and heroin (in some countries) are prescribed and used, and for the 
case of morphine, it is the most widely administered substance in the 
medical field. This is extremely important to point out, as it 
illustrates quite clearly the level of misinformation, which is 
prevalent regarding controlled substances, an area of conflicting 
specialized knowledge. The position of some key players (medical 
authorities and official actors working in the international control 
apparatus) involves misinterpretations. This converges with some of 
the interviews I conducted (Anonymous, 2020; Schild, 2020). When 
discussing whether heroin was a legally manufactured substance, 
medicine, the response was negative. However, it is, and can be in 
certain circumstances. This current confusion is noteworthy, 
particularly as all my interviewees can be considered – and consider 
themselves - as experts in the field: scientists, doctors, regulators in 
the international drug regime, law enforcement in controlled 
substances or drug policy analysts.61 
The second misinterpretation in figure 10, above, lies in the 
denomination “under international control.” Indeed, fentanyl and its 
analogues are under international control as are most research 
opioids. The interview with Prof. Schild, the Titan group DEA and 
the ECDD all stressed the difficulties for researchers to access 
opioids for research purposes. Even for minimal quantities, the 
criteria can be extremely rigorous, and the waiting list can be up to 
several years. In this respect, from the interviewees’ perspectives, it 
can be quite detrimental to have such weight for insignificant 
quantities. 
61 An interesting perspective is Cetina’s work on epistemic cultures. As she described, the 
term culture is often applied in many fields but when it comes to knowledge not. In order 
to analyze it, she says “one needs to magnify the space of knowledge-inaction, rather than 
simply observe disciplines or specialties as organizing structures.” I tried to implement this 
in the thesis, to extract knowledge culture societies in order to bring out a deep 
understanding of this broad topic (1999:3). 
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One highly debated issue should also be addressed here. 
Once a substance is put under international control, it becomes very 
difficult to determine who can prescribe it. This was an issue 
particularly in the Global South countries in which nurses are the 
primary care givers, but also often the first to prescribe medicines. 
For a substance to figure both in the international control schedules 
and on the essential medicine list can bring complications in 
implementation or in practice. In fact, to ascertain whether a 
substance is under current control or not, one must consult the 
yellow list published every year by the INCB (Yellow List 59th 
edition, INCB, n.d.).62 
To conclude this section, it would not be an understatement 
to say that legal and illegal, at least when it comes to opioids, are not 
distinguishable categories. Fortunately, this statement is not only 
mine but shared by many others. As an example, my e-mail 
exchange with Medicrime, a branch of Swissmedic, describing 
medicrime as “the umbrella term used by Swissmedic for all national 
and international activities to combat medicinal product-related 
crime” (Swissmedic, n.d.) can confirm it. To my questions: “do you 
believe legal and illegal activities are distinguishable” and “do you 
think there are nodes in the global supply chain that favorize illicit 
activities” they went further and responded by the affirmative “yes” 
(Medicrime, personal communication, December 3rd, 2020). The 
following section will thus examine the industry and attempt to 
identify these nodes, as well as the power that might be exercised in 
such a situation. 
62 All the lists can be found here: https://www.incb.org/incb/en/narcotic-
%20drugs/Yellowlist/yellow-list.html last accessed on November 17th, 2020. 
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Figure 11 : Summary of the technical aspects covered 








Opium Heroin Fentanyl 
Morphine Hydromorphone Methadone 
Codeine Hydrocodone Tramadol 
Thebaine Oxycodone Meperidine 
It seems important to mention that semi-synthetics are not 
clear categories. For instance, to make heroin, one needs a chemical 
named acetyl anhydride (also called acetic anhydride), a 
necessary precursor. From opium gum, from which morphine 
can be extracted, with a mixture of compounds and chemical 
process, one can obtain heroin. Due to this process, heroin is 
considered as semi-synthetic. Thus, any individual with minimum 
equipment can transform it for many different utilities. 
Pharmacology: science of drugs 
Medicine manufacture. Key components drug delivery system + active 
pharmaceutical ingredients + formulation 
Type of medicines for pain relief/pain management. Analgesics (allays the feeling of 
pain) + antalgics (counteracts pain). 
Difference between opioids and opiates. Opioids: all substances binding to 
neurotransmitters (plant, semi-synthetic, synthetic) vs opiate refers only to the plant-
based active ingredients (also called alkaloids). 
The substances of interest for us. Narcotics, which usually refers to opiates in general, 
also connotes to illegal substances like heroin. For us specifically, opium and its 
derivatives. 
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From poppy fields to opium trade 
In this chapter I aim to respond to my first research question and 
identify the critical nodes in the global production network of 
opiates. As a reminder, critical nodes in this work are interpreted as 
microcosms within a network in which value can be created, 
captured, transformed, or logistically transported; they are 
considered as crucial because of their role in the supply-chain and in 
their potential of being exposed to illicit practices such as diversion. 
This definition takes into account the actors and objects involved in 
those specific nodes, requiring that the actors and objects (such as 
regulatory instruments) involve a combination of logical 
perspectives which can be subject to change over time. Global 
production networks of opium also describe a global multiscalar 
network of licit and illicit economic and noneconomic actors, 
through licit and/or illicit practices, behaviors, sometimes 
coordinated, but from which actors are implicated in the specific 
industry. 
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To identify critical nodes, I will focus on the global supply chain 
of opium as a commodity. I will first explain and analyze how opium 
is cultivated and harvested. Then I will move on to the international 
trade of the commodities. This is important as it will show routes 
and give insight into the traceability of opium as a good, as well as 
featuring the actors involved in these various steps and the critical 
node location and forms. I will discuss in more detail the last critical 
node identified, and the end of the supply-chain, illicit practices in 
consumption. Finally, I will put forward several observations on the 
global production networks focused on the industry of opiates. 
The methods of opium harvests 
When examining the global supply chain of opium, and 
institutional documents, what becomes clear is the debate regarding 
the choice of method used for cultivating and harvesting this 
commodity. It appears that the choice of method is politically 
argued. Either for parts of traditions and domestic economic 
dependency, or for economic and security efficiency. 
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Figure 13 : A drawing of the opium poppy (papaver somniferum)63 
The traditional harvesting method 
A unique characteristic of opium is that it can grow nearly 
anywhere if the climate is clement enough. The plant used is 
generally papaver somniferum or bracteatum. Usually, fields are 
secured in such a way as to avoid diversion, but this practice is 
questionable. Space does not allow for a detailed description of 
63 Thomé, O. W. (1885). Flora of Germany, Austria and Switzerland - in words and pictures 
for school and home. http://www.biolib.de/ accessed on December 28th, 2020. 
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cultivation, but I will focus on two methods to harvest poppies: the 
traditional method vs the industrialized method. 
The traditional way to harvest is to vertically scratch off 
opium poppies capsules (seed pod) with a sharp scraping tool so that 
the milky latex it contains oozes out. Once the latex dries out and 
becomes dark, the semi-dried gum is harvested with a curved trowel 
and then left into a bigger recipient for it to dry completely.64 Once 
the gum is dried, this is what is called resin or gum and its trade 
commodity’s name is usually opium sap.65 The opium sap is then 
traded around the globe (its legal side is mostly concentrated in four 
key regions: Asia, North America, Europe and Tasmania). It is 
usually with this base that alkaloids are then extracted to formulate 
medicines with an added excipient. Other than for pharmaceutical 
use, the opium sap can be consumed in some places for 
traditional/cultural reasons, often by smoking opium.66 
The traditional method used to be the one chosen by all 
“traditional suppliers’ countries” – mostly located in the so-called 
Global South.67 For example, under the UN Single Convention 
(1961), India is the sole country authorized to produce and export 
opium gum. A practice well-documented in scholarship, to produce 
and export opium gum, implies the use of the traditional method 
(CBN website, 2020). However, this method also has some 
disadvantages. It is said that India has a unique status. “It is a sole 
licensed exporter of raw opium” (solid 90% content for UNODC) as 
a final product to the pharmaceutical world but also one of the 
biggest consumers, and the third largest producer of illicit opium 
(after Burma and Afghanistan) (Paoli et al, 2008: 347). 
64 See Appendix 8 for pictures of the traditional harvest method. 
65 For an example of what opium sap can contain, a figure on Indian sap is provided in 
Appendix 9. 
66 The popular way to describe one’s smoking opium is “chasing the dragon”. The root for 
this expression is debated but seems to have emerged in Asia. 
67 However, Turkey has passed to the industrialized method, and India is slowly adapting 
parts of its industry in the industrialized method. 
90 
Indeed, this method has been described by the Central 
Bureau of Narcotics (CBN) in India - which oversees cultivation and 
trade in legal opium and comes under the finance ministry— the 
lancing as a “skill acquired by years of experience... the depth of  
incision (by sharp blades) an accomplished, precise art" (Bera, Sep 
8th, 2017). This method has advantages since it is traditional it 
involves historical ties to this type of agriculture and agronomics - 
and thus employment and rural activities are implicated for these 
resources, and value is extracted, even though the value is less than 
the manufacturing itself. It also means that countries such as India 
are to some extent dependent on this niche market for their economic 
and societal economic well-being. The most important aspect for this 
research topic is the proportion of diversion that can arise from such 
a system. Although great effort has been devoted to prevent such 
behaviors, it is also a well-documented, everyday practice.68 This 
method would then constitute the identification of one of my first 
critical node. This critical node has different facets. Its culture and 
harvest, until its transportation to refineries. I will turn into the 
diversion practices that are current in this method now. 
A first priority for opium as a tradable commodity, and of 
utmost importance for this controlled substance due to its potential 
abuse, is to prevent diversion. Diversion, as explained above, “is the 
theft of opium at any point along regulated production and 
distribution lines” (Windle, 2012:56). 
Tracing back opium as a commodity in the perspective of a 
global production network has allowed me to highlight the types of 
diversion that can happen. Thus, the cultivation and harvest of 
poppies through this method is the first critical node and is 
characterized by various illicit practices. In spite of employing 
68 Please refer to appendix 10 for an illustrative one-page extract of an official document 
produced by the CBN in India, of de-licensed cultivators in one facility based in one region, 
for the year 2020-2021. What is striking is the section “reason for de-license” – and 
“theft/missing capsule” being predominant in the page extract. The other reason is “MQY- 
M below 4.2”. This refers to the minimum quantity yield of the plants containing mostly 
morphine alkaloids, a minimum quantity imposed by the CBN. 
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research articles, interviews, and my own investigative research, 
working on diversion can be complicated as the data available is 
solely based on official seizures made public. 
To prevent diversion from happening,69 divisional offices 
estimate the average yield produced in each village. This is a 
politically lobbied process70 and has to be linked directly with the 
black market as being “congruent to licensing – since opium farmers 
are able to produce significantly more than they had been licensed 
to” – a practice that has been taking place for some time now 
(Carnac, 1866 in Windle, 2012). The estimation is called “MQY”, 
an acronym meaning “minimum quantity yield”, with a number 
variables taken into account, such as the field condition, climate, 
past harvests, quality of gum; overall making an estimation of the 
minimum quantity yield on which the cultivator agrees in delivering 
such a result after the harvest. 
Diversion can already start before the cultivation of poppies. 
Indeed, in order to farm poppies, one need seeds. Obtaining seeds 
usually requires an official route, having to register and provide 
some information in order to buy them. Once purchased, however, 
there is room for diversion at this early stage and it is extremely 
difficult to control the right usage of seeds. This is due to countless 
factors such as not having the number of poppies initially mandated. 
It is possible to resell seeds to the illicit market, farm the seeds 
directly for the illicit market on unknown lands, or farm the seeds to 
feed personal cravings.71 
69 Other tools are used in detection and prevention of diversion such as satellite imagery 
and money retribution. 
70 The setting of MQY is highly politicized. The opium lobby (opium farmers, political 
patrons) if not happy can mobilize, and have in the past (US Department of States, 2005). 
71 What led me to think it could be a critical node is that the official website of the Central 
Bureau Narcotics in India has a section in which they require specific documents for the 
registration and import of poppy seeds. This fact strongly suggested that illicit practices 
must happen at this stage already. For the document details please see: “List of Documents 
to be submitted for grant of Registration for import of Poppy Seeds” or “List of Documents 
to be submitted by first time importer of Poppy Seeds” at 
https://cbn.nic.in/html/opiumcbn.htm (accessed on 15.12.2020). Another factor is the 
prohibition of selling poppy seeds in Taiwan (for exactly this purpose – out of fear of people 
growing poppies). This thought is therefore supported by others than me. In other countries, 
poppy seeds can be prohibited for their content in morphine (making false positive drug 
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According to Paoli and her colleagues (2009), diversion in 
Indian’s licit poppy fields can occur in four additional ways. Firstly, 
cultivators may plant additional hectares without the proper licenses; 
secondly, cultivators may claim falsely that licit growing is not 
harvestable and sell harvests illicitly; thirdly, a proper licensed and 
harvested field might yield more than the minimum quantity and the 
unreported excess can be sold illicitly; and finally, diversion can 
arise after the purchase from the government due to corrupted agents 
selling out the government inventory (Paoli et al, 2008: 349). 
In addition to these diversion methods, India is the only 
country that permits opium gum extraction and its export rather than 
“poppy straw concentrate” which is less prone to diversion. A 
fundamental trait then is that “diversion is a routine and openly 
tolerated activity and, to a certain extent, even promoted by local 
cultural norms and social structures.” (Paoli et al, 2008 :349), 
coming from the corruption of elected village headman known as the 
Lambardhar, who work for the government and have to record daily 
yields of opium from the cultivators. Indeed, agreeing with the 
studies conducted by Mansfield (2000, 2001), Lambardhar has a key 
role in the diversion process. By making false declaration and the 
practice of turning a blind eye they directly take part in diversion of 
crops, through means of benefits in return. 
The traditional method has been criticized since accurate 
estimates of the minimum quantity yield (even if it is high) is crucial 
to the success of licit production, but it is also more prone to 
diversion and superintendent of police have even gone as far as 
saying: “I strongly think the government should put an end to open 
cultivation and make way for captive farming by pharmaceutical 
companies" as “leaving the task of extracting the opium gum to 
farmers opens the door for illegalities” (Bera, Sep 8th, 2017). The 
concentrate of poppy straw method as used in other countries is more 
test results), such as in Singapore or United Arab Emirates for example. The selling of 
poppy seeds will be explored at a different critical node later. 
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secure. But having a high minimum quantity yield can result in other 
illicit practices in order to meet the minimum harvest contracted and 
not be de-licensed for the year after the farmer purchases the 
shortfall, illegally, from a neighbor whose yield is higher for a large 
sum of money (Bera, Sep 8th, 2017). 
This critical node explored above could well be applied to 
other countries applying this method, although techniques might 
differ. However, it seems striking that licit and illicit are intertwined. 
In the case of India, might it be through diversion practices, or the 
source of opiates to be found, there is blatantly illicit domestic 
cultivation, while its geopolitical position makes imports from 
Afghanistan and imports from Burma possible, and the diversion 
from licit production.72 “Illicit opium is most, produced domestically 
under licit auspices” (Paola et al, 2008: 348). Many justifications 
can be put forward, but one is overriding: the money farmers receive 
from licit and illicit sources is incredibly different and therefore an 
economic necessity (Ibid., 352). The analysis should not end here; 
indeed, when looking at the big picture, the link between India being 
the pharmaceutical center of the South, significant manufacturer of 
medicine, and the counterfeit of medicine is clear and has also been 
confirmed by some of the interviews conducted (Medicrime, 2020). 
Finally, to close the loop on the traditional poppy field critical 
node, one must visualize this subject as a puzzle. The production and 
commerce of opium poppy is not solely focused on opium, but also 
has by-products. Such by-products, for example poppy seeds, are 
then sold for culinary purposes. These seeds come from the same 
poppies and have morphine content, they could be the source to 
potential future illicit harvests (Carlin; Dean; Ames; 2020). This can 
be linked to my earlier point about the registered seeds needed in 
order to farm opium poppies. 
72 Please see appendix 11 for a table on the steps in opium cultivation to heroin manufacture 
process, how with only a few chemicals and material, one can make heroin. 
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Nonetheless, from the occidental perspective, 
pointing out to India’s particular case is political bargaining, to the 
same extent as pointing out Afghanistan as a nearly exclusive illegal 
source of opium and heroin (Tinasti, 2020). Many more participate, 
but Afghanistan is most discussed. Indeed, it is political as in India 
the industry is state-owned but has inherent structural flaws which 
enables a fully diversion-free industry. Whereas industrialized 
countries are proud of their most effective method when it comes to 
speed, effectivity and control (UNODC, 1956) - are also prone to 
diversion. The main difference is that this diversion is much 
opaquer, and pharmaceutical industries are responsible of their 
actions and misdoings working in a mixed environment of trust and 
mistrust. Let us explore this now. 
The industrial harvesting method 
The industrial poppy straw process of harvesting consists of 
using the dried whole poppy capsules with the straw (Breger Bush, 
2020: 8). Then the dried poppy is processed into a crude extract 
referred as “narcotic raw material” and is flown to manufacturing 
facilities (Pacific Standard, July 24th, 2019). In these facilities, 
alkaloids are extracted, then referred to as “concentrate of poppy 
straw” (CPS) or if more refined, “opium alkaloids and their 
derivatives”. Usually, such a method does not involve human labor  
as such, but mostly machinery for the whole process. 
The advantages of this method are that is it much more cost- 
efficient, as the input is less, compared to the output, (human labor 
vs machinery and time), and is less prone to diversion practices. It is 
less prone to diversion as the whole plant is used towards the 
extraction of alkaloids. This method is particular to pharmaceutical 
purposes whereas, as said above, the traditional method has various 
purposes, including the selling of by-products coming from the 
poppy plant. 
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It should also be mentioned that in the industrial method of 
poppy farming, over time, the plants have been genetically 
transformed in order to perform better in their hold of active 
ingredients. This means that papaver somniferum or papaver 
bracteatum can have a distinctive yield potentiality in their content. 
In the field, the different types of plants from which alkaloids will 
be extracted are denominated as “papaver somniferum/CPS (M), 
(T), (C), (N), (O)” (INCB, 2019: 145).73 The letter in brackets 
indicates the main alkaloid prevalent that will be extracted. 
This method is usually used by “non-traditional suppliers”, 
mostly located in the Global North. Eleven countries are listed to 
legally produce and sell narcotic raw material and use the 
concentrate poppy straw (CPS) method: i.e., Australia, Austria, 
France, China, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, 
Turkey and Czech Republic. However, the countries involved in 
cultivating poppies can vary regarding sources. Sometimes Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Japan and Luxembourg figure as well 
(UNODC, 2019:34), as do Macedonia, Democratic Republic of 
Korea and Japan (Williams, 2010: 304).74 For most of these 
countries, the industrial production of opium poppies has been a 
process over the years as crops might have been cultivated for 
hundreds of years prior, for food or other reasons, as for the case of 
Hungary when it begun its commercial morphine opium poppies 
production (UNODC, 1953). 
I was able to identify potential critical nodes in the 
industrialized method.75 I will take the case of Tasmania as an 
example. As Williams (2010) explored in his article with the 
theoretical framework of deconstruction, Tasmania has an ultra- 
73 (M)= Morphine; (T)= Thebaine; (C)= Codeine; (O)= Oripavine. 
74 In the following section I will explore the data I have collected with the list of countries 
enumerated to see if it coincides. As for the list of countries involved, the specific method is 
assumed to be industrialized but clear data could not be found. 
75 it was nearly impossible to find anything on the production, manufacture and commerce 
of the commodity – in all its forms. The main reason is due to opacity and information 
deemed confidential. 
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modern manufacturing process – and can be examined “as both 
isolated (insular by definition) and connected (globalized)” 
(Williams, 2010: 290). Tasmania “has often provided up to half of 
the world’s supply of licit narcotics each year” (Idem.,) and counts 
for a significant part of its economy. Tasmania plays on its 
“islandness; drug free, geospatial- law-abiding” (Ibid., 297) and 
meanwhile it is an international success, with significant levels of 
output and technological innovation, it is yet “shrouded in mystery” 
(Ibid., 291). This tendency for the industry to be covert arises 
because its commodities are “not ordinary merchandise'' (Wood, 
1988:149). Although the narcotic raw material can vary in types and 
strengths from the various producing countries and counterparts, I 
would suggest that the process from opium poppies to medicine is 
very similar, and therefore, the critical nodes too. 
Although there might be specific characteristics to one’s 
territory, it seems like general patterns can be attributed to this type 
of industry overall. As Williams said, deconstruction can be a “useful 
tool for interpreting such discursive silences and duplicity, and it has 
a specific relevance in this context” (Williams, 2010: 292). How 
opium is referred to – or omitted – in addition to the opacity and 
secrecy englobing the industry greatly reveals the inner workings of 
the business, the rules of the game between the players and its link 
with domestic and international regulations. Obfuscation is intended 
as it minimizes enormously the potentiality of one to familiarize with 
the topic and research it. It creates an extremely complex system that 
no one can understand fully and therefore leaves power to be 
exploited by the actors who know how the business work and its 
possibilities. 
Further evidence of intrinsic political processes in the 
making of regulations is the 80/20 rule, adopted in the 70s by the 
U.S. (one of the largest consumers in the world) (DEA, 2008: 1312). 
They decided to buy 80% of their morphine from Turkey and India 
– a rule still in place today.  Turkey has been considered as  a
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traditional country, open to illicit crops and had important incentives 
to convert illegal production into legal. Over time, they changed 
their method to concentrate poppy straw (CPS) as in the past they 
were using the traditional method. At the time, the U.S. saw a 
political advantage in letting Turkey doing so, as it would halt the 
“spread of communism as a heavily Muslim country that had warm 
relations with Israel” (New York Times, July 19th, 2014). 
This is the context in which GlaxoSmithKline and Johnson 
and Johnson (Business Standard Report, March 4th, 2015), at the 
time in competition in this type of industry in Tasmania, exploited a 
regulation loophole. Indeed, the substances regulated concerned 
certain strains of opium poppies, and through genetic engineering, 
these companies were able to syntheses the papaver bracteatum 
(Washington Post, March 26th, 2020), deadly if consumed from the 
fields76, and high in thebaine content (one of the alkaloids). This was 
the premise of oxycodone, and the exportation into U.S. soils in great 
numbers, as no regulations had been placed on thebaine. This 
“allowed for a decades-long boom in licit opioid production fueled 
by Tasmanian-grown poppies” (Pacific Standard, July 24th, 2019). 
This opened a market in the U.S. and was exploited by the 
pharmaceutical industries, which then undertook general 
malpractice from them into the medical practice by sponsoring 
congresses and the sale of this new –non-addictive— medicine, 
which resulted in over-prescription and high numbers of addicts 
which is still the case today (Financial Times, June 19th, 2020; 
Brookings, June 22nd, 2020). Industrial manufacturers do exploit 
possibilities in order to grow and have better opportunities in their 
market shares. Although highly moral and directly linked to the 
76 On diversion practices, newspaper articles can be informative. In a few articles, there 
have been reports of death resulting from the ingestion of opium poppy capsules in 
Tasmania. Indeed, the opium poppies cultivated in Tasmania can be highly dangerous if 
consumed as is and several people have died resulting from the theft of these (ABC, 
September 19th, 2013; Worldwide Waftage, January 4th, 2017; ABC, May 9th, 2017). In 
response to the thefts and deaths, the Tasmanian Justice Department has asked to place a 
death danger sign outside the facilities. 
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health of the people, it remains a business striving for profit, in 
which illicit practices can come to play. This phenomenon that I 
have just described could be considered as a critical node. 
Other potential critical nodes may exist, as 
mentioned earlier, for the traditional method in the seeds in order to 
cultivate poppies, but mostly at the initial stage. Otherwise, 
diversion can occur at different steps, such as diverting parts of the 
harvests, the chemical used in the process (which can then be sold 
and used in the illicit market), proportions of the narcotic raw 
material itself, and diversion when it comes to inventorying and 
transporting the substances. Another important concern, especially 
for illegal trafficking is the use of internet. One can think that 
internet can be a tool for which to pass merchandise or communicate 
in diversion of licit production too. These types of diversion not only 
feed the illicit market but also individual substance dependences. 
In fact, forensic and chemical studies show that the heroin 
found in Tasmania and Australia is of the same chemical compounds 
as that of the licit production in controlled facilities.77 With 
techniques in order to determine the origin of heroin, scientists were 
able to identify the signature compound of this substance, with 
oripavine, present in the papaver bracteatum, for thebaine. This 
important study reinforces the fact that diversion does happen, even 
in licit facilities using the industrial method, and in the Global North 
(Odell; Skopec; McCluskey, 2008). However, it is unclear whether 
one can fully accept this study as a reliable source, or whether it is a 
case of researchers being pressurized. An erratum has been 
formulated from the industries and Tasmanian officials at the 
express wish of the Tasmanian Poppy Advisory and Control Board 
(PACB) saying it does not “accurately reflect the current state of the 
Tasmanian poppy industry”. What is certain, however, is the 
77 The only company I am referring to is Extractas Bioscience – formerly known as 
Tasmanian Alkaloids. They changed their brand name in 2020. Their website: 
https://extractas.com.au/expertise/alkaloid-raw-materials/ accessed on the December 16th, 
2020. 
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historical thefts of flower pods and their potential to be transformed 
into heroin (Odell; Skopec; McCluskey, 2008). 
The critical nodes in the industrial method are much more 
difficult to point out compared to the Indian case and much opaquer 
and lobbied. When interviewing retired pharmaceutical employee, 
he told me: “everything is done to prevent. It depends obviously on 
the country and the matter but most attention is driven on counterfeit 
drugs, and wholesaler, depending on the matter. Usually there are 
one or two bottles of diversion, but we use special seal and lot 
numbers so we can detect anomalies easily.” He continued by saying 
that in such an industry “there are no such thing as business as usual” 
and that there is always something. 
Another predominant feature that illustrated my interview 
was the importance of the environment of distrust amongst all actors 
involved. Pharmaceutical industries are subject to regional laws in 
addition to other international differences. For instance, to my 
question “do you know all actors involved in this business” he 
responded: “yes, it is our responsibility. Products are registered in 
one country and the mistake would be excessive – in cost and jail. In 
the European Union there is the QPPV78 – which means that the 
responsibility is on the person and not the company.” This kind of 
industry is costly, risky and highly competitive, with many 
variations between small and big companies, with many facets 
around it, making the entire business incredibly complicated. It has 
been said that from a government or regulator’s point of view, it is 
under a climate of trust and mistrust that business happens 
(Anonymous, 2020; Schild, 2020; Medicrime, 2020). A number of 
tools developed in the industries prevent diversion from happening, 
including contents being sealed, lot numbers and expiry dates 
inventories, fully computerized systems with sophisticated software 
in which everything is calculated. Clearly, it would be far too 
78 Qualified Person Responsible for Pharmacovigilance (QPPV). This protects the company 
by making responsible the person in charge. 
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difficult for regulators to verify all the compliance to regulations. 
Therefore, companies have this flexibility to themselves undertake 
such compliance, and possibly be controlled at a later stage, by an 
external compliance body. Regulators do trust pharmaceutical 
industries in the sense that they should comply with regulations, but 
regulators do not fully trust pharmaceutical industries in the sense 
that they have to put forward regulations and sometimes control it. 
It is also interesting to note that for regulators or businesses, it is in 
their interest that behavior is up to standards as it would otherwise 
badly reflect on their reputation. As my interviews with Prof. Schild, 
Ms Steber Büchli and the retired pharmaceutical employee exposed, 
pharmaceutical industries have absolutely no gain to turn into illicit 
sources for their business. If they want to be viable, they ought to 
control their sources properly. 
Furthermore, during my interview with the Titan Group 
DEA, the response to my question “are businesses usually compliant 
with the current regulations?” was that “every one of them [they had 
visited] were never a hundred percent compliant.” The percentages 
of incompliance thus leave room for malpractice. The whole supply 
chain is supposed to be on a “closed loop distribution” meaning as it 
leaves the manufacture until its distribution, nothing should slip out. 
Nonetheless, as theft occurs in manufacturing facilities, one can find 
shipments with unexpected addresses, stolen by different means. 
This is why other tools are used, depending on the country, to track 
down the good until its consumption. What is interesting to bear in 
mind, is that for instance in the U.S. it is based upon trust that 
companies should follow their own compliance. If they notice 
something unusual, they can contact the DEA, or other companies 
that will look into their compliance system. Apart from the DEA’s 
occasional random audits, compliance is to the responsibility of the 
business itself, and whether or not it is possible to be “diversion- 
free”, the interviews I had suggested different responses, a few 
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agreeing but most understanding that this is part of the business, and 
impossible to fully eradicate. 
Finally, what is important to understand here is that the 
responsibility of diversion in any kind of harvesting method is borne 
by the country of origin of the cultivation. This means that 
internationally speaking, all actors accept that what has to be 
controlled happens in their territory. In terms of international trade, 
it is a commodity like any other controlled one. It is not to anyone’s 
advantage to have a supreme authority that would oversee the entire 
global trade. 
Figure 14 : Summary Traditional vs Industrialized method 
Traditional method Industrialized method 
Poppy fields à scratch off 
poppy pods à milky latex 
àdries out à “opium 
gum/sap/resin”; poppy seeds 
harvested. 
Poppy fields à drying of the 
whole poppy à dried poppies 
processed into extract or 
powder known as “narcotic raw 
material”; poppy seeds can be 
used. 
Opium sap goes to centralized 
refineries and then to 
pharmaceutical industries 
throughout the world. This 
will be refined and finalize 
into “opium alkaloids”. 
Narcotic raw material is flown 
to manufacturing facilities, 
which is then referred to 
“concentrate of poppy straw” 




Figure 15 : Critical nodes identified in the first phase 
• Corruption of officials








• Theft from the poppy
fields 
• Unreported excess sold
to illicit markets
• Theft of poppy straw or
sap 
• the base for heroin
manufacture
opium sap 




harvesting • False claim of not harvestable
crops that are sold illciitly 
• Theft of dried latex
• Theft of dried poppy straw
• Minimum quantity yield
might be excessed but left
unreported 
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The international trade 
The names of the trade 
Figure 16 : Graph of the identified forms of opium as commodities 79
In order to further grasp the critical nodes in the licit channels, it 
is important to understand the forms opium can take as a commodity. 
This kind of thought provides information on who-does-what-when. 
It is also useful as to provide data on the global trade of opium, and 
its derivatives as it enhances how opium is captured in the 
international trade. I will thus describe below how this commodity 
is coded internationally in the context of international trade and 
substance control. 
The World Customs Organization (WCO) created a 
“multipurpose international product nomenclature […] which 
comprises more than 5,000 commodity groups; each identified by a 
six-digit code, arranged in a legal and logical structure and is 
supported by well-defined rules to achieve uniform classification. 
79 Made by my own understanding on the diverse form opium can take, and how it is referred to in 
international trade, including the methods of cultivating and harvesting. There might be other forms 
of opium poppy that are sold, but within my research, I was only able to confirm these forms. 
“By-products” are considered to be by the market, but in fact they are really not. Poppy seeds can be 
used for poppy cultivation (and make the loop from seeds to poppy again) and poppy straw is what is 
primarily used as the trade code for then the extraction of alkaloids.  
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[It] is used by more than 200 countries and economies as a basis for 
their Customs tariffs and for the collection of international trade 
statistics. Over 98 % of the merchandise in international trade is 
classified in terms of the HS (Harmonized System)” (WCO, n.d.).80 
Thus, this instrument is particularly useful to order international 
trade and helps to provide some clarity in all the forms that one 
commodity can have. 
The Harmonized System is organized is twenty-one sections, 
and I base the following on the latest edition, 2017. A new and 
accepted form will be enforced in 2022, but no changes appeared for 
the case of opium. Within the twenty-one sections, there are 
different chapters within which categories are referred as “heading” 
and each commodity has a six-digit “HS code”. For opium and its 
by-products, it had four appearances, in three different chapters, 
meaning that opium has four forms by which it can be traded. 
The first occurrence is in the chapter 12, (WCO, 2017) title: “Oil 
seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; 
industrial or medicinal plants; straw and fodder” with the heading 
1207 “other oil seeds and oleaginous fruits, whether or not broken” 
the HS code 1207.91 “Poppy seeds” appears. Poppy seeds are 
considered as by-products of the licit opium production. Those are 
traded for food consumption but also the opium poppy cultivation. 
As discussed above, one can presume a critical node in this form of 
commodity as diversion could occur, for example, for illicit 
cultivation of poppy crops. 
The second occurrence is in the same chapter (WCO, 2017), 
heading 1211 “Plants and parts of plants (including seeds and fruits), 
of a kind used primarily in perfumery, in pharmacy or for 
insecticidal, fungicidal or similar purposes, fresh, chilled, frozen or 
dried, whether or not cut, crushed or powdered” under the HS code 
1211.40 “Poppy straw, fresh or dried, whether or not cut, crushed or 
80 In appendix 12, a list of the countries and organizations applying the Harmonized System 
is provided. 
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powdered” figures. The purposes of poppy straw are not entirely 
clear, but as said in the heading, it can be used for different aims. 
However, poppy straw can be diverted into illicit ends, as it can be 
consumed as itself and transformed into illegal heroin. The latest 
news checked on this practice can be found on December 8th (GK 
news; December 8th, 2020; Daily Excelsior, December 8th, 2020). 
The difficulty here is to have a controlled substance that has legal 
by-products partially regulated but opened for other industries – a 
big issue also present in the precursor regulation debate. 
The third occurrence is in “section II (WCO, 2017): vegetable 
products”, chapter 13: “lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps 
and extracts”, for a heading: “13.02 Vegetable saps and extracts; 
pectic substances, pectinates and pectates; agar-agar and other 
mucilage and thickeners, whether or not modified, derived from 
vegetable products.” For which opium figures in the list and has the 
HS code: 1302.11. One should be attentive as in one note it is stated 
that “(f) Concentrates of poppy straw containing not less than 50 % 
by weight of alkaloids (heading 29.39)”81. This form is thus mostly 
used for pharmaceutical process in the alkaloid transformation. This 
type of commodity can be consumed and also diverted into illicit 
ends. 
The fourth occurrence is in section VI (WCO, 2017): “products 
of the chemical or allied industries”, in chapter 29: “organic 
chemicals”, heading 29.39 “alkaloids, natural or reproduced by 
synthesis, and their salts, ethers, esters and other derivatives”, opium 
appears with the HS code 2939.11 as: “Alkaloids of opium and their 
derivatives; salts thereof : Concentrates of poppy straw; 
buprenorphine (INN), codeine, dihydrocodeine (INN), 
ethylmorphine, etorphine (INN), heroin, hydrocodone (INN), 
hydromorphone (INN), morphine, nicomorphine (INN), oxycodone 
(INN), oxymorphone (INN), pholcodine (INN), thebacon (INN) and 
81 Chapter 13 is provided in appendix 13 with the important parts highlighted. 
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thebaine; salts thereof.”82 To add another complexity, just further 
below, HS code 2939.11 refers to “Alkaloids; of opium and their 
derivatives; other than in 2939.11, salts thereof”. It should be 
clarified here that it has been impossible to find more explanation as 
to what it includes specifically.83 However, there are costly 
explanatory notes and materials that can be purchased on the WCO 
website, that may possibly explain what the “other” refers to. This 
product relates to the part in the global production chain of 
formulation of the medicine. This usually happens internally. It is 
less probable that diversion occur but remains possible that it 
occasionally happens, in small quantities. 
It should be added that the INN mentioned after the substances 
in 2939.11 refers to the international nonproprietary name, created 
and coordinated in the 1950s by the WHO. Confusion is prevalent. 
In a document written at the WCO to correlate the Harmonized 
System with other conventions in place, it is said that the INN comes 
from the WTO. Although in the document itself, it is said to be not 
considered as an official source as it is mentioned on it, it shows the 
level of confusion that prevails, but also the complexity of the whole 
system. Indeed, the WTO had a Pharma agreement in 1994, which 
is, actually different and has different purposes.84 The only mention 
of INN in the WTO Pharma agreement85 is that the names of 
pharmaceutical active ingredients are made with a combination of 
different nomenclatures. The combinations involved are HS codes, 
product description, Chemical Abstract Service codes (CAS) and 
82 Please see appendix 14 to visualize chapter 29 with highlighted parts. 
83 I attempted to call and email the WCO, but I was unable to obtain results. 
Notwithstanding what they contain or describe, it shows only a limited transparency and 
certain power exercised over the knowledge made public, and the one, limited to the actors 
who can pay. It also shows that only implicated and direct actors usually use and pay for 
such material, and for anyone to do research on it, it is time-consuming and nerve-taking. 
This, therefore, constitutes one of my limits for the data I wanted to present, as I will not 
know what 2939.19 refers to. 
84 See appendix 15 for the illustration of the confusion. 
85 The WTO Pharma agreement was born from the Uruguay Round, part of the GATT to 
eliminate/reduce tariffs on specific sectors. In 1994, since then they have reviewed it four 
times, last being in 2010, they decided on specific products to be concerned. What is 
specific with this multilateral agreement is that it is the parties who directly signed by and 
applied were groups of participants rather than all WTO members (WTO, n.d.). 
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INN (WTO, 2020). It should also be mentioned that the Chemical 
Abstract Service codes (hereafter “CAS”) is commonly utilized. It is 
a division of the American Chemical Society which sources 
chemical information and has various databases and printed until 
2010 Chemical Abstracts on many substances and tools. It seems 
that for industries, what is used is the HS and CAS, whereas for 
international organizations and regulators, the INN is preferred. It is 
therefore a mixture of all those instruments described above that is 
in practice among the actors when it comes to controlled substances, 
and directly for our research object, opiates. 
In addition to the four commodity’s polymorphism in which 
diversion practices can occur, another independent factor arises: the 
transportation of these goods.86 The techniques might differ but can 
be summarized in general patterns. These goods are distributed by 
air, sea, land travels, using planes, ships, cars/trucks. The global 
logistics of these goods involve domestic and international trade. A 
large mix of journeys are made from one poppy to a medicine. 
Between the steps there might be key transshipment hubs in which 
smuggling practices happen, from the moment it leaves one node of 
the global production network to another. Now that we have seen 
how the international trade of this commodity works and identified 
the critical nodes, let us delve into the countries involved and analyze 
official lists of importers and exporters to determine whether any 
patterns are visible. 
Data on opium’s international trade 
This section is limited to the availability of information, i.e., 
on the commodity HS 1207.91 (poppy seeds), HS 1302.11 (opium) 
and HS 2939.11 (opium alkaloids and its derivatives). Regarding the 
database used for the other three commodities, nothing was found 
on the opium poppy. However, on UN Comtrade there was mention 
86 Transportation in the supply chain includes land traffic (vehicles, trains, postal services), 
international air supply chain; maritime supply. Through them all applies for the licit supply 
chain (and in diversions) and the illicit supply chain. 
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of it (HS 1211.40). It should be mentioned that these data (from
Harvard database) come from an aggregation of IMF and UN
Comtrade. For the last 20 years, it has been a business of an average
of $120M, mostly located primarily in North America, Europe, Asia
and Oceania.87
Figure 17 : Import-Export poppy seeds between 1996-2018 
87 Please see appendix 16 for other graph detailing the countries specifically – the biggest
exporters in 2018 are Czechia, Turkey, Netherlands, China, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland,
Australia, France, Spain, Austria and Germany. On the other hand, the biggest importers in
2018 are: India, Russia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Austria etc. These results can












































































































Who exported poppy seeds between 1995-2018?
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It seems that the countries involved are the same as for other
opium commodities but vary in proportions. What it shows most
importantly are the countries exporting poppy seeds, which must
have opium poppies at home, licensed or unlicensed, properly
controlled or not.
Figure 18 : Import-Export opium sap 1996-2018 
On the second graph on opium sap, what is particularly 
interesting is the predominance of Asia, Oceania, Europe and North
America inexporting opium sap. The importing data shows that most 
of the transformation of opium sap is made in the Global North and 
whilemany regions can grow opium poppies, not all do import this
commodity.
Regarding the poppy straw, I gathered data from the UN
Comtrade database. It is a list, that I have cleaned, of the imports-









































































































exports for 2018. The countries involved are mostly the same as 
mentioned earlier, with some new players. The biggest actors seem 
to be Australia, Belgium, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovakia, South Africa, North Macedonia and Afghanistan, either in 
imports and/or exports. 
Figure 19: Import-Export Poppy Straw 2018 
Y ear  T rad e Flow C od e T rad e Flow  R eporter P ar tner C om m od ity C od e Q ty N etw eig ht (k g) T rad e V a lu e (U S $) 
2018 1 Import Andorra World 121140 16 16 78 
2018 1 Import Australia World 121140 894420 894420 1754013 
2018 2 Export Australia World 121140 626801 626801 98087 
2018 2 Export Austria World 121140 2277 2277 15952 
2018 1 Import Belgium  World 121140 626801 626801 277939 
2018 1 Import Canada World 121140 3 3 64 
2018 1 Import Finland World 121140 942 942 7400 
2018 1 Import France World 121140 53  8 
2018 2 Export France World 121140 1899  2406 
2018 2 Export Germany World 121140 337 337 2276 
2018 2 Export Ghana World 121140 18350 18350 3012 
2018 1 Import Greece World 121140 577600 577600 40907 
2018 1 Import Honduras World 121140 21 21 31 
2018 1 Import Hungary World 121140 2 2 30 
2018 2 Export Hungary World 121140 1120680 1120680 1890142 
2018 1 Import Italy World 121140 1068 1068 14413 
2018 1 Import Luxembourg World 121140 40 40 256 
2018 1 Import Namibia World 121140 235  36 
2018 1 Import Netherlands World 121140 187 187 1204 
2018 2 Export Netherlands World 121140 72 72 1889 
2018 1 Import Palau World 121140 1 1 36 
2018 1 Import Portugal World 121140 35352728 35352728 2660849 
2018 2 Export Portugal World 121140 1079637 1079637 542692 
2018 2 Export Singapore World 121140 5935  7520 
2018 1 Import Slovakia World 121140 201320 201320 243658 
2018 2 Export Slovakia World 121140 72000 72000 46474 
2018 1 Import South Africa World 121140 90 90 40 
2018 2 Export South Africa World 121140 15950 15950 169678 
2018 2 Export Spain World 121140 1250 1250 14342 
2018 1 Import Eswatini World 121140 11 11 60 
2018 2 Export Turkey World 121140 65 65 695 
2018 1 Import Uganda World 121140 12 12 27 
2018 1 Import North Macedonia World 121140 23000 23000 77983 
2018 1 Import United Kingdom World 121140 89 89 3885 
2018 1 Import Afghanistan World 121140 3076951 3076951 311432 
2018 1 Import Burundi World 121140 554 554 296 
2018 2 Export Georgia World 121140 160 160 3704 
2018 1 Import Egypt World 121140 510 510 2977 
2018 2 Export Egypt World 121140 250 250 1352 
2018 1 Import Sao Tome and Principe World 121140 9 9 468 
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Finally, the import-export graphs for opium alkaloids show 
that the international trade on this commodity is led by North 
America, Europe and Oceania mostly. This affirms my hypothesis 
that most of the extraction and creation value, close to $1BN 
business in the recent years, is concentrated in these regions. This 
shows that while opium sap can be a business of most $60M, 
pharmaceutical industries are able to generate more profits in 
transforming opium into opiate-based medicine than the value of the 
cultivation of the raw material itself. However, China and India who 
are purportedly large actors in the active pharmaceutical ingredients 
are not visible in this graph.88 This is probably due to data collection 
biases. Other graphs can be found in the appendix, but mostly show 
countries involved with the data available, which corresponds in 
general terms to the list of countries that can be involved in this 
industry. The separation of supplier countries in this trade seems less 
clear than in official reports or convention and the reality of the 
market shows that more actors are involved. Many questions remain 
unanswered, and some countries which appear to take part are not 
mentioned outside of this data.89 
88 On the WTO website, I have found that certain countries have “most-favored nation 
tariffs” on the international trade of opium and its derivatives. If interested on this data, see 
appendix 12 for an extract of the ones that benefited the most. The link to the online data 
with the variables already applied: https://data.wto.org/?idSavedQuery=c99f41cb-e8f7- 
4a47-8542-01fffebe868a accessed on December 20th, 2020. 
89 The reader in having figures and means for comparisons. I also looked whether any 
patterns can be shown with the global flow of heroin through illegal routes, from various 
origins but difficulties were encountered to correlate the data as they are aggregated 
differently, but it could be worthy to examine it in another research. However, what can be 
said at this point is the geographical proximity of the actors involved in licit production and 
manufacture to illicit production and manufacture routes. This is an important food for 
thought to bear in mind as it can have many implications.
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Who exported opium alkaloids between 1995- 2018?
HS 2939.11
Source: Harvard Atlas
Figure 20 : Import-Export opium alkaloids 1995-2018 
In a globalized and privatized world, one can say that
making global policy results from the mastery of ‘network
diplomacy’– the negotiation of a wide range of relationships with
states, NGO and commercial actors.90 By extension, the utility of
assemblage theory can encourage to study how actors establish and
90 These coalitions (in network diplomacy) are most effective when they create strong
linkages and partnerships between these states and civil society actors at all levels (officials,
parliamentarians, politicians, etc.) based on their comparative advantages” (Bolton; Nash,




































































































Chapter V. Critical nodes in the global production network of opiates 
maintain relations, and create shared regulatory spaces and 
narratives, as discussed by Bueger (2018:615). In addition, in this 
section it is possible to see what Breger (2020: 3) was describing: 
“commodities in industrial capitalist economies, including drug 
technologies, are “assemblages” that reflect in microcosm the 
broader social-ecological dynamics that create them” and we see 
multiscalar trade, with “multiscalar politics and global complexity” 
(Williams, 2010: 302) taking part in this industry, but which can be 
outlined in other types of industries too. 
Practices: domestic consumption 
There is one crucial critical node, which is admitted by most 
actors involved in the global production network: diversion practices 
by individuals, but most specifically the practices that occur in the 
distribution and consumption phase (Schild, 2020).91 Indeed, when 
it comes to regulate and comply, it is affirmed that many useful tools 
have been put in place in order to avoid diversion, or any junctures 
of licit and illicit converging. In addition, when diversion is brought 
to the table, a common presupposition is that every single actor has 
a specific role in the global production network and has its own 
responsibility when dealing with controlled substances. With a 
mixture of trust and mistrust, regulation and compliance, the global 
production network should therefore work. However, the opioid 
crisis has highlighted practices that most likely have been in place 
for some time. 
The difference is that now they happen in the light, and some of 
these practices can evolve with time but mainly remain consistent in 
their behavior. In that respect, just like in full illegal markets, they 
are resilient and adapt themselves to external factors in order to be 
91It is assumed in licit production and commercialization diversion practices are caused by 
actions of individuals mostly. Whereas in illegal trafficking, it is assumed to be organized 
(transnational) groups. Although it seems mostly be the results of individuals in my topic, 
no certainty as to whether organized groups acting in licit production/commerce take place. 
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viable. Interestingly, the participants of illicit practices in the legal 
industry tend to be similar. Although, as we have seen, diversion 
practices can differ from the geographical position, once identified 
they remain stable. 
Within a perspective of global production network, once the 
medicine has been formulated, it is the moment that it is distributed. 
Between the distribution and consumption, malpractice can arise. As 
soon as medicines are distributed, another critical node, agreed by 
all the interviewees I discussed with, is a source of illicit. As with 
most medicines, they have different uses, and may be targeted for 
research, in closed research facilities, highly controlled and in which 
not much diversion happens. 
Medicines can be prescribed, distributed and are usually 
consumed in hospitals, where much diversion arises. Medications 
are stolen by nurses and rarely patients (Titan group DEA, 2020). 
Other than in hospital facilities, drugs are prescribed by doctors and 
sold in pharmacies. In this context, malpractice can happen. Indeed, 
it has been shown that some patients do “doctor shopping” (The 
Canyon, n.d.) – obtaining prescriptions from different doctors in 
order to have more of the same medications (Green; Bowman; Ray; 
et al, 2013). 
Patients have been known to sell their own medicines in the street 
– elderly and youngsters are a phenomenon seen throughout the
world (CBS news, December 13th,2005; Additude, March 21st, 2018;
AARP, May 18th, 2017), and in terms of consumption, practices of
self-medication and “off-label” – using the prescribed drug for
another purpose than the prescription - (Schild, 2020) are common.
Another non-medical practice is the theft of medicines from 
family members and acquaintances, happening more frequently than 
thought (Healthcare Finance, August 22nd, 2017). Also, pharmacies 
have been accused of selling prescribed drugs despite obvious “red 
flags” (News&Observer, December 17th, 2020), or as seen in the 
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opioid crisis, doctors over-prescribing for their own benefits (NBC, 
December 20th, 2020).92 
There are further places in which diversion happen, and 
depending on the source, where most diversion is present. This is the 
case in veterinary practice, for example (Titan Group DEA, 2020; 
Veterinary Doctor, December 2020), whereas unique feature 
involves medicines being prescribed and sold in the same facility. 
Although subject to the same regulations as for humans, diversion 
occurs often in animal treatment environment in facilities such as 
animal hospitals, in private clinics and animal refuges. 
A practice also seen for other medications is the pharmaceutical 
industries’ lobby for the use of medicines. Well-supervised by 
regulatory bodies, care is required in how they market their products 
and the loyalty programs they organize. In the past, training in 
medical conferences was largely sponsored by such industries, and 
from the doctors interviews I gathered, most told me that they had 
questioned, at least once, the therapeutic adequateness of certain 
medicines. As mentioned earlier, this is not only the case for opiates, 
in which it is felt that new markets are created for the substance sold 
by industries – i.e., the case for CBD and proton-pump inhibitors – 
PPIs (Veterinarian, 2020). In that respect, Lakoff (2005: 174) talks 
about “diagnostic truing” – the art of adapting the diagnostic to 
medicines in the market. She shows the relationship between 
pharmaceutical industries and the prescription and distribution to 
medicines in medical facilities. 
Furthermore, doctors working in this environment have been 
confronted with another trend. In the eighties, the prescription and 
use of opiates was disapproved, and most were afraid of using it in 
their practice, a term coined as “opiophobia” (Schild, October 2020). 
This fear made them use other types of substances. However, for 
about thirty years now, the relation to pain has changed dramatically 
for both humans and animals. 
92 Another implication of over-prescription is once discovered, or if the dependence is too 
high, patients result to the black market to feed their addiction. 
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Indeed, now doctors must counteract pain, or be seen as not doing 
enough to relieve patients and animals. This is not only a societal 
demand, but also comes from the demand of patients and animal 
owners.93 It is a phenomenon that has another implication. 
Since the measurement of pain is relative and subjective to a 
certain degree, prescriptions of these medicines are “variable 
prescriptions” (Veterinarian, 2020). This means that the dosage will 
depend on the pain intensity felt, and left to the patient to take, 
following the recommended dose, whenever they need it. From a 
point of view of preventing diversion, these variable prescriptions 
provide an opening to malpractice, but, from a health and efficiency 
point of view, this option is preferred. It is similar to giving a higher 
dosage in hospital settings so that the patient can leave the facility 
earlier and continue treatment at home, leaving space for another 
patient. The risk here is over-prescription, not necessarily illicit but 
which can have detrimental consequences. 
Another aspect of the difficulty that health care professionals 
confront is the close collaboration with pharmaceutical industries. It 
is a required close collaboration that they work together as 
medicines are fundamental in health practice. Both are 
interdependent (Schild, 2020). This can create a peculiar climate as 
criticism would not be welcomed from the industries and because of 
the dependence of the health sector on them, this reduces the space 
for a real healthy relationship. It is as a zero-sum game, and even if 
not, all doctors are of good intentions, the ones I have interviewed 
shared that in their practice, they have had to ask themselves about 
reasons underlying certain behaviors and remain true to themselves 
in order to avoid malpractice (Anonymous, 2020; Veterinarian, 
2020). 
93 When discussing with Diane Steber Büchli about the opioid crisis she mentioned a 
question had been added in the doctor’s checkup: "are you suffering pain?” but at this stage 
however they didn’t realize the different pains. 
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For pharmaceutical industries and governments, fighting against 
counterfeit medicines. is a particular issue as trust, reputation and 
benefits are involved as well as the health of innocent citizens 
(Anonymous, 2020, Dilkushi, 2020, Steber Büchli, 2020). Finally, 
another malpractice, which could lead to diversion and constitute a 
critical node is the corruption of official agents, representatives from 
all sectors, the latest news on the subject being a corrupted DEA 
agent (Breitbart, December 5th, 2020) in which greed surpassed the 
sense of duty (Steber Büchli, 2020).94 
In practice, but also throughout the global supply chain, a social 
phenomenon discussed by Appadurai (1986) appears, the social life 
of a commodity. His work is known for the value of commodities, 
and how different value regimes exist within one commodity. In my 
case, this can be seen as different ideas and norms prevail depending 
on which standpoint one look into it. The meanings differ, and for 
medicines this has been studied previously. (Van der Geest, 2012: 
9). Medicines travel in the sense that their meaning and the relations 
to them transfer in various social spheres. They have a social life to 
follow Appadurai’s work (Van der Geest; Kinsman; Hardon; et al., 
2010: 44). Following this understanding, this is how “medicines 
could flow from medical locations to the economic sphere where 
they are subject to illicit trafficking” (Lovell, 2008: 309). 
To summarize and respond to the question: what are the critical 
nodes in the global production network of opiates in which licit and 
illicit can become indistinguishable categories? There are a few 
points to  reiterate in order to answer this question. 
First of all, the global production network, specifically focused 
here on the global industry level, has shown that such categories – 
94 Tools have been put in place domestically in order to prevent diversion from occurring. 
For example, automated dispensing systems which inventories every medicine and only 
dispense the needed dose. But it has happened that automated dispensing systems 
technicians have had diversion practices in the past (Titan Group DEA, 2020). Therefore, 
there are no easy solutions when it comes to diversion. 
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licit and illicit – are never quite distinguishable. The meanings and 
interpretations differ depending on social groups and are translated 
differently. There is what is written, stricto sensu, and in practice, 
and in which practice. However, two extremes can be drawn: a fully 
illicit activity and a fully licit one. Anything in between, as 
Goodhand and Mansfield (2013: 224) describe is a scale of “semi- 
licit graduation”. To some actors, there are heterogenous categories, 
describing parallel and competitive markets such as, from my 
interviewees sample of representative groups, law-enforcement, 
regulators and health practicians. To them, the expression of illicit 
practices penetrates licit practices by spikes of independent illicit 
actions. 
Whereas I see this through a perspective of structuralism, in which 
illicit practices can arise by independent spikes but also be organized 
in their diversion practices, thus also illustrating social phenomena, 
I see it more as an expression of a system. Others I exchanged with, 
such as Medicrime, to my question answered ‘no’ to my question “do 
you believe legal and illegal activities are distinguishable?”, agreeing 
that these categories are not, in any case, hermetic. From my 
understanding, it is more the penetration of illicit activities in the licit 
market that happens, than the licit market resulting in illicit activities. 
I was able to identify critical nodes, most confirmed by my 
research.95 However, due to the fact that such practice is illicit, data 
are limited. In terms of critical nodes in the global supply chain, to 
summarize, they can intervene at various moments: poppy seeds, 
cultivation, harvest, manufacturing, transport, retailing, selling, 
consumption, for human, animals and research purposes. The logic 
and reasons in the critical nodes might differ but results are similar.  
Finally, another observation should be made. Illegal supply-chain 
can converge to legal ones due to the geographical proximity, as seen 
for instance in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan with India. Three  main 
networks  facilitated by  geographical proximity can be 
95 For example, to my question: “do you think there are nodes in the global supply chain 
that favorize illicit activities?” asked to Medicrime, they responded “yes”. 
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India/Pakistan/Iran/Afghanistan (extended Golden Crescent); 
Thailand/Laos/Myanmar (Golden Triangle); Mexico/Colombia 
(Bashir, 2002: 11; Miltenburg, 2018). Corruption is a global 
phenomenon and one can imagine that such production, to some 
degree (licit and illicit) can adopt modern slavery practices. There is 
a link between India being the biggest manufacturer of opiates, and 
generally a key player in the pharmaceutical industry, with being the 
prime source of counterfeit medicines. It is quite certain that licit 
pharmaceutical industries not being supplied by illicit sources as 
much as regulation, compliance and tools are effective, and in that 
respect, this is what authorities say they ensure (Steber Büchli, 2020; 
Schild, 2020).96 
Let us now turn to observations that can be made on the global 
production networks of opiates, applying the studies of the field, for 
this analysis. After covering this aspect, I will finalize my answer to 
the second research question regarding the role of the UNODC in the 
regulation of the critical nodes of controlled substances used in 
medicine. 
Observations on the global production network 
of opiates 
In the literature of the pharmaceutical value chain, three phases 
are usually described. Lovell (2008: 56) highlights three phases: 1. 
the manufacturing of the medicine; 2. the distribution at the 
dispensing point, 3. the dispensing to the end user.97 The first phase 
are the steps involved from the initial research and development 
phase, to gaining regulatory approval and the commercialization. 
96 On that point, when discussing with Diane Steber Büchli, she shared that companies 
would not result to substances for which they are not a hundred percent sure about. But yes, 
there is always a box or two that might be lost or stolen in the process (2020). 
97 For more information on the pharmaceutical supply chain and their use of technology, 
see: https://www.pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/supply-chain-logistics/managing-supply-
%20chains-cloud/ accessed on December 22nd , 2020. 
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Two categories of manufacturing occur for the drug production: the 
active pharmaceutical ingredient (raw material used in medicine) to 
the finished form, also known as the formulation stage (the form and 
excipient are chosen). The second phase includes the transportation 
and handling of the medicine from the manufacturer to the end user. 
The third phase involves providing the correct medicine dosage and 
form, to the right patient in a convenient and timely manner. As seen 
above, it is now clear that at each step of the licit supply chain, 
critical nodes can be found and be vector of illicit practices. 
Figure 21 : Usual supply chain of medicines 
Summary of the phases with the consumption phase. The image was taken from Mallinckrodt website. The legend is my own. 
What is missing in this figure is the supply of the ingredients 
in the manufacturing. This absence is interesting. Indeed, it is rare to 
think of the supply of active pharmaceutical ingredients as a process 
of making medicine. Otherwise, it is not general knowledge to be 
aware of the sources of these substances and how it works overall is 
taken for granted. 
From Lovell’s stages and Mallinckrodt’s graph I would 
therefore add two phases: 1. supply before manufacturing; and to 
Lovell’s phases: 2. consumption after dispensing to the end user. 
Figure 22 : Supply chain of medicines 
In a perspective of value chain, this integrates the network of 
production, trade and service activities that covers all the stages in a 
supply chain, from the transformation of raw materials, through 
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intermediate manufacturing stages to the delivery of finished goods. 
The chain is conceptualized as a series of nodes, linked by various 
types of transactions (Rodrigue, 2020). 
In global production network studies, a useful figure to 
examine the structure of opiate global production networks is 
through the location strategies of companies throughout the supply 
chain. What is usually distinguished is multidomestic strategy 
(centralized or regional production) vs globally integrated strategy 
(regional specialization or vertical integration). In this research, it 
seems like it is a combination of all four. 
For the cases examined above, the example of Tasmania is 
that two companies operate between a mixture of centralized and 
regional production. For India, it is a state-owned business, from 
regional production for the cultivation by independent, yet controlled 
farmers - and centralized, as to when it is sold to other businesses or 
for the formulation process of medicines. 
Figure 23 : Global production networks and location strategy 
However, the global production networks of opiate also have 
globally integrated facets. For instance, multinational 
pharmaceutical industries outsourcing parts of the manufacturing 
abroad, based upon comparative advantages. This is the case with 
American pharmaceutical industries, from which their active 
pharmaceutical – ready-made – are manufactured in countries such 
as India and China, then sold to the US for them to finalize the 
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manufacturing with the formulation and the final commercialization 
stage. This is mostly regional specialization.98 
There are different observations that can be discussed on the 
global production network of opiates. Miltenburg (2018) examined 
the global production network of illicit opiates and describes the 
networks of opium being convergent. This means that “the one raw 
material (opium poppy) becomes one or small number of end 
products (heroin)”. I disagree, seeing opium networks are divergent 
“the one raw material […] becomes many different end products 
(different grades, dimensions and lengths […]” (Miltenburg, 2018: 
4). As I have shown in the graph of the international trade of this 
commodity, it seems that opium can vary greatly in grades, 
dimensions and lengths and create various organized networks 
around these commodities, implicating kinds of trade flow. 
It is therefore possible to see international divisions of labor 
(Hudson, 2016), and macro-economic geographies (Peck, 2016) 
which “are continually being forged and “the result is a finely  
grained, multiscale, territorial patchwork of diverging real incomes 
and rates of labor-force participation: between states and regions; 
within regions; between core areas and peripheral areas; and 
between prosperous metropolitan regions and less-prosperous ones” 
(Martin et al., 2018: 10)” (Coe; Yeung, 2019). Characterized by 
private-public partnerships, with a mixture of state-owned 
monopolies and private companies, in which pharmaceutical 
industries are non-state authorities, they detain power in the sense of 
Strange – “to be gauged by influence over outcomes rather than mere 
possession of capabilities/resources” which is “exercised 
98 For examples of companies working in this industry: PannonPharma is a company in 
Hungary which offers Concentrate of Poppy Straw, Poppy Straw Extracts (CPS AMA and 
CPS ATA) and APIs from controlled cultivation and herbal extracts (PannonPharma, n.d.). 
Mallinckrodt is involved too. Shipments made by Government Opium and Alkaloids 
Factories in India, stopping in Hong Kong before being shipped to New York. Long 
logistics are implied. This was found in market intelligence websites (Panjiva, n.d.) and 
also the Government Opium and Alkaloids Factories website 
(https://goaf.gov.in/index.html) accessed on December 22nd, 2020. There are also many 
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients companies that focus only on this, such as: TAPI 
(Israck), Dr Reddy’s, Aurobindo, Cipla, Ranbaxy but now belongs to Sun Pharma (India). 
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impersonally by markets and unintentionally by those who sell, buy, 
deal in markets” (Strange, 2009: 52). There are various dimensions 
of trade facilitation as Rodrigue (2020) shows in Figure 24, copied 
below: 
Figure 24 : Trade facilitation dimensions 
Their power is impressive, and they can also be prone to 
abusive practice, as numerous scandals have shown in the past (Le 
Monde, September 9th, 2020; Hermann; Lasko; Maadad, 2020). 
They have various associations and federations such as the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & 
Associations (IFPMA, n.d.) in which they organize discussions 
around pharmaceuticals. Other general characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical chain involves the costs and value added, illustrative 
of their Weltanschauung. Aitken’s (2016: 57) figure 25 expresses 
this clearly: 
Figure 25 : Value chain of the pharmaceutical industry 
An important difference between pharmaceutical companies is 
their product-portfolio and whether or not they depend on the 
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availability of raw material. Whether the substance is scar or 
abundant with the necessity-convenience nexus while imply 
different strategies.99 But perhaps the most flagrant trait is the 
competition that prevails. Competitive rivalry is extremely 
intense100 (ABC, June 23rd, 2018): “with more than $1 trillion in 
global sales, the pharmaceutical business can be cutthroat.” 
(Investopedia, January 4th, 2020). They strive for the discovery of 
blockbusters and the protection of their intellectual property, all of 
which have been highly discussed. In this respect, the Alcaliber 
webpage, a Spanish company known for their production of narcotic 
products, highlights the mentality that is found in such companies.101 
However, with the example of Tasmania, one can see the vertical 
integration. An Indian company (Sun Pharma) has bought the GSK 
opiate business in Tasmania allowing it to oversee the process 
from poppies to the medicine (Business Standard, March 4th, 
2015; Fiercepharma, March 3rd, 2015; ABC, May 9th, 2016). 
Global production networks must be dynamic – i.e. adapt and 
restructure through time – in order to generate profit and be viable. 
Due to external factors such as technology innovation, 
environmental conditions, international, regional, national 
regulations.102 For example, India, in order to remain a competitor 
in the global market had to extend the scope of its services and 
started to use the concentrate poppy straw method (formerly usually 
reserved to the Global North apart from Turkey). In terms of 
products, it started to manufacture a wider range than initially, 
including codeine phosphate (The Economic Times, May 18th, 
99 In appendix 17– see a figure that outline the differences 
100 For example, India has turned to minimum quantity yield from opium to morphine based. 
“Morphine yield differs from area to area as soil fertility and dew affects the morphine 
content, so growers will not be able to provide desired morphine, which will mean that the 
number of licenses issued will go down” which will affect growers. This is again, a sign of 
high competition targeted around profit (Hindustan Times, October 27th, 2017). 
101 The website can be accessed through this link: https://alcaliber.com/productos/ 
102This sense of dynamicity can be observed with illegal trafficking. As noted by the World 
Drug Report published by the UNODC “traffickers show resilience by changing routes and 
production practices” (2020: 19). 
126 
Chapter V. Critical nodes in the global production network of opiates 
2019). The Government of India, Ministry of Finance, made a public 
declaration inviting interested companies to apply to produce 
concentrate of poppy straw and manufacture alkaloids.103 But being 
dynamic applies to the critical nodes too. Practices and the location 
of nodes might change, and the market and illicit activities are 
resilient and adapt. However, regulations don’t usually follow the 
pace of the restructuring global production networks, in general a 
little behind of the realities of practice; if the objective of regulations 
is to prevent diversion.104 
With competition comes mistrust, not only between the 
pharmaceutical actors, but from anyone dealing with the 
pharmaceutical industry world, from industries to regulators, to 
health practice, to scholars. I contacted a number of pharmaceutical 
companies who expressed their wish not to divulgate any 
information, as it was deemed confidential. “Unfortunately, we are 
not in the position to answer your questions” replied Merck, or La 
Roche on the phone telling me it is “confidential” information. 
Novartis after forwarding my calls to all departments possible finally 
said they were unable to inform me as due to the private nature of 
the data. Johnson and Johnson responded negatively by email 
claiming data privacy -- not allowed to divulge any information on 
the questions asked. Words changed but the results were the same. 
Sanofi is one of the only pharmaceutical company that shows on 
their website, publicly, that they grow and harvest opium poppy and 
103 “So far, only opium gum has been produced in India. Govt. of India has now decided 
that CPS production should be commenced in India. For this purpose, it has decided to 
select and license one company. This notice invites Expression of Interest (EOI) from 
companies willing to produce CPS in India, within 60 days from publication of this notice.” 
File number: 616/1/2007-NC-1 accessed on December 23rd, 2020: 
https://dor.gov.in/sites/default/files/7_0.pdf This raises another issue to consider, if India 
results to CPS, is its traditional cultivation and harvesting method at risk of disappearing? 
104 To my question to Medicrime (2020): “Do the techniques of diversions change over 
time?” they responded: “yes (used systems, trading routes).” To another question asking: 
“do you have to adapt the strategies put forward in order to remain adequate?” they 
answered by the affirmative. However, when asked: “Are there enough regulations 
instruments in place to avoid misuse?” they also responded by the affirmative. But the latter 
should perhaps not be taken as it is, since they might not be able to respond differently as 
it was an official correspondence, for the reputation of the organization. 
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manufacture fifteen active pharmaceutical ingredients from it.105 
Finally, the only person able to provide me with information on the 
pharmaceutical industries was the one I interviewed, who had retired 
and requested to remain anonymous. 
Pharmaceutical industries have a liability to know their 
provider – when discussing with a senior retired employee, to my 
question: do you know all the actors involved? He responded: “yes, 
it is our responsibility”. Furthermore, to my question “would you say 
there is trust between the various actors?” He responded firmly by 
“absolutely no trust”. I asked whether pharmaceutical industries 
work together, and he responded that “it depends but usually not”. 
To finish by saying that this industry is “too complicated, highly 
risky and competitive, and too many variations between a small and 
big company.” I thought his last sentence was extremely telling: 
“there is no such thing as business as usual in this industry.” 
(Anonymous, 2020). To my email exchange with Medicrime, part of 
Swissmedic, when I asked: “do you trust pharmaceutical 
industries?” they answered: “yes and no (depending on the system 
used to license/authorize the companies)” (Medicrime, 2020). 
Therefore, it makes sense that with mistrust and regulation 
comes a compliance market. Indeed, as for other industries, a part of 
the global production network is compliance. Many businesses106 
have flourished and specialized in certain kinds of compliance, 
either independent or state-mandated companies. They usually focus 
on the whole supply chain, on the technology side, service and 
resources management, logistics domestic and global, or regulation 
based. Their aim is to ensure businesses of doing right, be more 
efficient and prevent diversion from occurring. It is in fact diversion 
prevention and the content that is produced in that respect that 
105 See appendix 20 for a screenshot of the website section. 
106 For example, of companies that provide compliance services, here is a selection: 
Systech, Cambrex, Titan Group DEA or McKensson. For an example, see this link: 
https://www.mckesson.com/about-mckesson/fighting-opioid-abuse/controlled-substance- 
monitoring-program/accessed December 27th, 2020 
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helped me identify critical nodes. Through their strategies one can 
assume the reasons underlying choices107. A globalized industry like 
this one also reflects different corporate cultures and domestic 
regulations. It is said that about 20% variation arises when 
undertaking global operations (Anonymous, 2020). 
In the first part of this chapter, I have delved into the critical 
nodes I have identified in the global production networks of opiates. 
In the following part, I have analyzed through global production 
network studies the empirical case study (opiates). Now that I have 
outlined the critical nodes and made general observations on the 
global production networks, I shall examine what is the role of the 
UNODC in the regulation of the critical nodes of controlled 
substances used for medicines. 
The role of the UNODC 
When I began my research, I believed the UNODC had an 
important role in the regulation of controlled substances used for 
medicines. They do in fact have a general role, but it is in the 
international drug control regime. In 1997, on the initiative of Kofi 
Annan, and since the issues of drugs and crime clearly intersect, they 
merged two UN programs (International Drug Control Program 
(UNDCP) and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division). 
The change was implemented by the creation in 2003 of the UNODC 
(UN General Assembly, 1997). The UNODC contains the word 
“drugs” (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime), but it seems 
they concentrate more on issues other than licit trade and its critical 
nodes. The UNODC defines itself as “a global leader in the fight 
against illicit drugs and international crime, in addition to being 
responsible for implementing the United Nations lead programme 
107 The American Society of Heath-System Pharmacists produced guidelines, some that 
targets diversion of controlled substances. These documents were illustrative of certain 
practices. For example, the practice in certain countries (like in the U.K) of only giving the 
necessary medicine dosage rather than a full package. Obviously, this practice is not only 
diversion oriented but also shows consideration to medicine waste and better management. 
This thought can raise to other concerns as to medicine waste and its management. This 
phase could potentially be a critical node too to bear in mind (ASHP, 2017). 
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on terrorism.” It can be seen with this quote that the matters of their 
interest are therefore different from the one of this study (UNOV, 
n.d.).
The UNODC therefore focus primarily on matters such as
transnational organized crime, human trafficking and corruption.108 
They have a collaborative role in assisting the INCB and CND in 
performing their treaty-based functions and in assisting state parties 
in the implementation of their obligations under the international 
treaties (UNODC, n.d.). The UNODC merge research and actions in 
one place, while hosting conferences and being a referential 
organization for other agencies. They produce reports and estimates 
and work closely with states and civil society. They detain soft 
power in producing norms but mainly do naming and shaming 
(Tinasti, 2020). With respect to producing regulation itself, 
however, they do not actively contribute, although some bodies 
under the UNODC do so (such as the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs – CND). 
In terms of initiatives aiming at enforcing the conventions, the 
UNDOC has various partnerships, UN intra-agencies and private- 
public partnerships. These programs are mostly focused on the fight 
against illicit trade.109 An example of intra-agency initiatives is the 
UNODC and WCO in their container control programs. Their aim is 
to build capacity for countries willing to improve “risk management, 
supply chain security, and trade facilitation in seaports, airports and 
land border crossings in order to prevent the cross-border movement 
108 An interesting perspective is following Buegger and Knorr Cetina on “epistemic 
practices”. Epistemic practices aim at making generalizable claims about such objects, by 
drawing different particulars together, including data, facts, and claims. “They are tempo- 
spatially distributed, and the epistemic infrastructures bring together various sites. An 
epistemic object is produced in various sites, including organizations, and will involve 
different kinds of epistemic practices” (Bueger, 2018:7). Certain sites will be more 
important than others, exerting control and will sustain the whole structure. STS scholars 
refer to these as “laboratories”. “Laboratories are sites of mediation that bring about and 
shape structures and which combine elements from different contexts. They assemble and 
bring together entities and processes with the objective of developing more enduring 
connections, which create a common biography and entail their own dynamics.” (Knorr 
Cetina 2008:64). 
109 Diversion from licit sources is not a priority for the UNODC which reaffirms one of my 
hypotheses. 
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of illicit goods” (UNODC, 2020). An example of another initiative 
of UN agencies and other organizations is the Paris Pact Initiative 
(PPI). It consists of 58 partner countries and 23 organizations and 
combats illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan 
(UNODC, 2020). 
A final example of inter-agency and private-public partnership 
is what the UNODC has developed against the opioid crisis, known 
as the opioid strategy110 based on the principles of “predict, prevent 
and protect” (UNODC, 2020). This opioid strategy includes the 
following partners: the WHO, INCB, WCO, Universal Postal Union, 
INTERPOL, EUROPOL, as well as strategic regional organizations 
such as the Organization of American States, the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drug Dependence and Addiction, African 
Union and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. For such a globalized and interdisciplinary matter, 
partners from various sectors are necessary (UNODC, 2020) and 
their focus is on illegal trafficking above all. They also work on New 
Psychoactive Substances (NPS) and precursors (necessary chemicals 
to manufacture drugs) which intersect with legitimate enterprises 
due to their use in many sectors (UNODC, 2014), and on drug 
precursor diversion – when individuals or groups take these products 
out of the legal market and use them for illegal purposes. Aside from 
these examples, they are heavily involved in opium replacement 
programs – crop replacement projects such as those in Turkey and 
parts in Afghanistan (INCB, n.d.). 
Regarding the specific issue of critical nodes, the UNODC does 
not act directly and plays no role. In terms of the regulation of the 
critical nodes, the convention does have certain articles in which 
they require the use of tools to monitor the forms of goods. Apart 
from these conventions, however, there are no regulations on critical 
nodes. This contrasts with new psychoactive substances or 
precursors, where the CND revises regularly its lists of controlled   
110 See the strategy in detail in appendix 18. 
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Substances in order to stay up to date, but where the market seems 
to evolve more rapidly than the pace of bureaucratic regulation. 
Another body that has a bigger role in critical nodes is the INCB. Its 
role involves implementation of the regulation and it collaborates 
directly with signatory Parties. INCB is there to facilitate the trade 
of internationally controlled substances and to balance the demands 
of medical and research necessities with supply. They produce 
estimates with the help of Governments and are responsible for 
examining the import/export of controlled substances. Typically, for 
the case of India as an example in the traditional cultivation and 
harvest method, the INCB reviews the licenses authorized for 
opium. Apart from overseeing import/export and producing reports 
and estimates, they also have three tools to help governments 
trading. 
These three specific tools for governments can be found on the 
webpage of the INCB (2020). The first is the I2ES: International 
Import and Export Authorization System – a platform allowing 
governments to exchange import and export authorizations for 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (INCB, 2019). The 
second tool is the PEN Online: Pre-Export Notification which 
allows exporting countries to electronically notify receiving 
countries of exports of precursor chemicals. The third tool is the 
PICS: Precursor Incident Communications System which permits 
governments to report to INCB and/or other countries when 
unauthorized activity involving a precursor chemical occurs (INCB, 
July 2020). 
In addition, the WHO takes part in the international drug control 
regime through the ECDD and the International Nonproprietary 
Names (INN). The WHO recommends that countries, hospitals, 
health centers, pharmacists and anyone dealing with medicines be 
especially attentive to counterfeit medicines. But apart from this 
main issue of counterfeit medicine, no concrete actions focus 
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specifically on diversion, as it is not in their mandate (Dilkushi, 
2020). 
One must also consider the role of EUROPOL and INTERPOL. 
Their role in critical nodes is not publicly expressed but their 
involvement against illicit trafficking and all kind of organized 
crime is certain. Apart from official reports, no other document 
supports their potential work against the critical nodes. 
Regarding the regulation of critical nodes, a policy transfer can 
be observed from the conventions (international sphere) to regional 
organizations (such as the EMCDDA at the European level) and then 
to national levels (Graham; Volden; Shipan, 2013). Each country is 
asked to apply the conventions, trace the trade and generate 
estimates. Countries are thus extremely important in their role of the 
critical nodes, as they are the first to be expected to observe any 
diversion. It is considered that governments are the first entities to 
deal with critical nodes, both in prevention and in action. They can 
count on international cooperation for detection and programs to 
help them achieve the international objectives. To return to Horner’s 
four roles of states, nation-states in this context fulfil the four. They 
are regulators by ratifying the conventions and implementing them 
at the national level. They are producers of controlled substances; 
they are buyers; and they are investors of controlled substances or in 
the international drug control regime. 
Moreover, powerful actors in practice are the pharmaceutical 
industries. This power was clearly expressed in various discussions 
I had. When asked whether it is the government or pharmaceutical 
company’s responsibility for the licit supply, I was told that the 
pharmaceutical industry is in charge, but that domestic medical 
agencies supervise (Titan Group DEA, 2020; Schild, 2020; 
Medicrime, 2020; Anonymous, 2020). This strongly suggest what 
Strange (1996: 4) argues: “[…] now it is the market, on many crucial 
issues that are the masters of governments states.” One can see the 
imbalance of power between the various actors. 
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Langenhove described (2010) a number of aspects of 
multilateralism 2.0, as being the diversification of multilateral 
organizations, the importance of nonstate actors and the increased 
interlinkages between policy domains. This can be seen in the 
context as well, through multilateral organizations working on one 
aspect or another of controlled substances and the interconnectedness 
between the domains (and the difficulty it creates) with the 
importance of nonstate actors. For instance, the epistemic 
community requests reforms and to some extent gains these on 
certain grounds (the example of rescheduling at the UN level of 
cannabis just recently). 
Another observation which crystalized when collecting the data 
was the technical microcosms around the subject of controlled 
substances. Some of my interviewees, mostly from the medical 
sphere, were unaware of the conventions, the UN work, UNODC 
nor INCB. It seems therefore that actions – by regulation, 
implementation or change – come with those informed, in this case, 
states and nonstate actors which can then mobilize their knowledge 
and resources towards their objectives and believes. Furthermore, 
while it is acknowledged that international organizations and 
governments must adapt their strategies in order to remain relevant 
to reality, they agree that enough regulations instruments are in place 
to avoid diversion/misuse/non-medical purposes (Medicrime, 2020; 
Steber Büchli, 2020). 
Finally, following this exploration of my research questions, 
another question arises – the role of international organizations 
(INCB, WHO, WCO, WTO), states and nonstate actors in the 
international drug control regime through the lens of risk assessment 
in the issues to be prioritized over others. As seen above, the 
UNODC does not have a particular role in the regulation of critical 
nodes, and the only entities that have a role in the implementation 
may be the INCB, WCO, and law-enforcements. The WHO has the 
technical mandate of reviewing the substances 
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(and the new ones) but the CND votes and regulates on the final 
decision. However, it became clear that issues are prioritized. They 
are prioritized through risk assessment and successful political 
bargain among actors involved in the international drug control 
regime. Once the framework built, it is through this thinking that 
mandates are given to the actors, and strategies are adopted in the 
fight of the drug problem. This risk assessment and agenda-setting 




When I first began this research, my overriding question was 
whether the global production network of controlled substances was 
hermetically licit. The ambivalent nature of controlled substances 
means that on one hand, they are commodities for the public good, 
providing access and the right to medical treatment, and on the other 
hand, they are based on substances with psychotropic attributes 
which feed addiction and are likely to be diverted into illegal markets 
causing harm, with moral, societal, health, economic and security 
implications. Opium seemed a good case study due to its socio- 
history, its use – and misuse - for millennia in many various 
purposes. My main research question was thus to determine how a 
controlled substance used in both medicine and illegal drugs markets 
is regulated at the international level. 
In order to answer to this question, it seemed important to 
examine regulation at the international level from a historical 
perspective. A thorough analysis was conducted, from the very first 
agreements to the three main conventions (1961, 1971, 1988) 
constituting an international prohibition regime (Nadelmann, 1990). 
I then chose to follow with the international drug control regime 
terminology, bearing in mind the prohibitionist ideologies which 
built the regime and was promoted by dominant states. Inspired by 
many theoretical approaches, I aimed to elaborate a unique
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conceptual framework for the questions I addressed. Andreas (2004) 
mentions the utility – and even the necessity - of eclectic theorizing 
when it comes to illicit activities. The eclectic theorizing allows one 
to put forward different aspects, resulting in a bigger picture. This 
thinking was intended here: to understand a phenomenon through its 
interdisciplinary networks. This involved studying the relations 
between the international sphere (at the UN level) with states, 
international markets and illegal international markets.111 It was a 
blend of international political economy, illegal international 
political economy and global production networks. As reminder, 
global production network, in this thesis, was considered to be a 
global multiscalar network of licit and illicit economic and 
noneconomic actors, through licit and/or illicit practices, behaviors, 
sometimes coordinated, but from which actors are implicated in the 
specific industry (here opium). Within opium lie many active 
pharmaceutical ingredients that are used not only in various 
medicines but are also the source of numerous illicit uses. What 
comes from opium production is not only the apparent use for 
pharmaceuticals, but also its by-products traded in other sectors. 
111 I have referenced it in the conceptual framework section, but it is important to restate 
Andreas’ description of eclectic theoretical perspectives, in my research topic: “For 
example, sharp variations in state responses to global drug trafficking (contrast, for 
example, the highly punitive US approach to the more public health approach of many west 
European states) cannot be explained without incorporating the role of culture (stressed by 
social constructivists). The creation and maintenance of a global drug prohibition regime 
cannot be explained without taking into account the backing of the most powerful states in 
the international system (stressed by realists), but also cannot be explained without 
recognizing the role of nonstate actors, including organized societal groups of 
‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ (stressed by both liberals and constructivists) 
(Nadelmann, 1990). The fact that some poor countries depend on illegal drug exports to 
generate foreign exchange and employment can be seen as part of the broader historical 
pattern of dependence on ‘boom and bust’ primary export commodities (stressed by 
Marxists and other radicals in the dependency theory tradition). Viewed from the economic 
perspective of comparative advantage (as stressed by neoliberal economics), such reliance 
on illegal drug crops can be interpreted as rational specialization based on a country’s 
competitiveness in a global market niche (thus, Afghan poppy growers and Bolivian coca 
farmers are, in a sense, taking the advice of western liberal economic advisors literally by 
growing high-demand export crops in which they have a competitive advantage and that 
offers them the highest international market returns)” (2004: 645). 
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I examined this through a commodity lens, but also from a 
global supply chain perspective, looking at the manufacturers in this 
industry. The key opposing actors were the legal and illegal 
production and manufacturing countries involved. For illegal 
production only, two extended regions are designated: the Golden 
Crescent of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, and the Golden Triangle 
of Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar. Other countries such as Mexico 
and Colombia are also involved in the opium/heroin business. Yet 
questions remain about legitimate and regulated business. 
As seen, states and businesses involved can be the source of 
illegitimate supply in the illicit market, although not advertised as 
such by international organization, states nor industries. Indeed, in 
an economic context giving prominence to laissez-faire and free 
trade, the regulation of commodities defined as controlled substances 
can easily become fraught with difficulties, as Mansfield describes 
with regards to opiate raw material (2001: 9). Consequently, the idea 
of bottleneck moments, as outlined in global production network 
studies, in which value is created, captured and transformed, was 
retained in conceptualizing the critical nodes within the global 
production network defined. For a globalized trade like this, I 
assumed that there were critical nodes in the global supply chain of 
opiate-based medicine in which licit and illicit cultivation, 
manufacture, production, and transportation join at specific 
junctures, and in which they bypass the seemingly binary distinction 
of lawful and unlawful activities. 
Critical nodes were defined in this work as microcosms 
within a network in which value can be created, captured, 
transformed, or logistically transported; considered as crucial 
because of their role in the supply-chain and/or in their potential of 
being exposed to illicit practices such as diversion. This definition 
takes into account the actors and objects involved in those specific 
nodes, requiring that the actors and objects (such as regulatory 
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instruments) combine a mixture of logic which can be subject to 
change over time. 
Based on this definition and my findings, a clear distinction 
between licit and illicit is unfeasible except in juridical terms. 
Nonetheless, some nuances emerged. For instance, it appears that 
entry of illicit sources into the licit opiate trade does not occur, but 
diversion from licit sources does. Also, entry of illicit sources into 
the market does occur, and nearly always for the majority of 
controlled substances and drugs (case of falsified medicines and 
illegal drugs). Despite the inherent ambivalence of drugs, being both 
a remedy and poison, this essential feature is what makes effective 
regulation difficult to attain. In addition, the globalized aspect of the 
industry provides structural opportunity for many illicit practices to 
penetrate licit trade of controlled substances. 
Indeed, as I have shown in this thesis, the global production 
network of controlled substances is regulated, highly fragmented, 
competitive, opaque and full of mistrust. It involves specific 
processes depending on the methods chosen and the purposes of the 
commodity. In these processes, the chain contains many nodes that 
are exposed to diversion practices. The same nodes are usually 
important phases for value creation, capture and transformation. My 
findings suggest that regardless of the type of method utilized; 
critical nodes are present in the licit global production network of 
opiates. This means that for controlled substances in general, the 
same assumption can be made. My research addressed this gap. The 
literature on diversion practices has focused on geographical case 
studies, such as India or Tasmania, from a political economy 
perspective, but no work has been undertaken on global production 
networks of opium combining my conceptual framework with my 
research subject. 
The critical nodes I identified in the opiate industry are 
hidden in different stages, from poppy fields to consumption. Let us 
reiterate them briefly. Critical nodes may contain sub-nodes, unique 
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to the geographical place and culture. The first critical node 
identified resides in the cultivation phase. In cultivation, illicit 
activities can come to play with the handling of poppy seeds (their 
diversion and then their illicit cultivation), cultivation of the opium 
poppies can arise by the theft of crops from employees or 
individuals, additional hectares without the proper licenses, falsely 
claim that licit growing is not harvestable and sell harvests illicitly 
but also proper licensed and harvested field which yield more than 
the minimum quantity and the unreported excess can be sold illicitly. 
After the purchase from the government, diversion can occur due to 
corrupted agents selling out the government inventory but also, for 
example in India if the minimum quantity yield is not met, in order 
to avoid being de-licensed farmer purchases the shortfall, illegally, 
from a neighbor whose yield is higher. The was to divert are multiple 
and depends on various variables. 
Another critical node lies in the transportation for either 
manufacture or distribution within or between nations. Licit 
transportation can be penetrated by illegal activities. The extent to 
which this happens, again, would depend on the country, the 
business, the form of commodity and the regulations and practices in 
place. Furthermore, an important critical node is found in practices and 
consumption. Practices include corruption and “doctor shopping”, at 
the consumption phase, examples are medicines stolen from hospital 
facilities by patients or nurses who consume them or sell them in the 
streets, but also theft of medicines from family members. 
Interestingly, this also occurs in veterinary practices, and according 
to my interviewees, this is where most diversion arises (in the U.S. at 
least). Veterinarians are prescribers and sellers, often providing 
variable prescription according to pain, which leaves room for illicit 
practices. In general, critical nodes contrary to my expectations, does 
not seem to appear in the context of scientific research purposes; 
researchers are subject to a strict regulation regime. Generally, 
critical nodes are present in different forms and 
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based on the whole structure of the networks. They are subject to 
change over time, depending on cultures, practices, technologies and 
regulations. Critical nodes have been studied here through the lens 
of regulation appliance and diversion aversion. Yet as one of my 
findings has shown, the way one chooses to view and analyze this 
highly moralized subject will depend on the objectives, and result in 
another perspective on risk assessment. For instance, if one is 
looking at the enforcement of regulations to avoid diversion from a 
strictly moral and societal standpoint, it is not the small amount that 
is being diverted that counts. It is rather the number of people that 
we have been able to treat because of the availability and trade of 
controlled substances. 
My second research question was to determine the role of the 
UNODC in the regulation of critical nodes for controlled substances 
used for medicines. My findings showed that the UNODC does not 
play an important role in the regulation of the critical nodes. They do 
host the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) which evaluate the 
scheduling of the drugs based upon the recommendations of the 
ECDD (WHO). Apart from this, the UNODC is rather a bureaucratic 
organization that focuses on illegal matters. It provides a space for 
discussions, produces reports, collaborates with states and other 
organizations and has specific programs to fight for the set agenda 
they have agreed on. It seems that critical nodes are not a subject 
deemed to be of high importance for the UNODC which has no role 
in them. However, the INCB, semi-independent of the UNODC has 
a mandate to prevent diversion from happening in the licit 
production of controlled substances. My research question should 
have therefore been extended to the INCB. The INCB however, has 
only a limited number of tools to assist governments in enforcing the 
conventions; they can be available for help or inspections, provide 
estimates for a balance between supply and demand but do not 
function beyond this role. 
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In this research I have therefore addressed a gap in the 
literature, examining the global production network of licit opium 
trade in relation to international regulations. However, a few 
limitations can be discussed. In the controlled substances industry 
business as usual does not exist. The entry cost is extremely high. 
Thus, the whole research process has been largely inductive, locating 
and accessing information which was often contradictory or 
misleading.  
As Williams (2010) says “terminologies are difficult 
purposely” as this commodity is “not ordinary merchandise”. One 
can say that knowledge is power in this case, as for any other 
regulated technical subject. It leaves space for only experts to fully 
grasp what is at stake. The misunderstandings among the active 
actors are truly striking, and the methodologies and terminologies 
vary greatly between reports. Another fundamental limit was my 
numerical data. In this kind of research, data are only “guestimates”, 
so absolutely no information can be taken for granted, even if it 
comes from legitimate sources. Moreover, due to COVID-19, it has 
been particularly difficult to access people. Nonetheless, the best 
effort possible was made to obtain a representative sample of 
interviewees which helped considerably in forming the analysis, but 
also in clarifying certain information. Finally, I initially aimed to 
study in greater details the illicit market and its link with the licit. 
The work has focused on illicit practices penetrating the licit 
industry, but an interesting study could be made on the examination 
of the two markets. 
This research opens the door to other potential research that 
could be conducted such as exploring the similarities of the licit and 
illicit trade routes while comparing the states and nonstate actors 
taking part in these competitive markets. But also, other work could 
focus on the risk assessment that policymakers undertake to 
prioritize the issues – their securitization – and agenda-setting. 
Similarly, another important study should focus specifically on the 
role of the experts and technocratic bureaucrats of the UN 
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Conclusion 
international drug control regime and the politics behind the 
expertise and the agenda-setting. This study could use as theoretical 
roots the assemblage theories, which can provide “a feature-rich 
toolbox sensitive to mundane matters of of international 
cooperation, the role of objects and things, the importance of 
territories of governance, the vitality of expert knowledge, and the 
instability of governance arrangements”, as described by Bueger 
(2018 :615). Yet another study could assess the adaptative-resilience 
of the global production network in relation to external variables 
(such as technology). On a post-structuralist perspective, a study on 
the lexical items mobilized in the global production networks of 
controlled substances would be of interest, analyzing how this is 
mobilized by actors, given the highly moralized nature of the topic. 
Finally, in accordance with the current day-to-day, one could study 
how COVID-19 has changed our relationship to necessity goods and 
the perspective of interdependence in the world for issues that are 
regarded as falling under national security but are nonetheless 
transnational and highly globalized. What is certain is that the fate of 
controlled substances is to continue for the foreseeable future. 
Whatever we decide to prioritize, orienting public policy today will 
have impacts tomorrow and most likely on the whole network. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Typology of four state roles within global 
production   networks 
Source: Horner, R. (2017). Beyond facilitator? State roles in global value chain and global 
production networks. Geography Compass, 11, p.6 
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Appendix 2. Chronology of opium use in long history 
Source: Brook, K., Bennett, J., Desai, Sukumar P. (2017). The 
Chemical History of Morphine: An 8000-year Journey, from Resin 
to de-novo Synthesis, Journal of Anaesthesia History 3(2),  p.52 
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Appendix 
Appendix 3. Example of commercialization of heroin
by pharmaceutical industries 
Advertising in 1901 for Bayer Pharmaceutical Products. Of interest is Heroin, 
marketed against cough suppressant and as an effective non-addictive 
substitute for morphine. Source: https://medium.com/discourse/heroin-was-
originally-prescribed-as-a-cough- 
suppressant-b88192e7aecc accessed on 14th October 2020 
Appendix 4. Measures and exceptions for the UN Single 
Convention schedules 
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Appendix 5. David Nutt. The other harms for scheduling a drug 
correctly (3) 
(1) Harms of drugs in public policy
Source: David Nutt conference PowerPoint: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8E5depBDKtQ&feature=emb_logo 
(2) Evaluation criteria organized by harms to users and harms to
others, clustered under physical, psychological and social effects
David J Nutt, Leslie A King, Lawrence D Phillips. (2010). Drug harms  in the UK: a 
multicriteria decision analysis, The Lancet, 376, Issue 9752. p.1559. 
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(3) His definitions on drugs




Appendix 6. The WHO three-step analgesic ladder 
Source: Reid, C., Davies, A. (2004). The World Health Organization 
three-step analgesic ladder comes of age. Palliative Medicine 18, 
p.176.
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Appendix 7. UNODC/INCB data for the distribution and 







Appendix 8. Traditional harvest methods (4) 
1. Tools for opium harvest with dried ripped poppies pods
Source: https://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/opium/production-
distribution.html 





3. Opium poppy pod ripped – dried latex getting harvested
Source : https://i.dawn.com/primary/2017/08/598979aae24e1.jpg 




Appendix 9. Indian opium sap content 
Source : http://cbn.nic.in/html/opiumcbn.htm 
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Appendix 
Appendix 10. One-page extract of de-licensed cultivators in one 
facility based in one region, for the year 2020-2021 in India 





NAME OF TEHSIL NAME OF 
VILLAGE 
NAME OF CULTIVATOR R!"#$% &$' D!- 
L()!%#! 
32 03010517021 091 BARE LLY AONLA M LK MASARA RAJESH KUMAR/ RAM PAL MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
33 03010517091 023 BARE LLY AONLA MUTLAKPUR JAY LAL/ OLE Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
34 BARE LLY AONLA NAKATPUR 
SHANT  )E* / * REN)RA PAL 
+* REN)RA PAL S N,H/ 
,OKRAN S N,H- 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
3. 03010517180 014 BARE LLY AONLA NATTHE K ,OT YA JAMUNA )E*  /KUN)AN MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
3/ 03010517183 005 BARE LLY AONLA NAU,A0AN THAKURAN 
SHANT )E* / NATTHU LAL 
+NATTHULAL / NANHKU- 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
31 03010517183 045 BARE LLY AONLA NAU,A0AN THAKURAN SH *RAJ / KOM L 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
32 03010517101 039 BARE LLY AONLA PYAS PREM PAL / SEETA RAM +K SHAN )E / SEETA RAM- MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
33 03010517101 046 BARE LLY AONLA PYAS PAT RAM/BHA)A  +KAN)HA / NATTHU- MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
44 03010517104 012 BARE LLY AONLA RAMNA,AR N RANJAN/ LEELA)HAR +LEELA)HR/ RAM K SHAN- 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
45 03010517027 063 BARE LLY AONLA SAKARPUR H RALAL/ NANKU LAL Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
42 03010517030 BARE LLY AONLA S N,HA SH * KUMAR S N,H/ RAKSHPAL S N,H MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
43 03010517115 013 BARE LLY AONLA S RAUL KHAS AN SHA BE,UM/JA6AR AL  +JA6AR AL / KAL BE- MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
44 03010517115 017 BARE LLY AONLA S RAUL KHAS *EER S N,H / )ESHRAJ+)ESHRAJ/ BEN RAM- MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
4. 03010517115 044 BARE LLY AONLA S RAUL KHAS 
,YANESH KUMAR T 0AR / 
SUN)ER LAL 
+SUN)AR LAL/ MATRULAL- 
 
MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
4/ 03010411009 035 BA)AUN BA)AUN 6AR )PUR %HAKOL BAHORAN LAL/ SHORU S N,H 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
41 03010411009 022 BA)AUN BA)AUN 6AR )PUR %HAKOL KALYAN/ MOOL%HAN) 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
42 03010411010 008 BA)AUN BA)AUN ,ABH YA  NA,LA SHAR)A )E* / BEN RAM Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
43 03010411059 007 BA)AUN BA)AUN ,AURAMA  
MOHAMMA) AHAMA)/ 
SAUKAT KHAN 
+SAUKAT KHAN/ %HAN) KHAN- 
 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
.4 03010411014 008 BA)AUN BA)AUN  ML YA %HHOTE LAL/ MANOHAR S N,H 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
.5 03010411015 010 BA)AUN BA)AUN  NAYAT,ANJ ANOKHE/ ,AUR  Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
.2 03010411015 012 BA)AUN BA)AUN  NAYAT,ANJ %HETRAM/ MATHURA PRASA) +MATHURA PRASA)/ SUN)AR MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
.3 03010411016 021 BA)AUN BA)AUN  SLAM,ANJ L YAKAT/ SAKRU)) N Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
.4 03010411016 010 BA)AUN BA)AUN  SLAM,ANJ LAJJARAM/ NANHE LAL MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
.. 03010411017 019 BA)AUN BA)AUN JAKHA L  LAL BAHA)UR/ JHABBU LAL Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
./ 03010411063 081 BA)AUN BA)AUN KAT NNA OMPAL/ )HAN S N,H Thef / M!""!#$ %&'"( e" 
.1 BA)AUN BA)AUN KU0ATAN)A RAMESH0AR / BABURAM MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
.2 03010411032 031 BA)AUN BA)AUN NAA  




MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
.3 03010411033 009 BA)AUN BA)AUN NA)AUL YA PAPPU/ MAKHAN +MAKKHAN/ HURMAT- 
Thef / M!""!#$ 
%&'"( e" 
/4 03010413004 089 BA)AUN B LS  BA RMA  RAM%HARAN/ HOR LAL MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
/5 03010413022 013 BA)AUN B LS  KUN)A0AL  ,AN,A S N,H/* )ERAM MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
/2 03010413022 005 BA)AUN B LS  KUN)A0AL  KR SHAN LAL/ BHA,0AT +BHA,0AT/B HAR - MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
/3 03010411059 002 BA)AUN B LS  RA PUR MAJHARA BALBANT / SH * LAL MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
/4 03010413016 020 BA)AUN B LS  R SAUL KHAAS PUROSHOTTAM/ ME0ARAM MQY-M Be ow 4 2 
Source : http://cbn.nic.in/html/ineligible.html 
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Appendix 11. Steps in the opium cultivation and heroin 
manufacture process 
Source: Miltenburg, J. (2018). Supply chains for illicit products: Case study of the global 
opiate production networks. Cogent Business & Management 




Source : WTO database :https://data.wto.org/?idSavedQuery=c99f41cb-e8f7-4a47-8542-01fffebe868a 
accessed on December 20th, 2020. 
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Appendix 12. List of countries applying the Harmonized System (WCO) 
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Appendix 
The two pictures represent the list of all contracting parties to the Harmonized 
System Convention. Please see the notes (+/x/+x) to read correctly the table. This 




Appendix 13. Highlighted parts chapter 13 of the Harmonized System 
The title, the note (f), the heading and H.S. code, the 13.02 and 1302.11 and 1302.19 have been highlighted 









Appendix 15. Correlation document produced by the WCO 







Appendix 16. Imports-Export opium commodities (Harvard Atlas 
Database) 
Imports 2018 of poppy seeds 
$226M 






















Hungary Poland France 
4.28% 
Spain Austria Germany 
2.22% 




Import of opium sap in 2018 
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Export of opium sap in 2018 
Import opium alkaloids 2018 
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Appendix 
Export opium alkaloids in 2018 
8IP FYQPSUFE PQJVN  BMLBMPJET JO 
2018 )4 2939.11 
Extraction and manufacture of opium alkaloids and others between 2014-2018 by type 
worldwide 
Source: Statista from INCB 
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Source: Statista from INCB 
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Appendix 
Comtrade UN database import-export opium sap and alkaloids in   2018 (exhaustive list of 








Source: https://comtrade.un.org/ (data cleaned and highlighted by me) 
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Appendix 
Appendix 17. Scarcity vs Abundance 
Source : https://transportgeography.org/ 
Appendix 18. Opioid Strategy 
Source: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/opioid-crisis/the-strategy.html 
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Appendix 19. Non-exhaustive list of expert research side-lined 
Source: Julia Buxton. (2006). The political economy of narcotics: Production, consumption 
and global markets. New York: Zed Books, p.121. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 20. Screenshot of Sanofi’s website 
Source: webpage of Global Sanofi accessed December 9th, 2020. 
Appendix 21. Table of human use of opium compared to other opioids 
Source: Breger Bush, S. (2020). Opioid Ontopolitics: Industrial Capitalism, Metabolic Rift, 
and the Power of Things. International Journal of Drug Policy, 82, p.7. 
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